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Abstract 
Secessionism occurs when the boundaries of ethnic groups do not correspond with the 
boundaries of the state and members of the group declare the intent of territorial 
separation. It is paradoxical that the struggle between a secessionist region and the 
state should vary in outcome. While some secessionist regions have successfully 
claimed their independence, others are still fighting for their cause. 
East Timor and Aceh have been long standing secessionist regions. However, only 
East Timor has achieved its goal in declaring an independent state. The success of one 
secessionist region in claiming its independence shows that the state has been less 
effective in maintaining its territorial boundaries in one case than the other case where 
secessionism remains active. This begs the question what determines the state's 
effectiveness in achieving its policy goals? 
This research is a comparative analysis of the Indonesian state's effectiveness in 
achieving its policy goals towards managing secessionism in East Timor and Aceh. 
The type of comparative study is the most similar systems. It is the relationship 
between the secessionist movement and the state where I explore the transformations 
between the two which in turn influences the characteristics of state response to 
secessionism. Based on the theoretical ideas put forward by the state-in-society 
approach, the two cases will be examined in the light of the assumed relationship of 
the independent variable: the coalitions between and among social forces and state 
segments which in turn influence state effectiveness in managing secessionism; and 
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Managing Nationalistic Aspirations in Indonesia 
Introduction 
On 21 May 1998, Soeharto's three-minute speech announcing his resignation brought 
an end to his 32-year-old rule. The situation was beyond the imagination of a 
generation of Indonesians who grew up under the orderliness of the New Order. The 
economy was in tatters and a once silent society was demanding reformasi (reform). 
Inter-ethnic conflict plagued the archipelago. The army, one of the main pillars that 
upheld the regime, had become disoriented and showed a considerable amount of 
restraint amidst strong societal pressures for democratisation. Secessionist movements 
in East Timor, Papua and Aceh re-emerged prompting fears that Indonesia could be 
heading towards the destructive path of 'Balkanisation' . 
Inheriting a state consisting of a multiplicity of cultures with more than one basis of 
differentiation was no easy task. The successors of the colonial state ruled a diverse 
population. The colonially constructed boundaries of the Republic of Indonesia 
brought together 17,500 islands stretching from west to east the distance equivalent to 
London-Baghdad. 2 These islands were home to 300 different ethnic groups speaking 
200 languages. Though nearly 90 per cent of the population is Muslim, the basis of a 
1 The term balkanisation was first used to describe the division of the Balkan Peninsula into smaller 
states in the early twentieth century. Currently, it is referred to break up of a state into smaller political 
units. 
2 Adam Schwarz, A Nation in Waiting Indonesia's Search for Stability, (Singapore: Talisman 
Publishing Ltd., 2004), p. 5-6 
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common religion failed to transcend other cultural boundaries to unify the Muslim 
population. Due to the sensitivity of ethnicity and the fear of state disintegration, the 
post-colonial government has never conducted a popular census on the basis of ethnic 
affiliation. 3 Only rough guesses can be made based on the 1930 census conducted 
during the colonial period. The sensitivity towards the issue is understandable. 
Secessionism is not a unique feature of the present but has challenged the Indonesian 
state throughout the post-colonial period. 
The possibility of secession occurs when `the boundaries of an ethnic group and the 
boundaries of the state do not coincide'4. The ultimate goal of a secessionist group is 
ultimately at odds with the state. With the aim to secede comes the destruction of the 
territorial boundaries of the state it wishes to divorce from. However, it is a paradox 
how the struggle between one secessionist group and its central government vary in 
outcome. While some have successfully achieved their goal of declaring an 
independent state, others continue with their struggle. 
Because there are both failed and successful cases of secession in Indonesia, it 
provides a good case study. Two secessionist movements in Indonesia, namely East 
Timor and Aceh have been long standing movements since the late 1960s. Under the 
rule of the New Order, these secessionist movements were suppressed by military 
means. It was after the downfall of Soeharto and the New Order that East Timor 
became the only successful movement, declaring its independence. It is now known as 
Timor Leste. On the other hand, Aceh still remains a part of the Republic of Indonesia 
3 Leo Suryadinata, Elections and Politics in Indonesia, (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian 
Studies, 2002), p. 2 
4 Don Maclver (eds), The Politics of Multinational States, (Hampshire: Macmillan, 1999), p. 1 
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and their fight for independence continues. This study aims to explain the 
effectiveness of the state in managing secessionism. 
East Timor's territorial status is a contentious issue. East Timor was a former 
Portuguese colony and annexed by Indonesia in 1975. Though under Indonesian 
control between 1975 and 1999, the UN had recognised East Timor as a non-self- 
governing territory, administered by Portugal. 5 From 1982, at the request of the 
General Assembly, successive Secretaries-General held regular talks with Indonesia 
and Portugal aimed at resolving the status of the territory. 
6 However though East 
Timor's status as a disputed territory remained; the reality of the situation was that its 
people were fighting for independence from the de facto control of the Indonesian 
state. The struggle for statehood against the Indonesian state cannot be regarded as 
any less real regardless of the territorial status of East Timor or the legality of 
Indonesian state's rule over the half island. I address the process of the 1975 
annexation in more detail in Chapter Four. 
Though the legality of the East Timor's territorial status remained disputed, I use the 
term secessionism to describe East Timor struggles to free itself from the control of 
the Indonesian state. Similar comparative studies on the cases of Aceh, East Timor 
and West Papua that have been conducted by Edward Aspinall and Mark T. Berger 
have also used the term secessionist to describe the three movements. 7 
5 United Nations, `Trust and Non-self-governing territories', 
http: //www. un. org/Depts/dpi/decolonization/trust2. htm#2, accessed 6 May 2007 
6 United Nations, `United Nations Mission of Support in East Timor - Background', 
http: //www. un. org/Depts/dpko/dpko/co_mission/background. html, accessed 6 May 2007 
Edward Aspinall and Mark T. Berger, `The break-up of Indonesia? Nationalisms after Decolonization 
and the limits of the nation-state in post-cold war Southeast Asia', Third World Quarterly, Vol. 22, 
No. 6, December 2001 
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Defining `secessionism' is problematic and contested. However among the many 
definitions of secession, there is a common understanding that the term is intertwined 
with territory. Often the term secessionism is used as an umbrella term to refer to a 
group that aims for an independent state whether it be an immediate or a temporary 
form of self-government while still respecting the boundaries of the existing state. 
Scholars such as Alexis Heraclides uses secessionism to refer to `an abrupt unilateral 
move to independence on the part of the region that is a metropolitan territory of a 
sovereign state's. Though he clearly states at the beginning that a secessionist group's 
ultimate aim is independence he continues to make the distinction between secession 
stricto sensu and incremental secessionism that differs in terms of its aims and 
formality of such aims. Secession stricto sensu is defined as `a formal act of 
declaration of independence on the part of the region in question while incremental 
secession is still in `process' and has no formal declaration that may aim for a 
separate state or a form of self-rule still respecting the boundaries of the state. He also 
stresses the importance of using the term secessionism to refer to a group that only 
`poses a credible threat to the centre' whether it aims for independence or self- 
government9. A secessionist group that does not pose a credible threat as such should 
be referred to as a secession front. Likewise, Ralph R. Premdas also notes the two 
alternatives of immediate outright divorce from the existing state and internal self- 
government; however, he does not make a clear distinction between the two. 
' 0 
Incorporating the acts of groups that are calling for independence with those aiming 
for a deal that falls short of sovereignty under the term secession can be potentially 
8 Alexis Heraclides, The Self-Determination of Minorities in International Politics, (London: Frank 
Cass, 1991), p. l 
9 Ibid, p. 1-2 
10 Ralph R. Premdas, S. W. R. de A. Samarasinghe and Alan B. Anderson (eds. ), Secessionist 
Movements in Perspective, (London: Pinter, 1990), p. 12-16 
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confusing while failing to acknowledge the differences in characteristics, goals and 
aims of both. While both are considered to have the characteristics of an ethnic 
conflict and are interlinked with territory, the acts of separatism and secessionism are 
directed at different goals. " Some scholars clearly recognise the difference of the 
terms separatism and secessionism. Horowitz utilises separatism as an umbrella term 
to refer to ethnic demands for a separate state as well as power sharing arrangements 
such as autonomy. 12 Likewise, Maclver takes a clear view that secession `occurs when 
a territory and its people break away from a state and establish a new politically 
independent society with a government of its own and claim statehood' 13. However, 
he makes use of the term `separatism' in a generic sense that refers to `ethno- 
nationalist movements' that vary in terms of their demands from the state that 
includes calls for self-government. The two territories in question, East Timor and 
Aceh both struggled to claim statehood from the Indonesian state. Though political 
and normative meanings attach to various concepts surrounding the field of ethnic 
based conflicts, by using the term secessionism I am not taking a normative view on 
the territorial status of Indonesia or East Timor. The aim of this study is to contribute 
to the field of ethnic conflicts and not theories of secession which are based on 
normative debates on whether a territory should have the right to claim statehood. I 
have selected the term secession due to the nature of the research that aims study the 
struggles and interactions between two groups of people that seek to claim statehood. 
I have discounted other concepts surrounding the field of ethnic conflicts such as 
separatism, ethnicity and nationalism which lack clarity given the nature and aims of 
this study. However, in the following sections I consider them as alternative terms. 
11 Donald L. Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict, (London: University of California Press, 1985), p. 
230-1 
12 Ibid, p. 231 
13 Maelver (ed. ), The Politics of Multinational States, p. 17-23 
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Separatism and Ethnicity 
The concept of secessionism and separatism are often used interchangeable. However, 
the term separatism is too broad to be used as a key term in this study. Separatism is 
an umbrella term that refers to `ethno-nationalist movements' that vary in terms of 
their demands from the state that includes calls for self-government. 14 Separatism can 
range from cultural separatism to territorial separatism. As such, separatism becomes 
unsuitable for the more specific aims of GAM and Fretilin which aim to seek 
independence. 
Other definitions such as ethnicity are also inappropriate for this study. The definition 
of ethnic group and ethnicity becomes clearer when compared to nation. Attempts to 
distinguish the differences between `ethnic group' and `nation' have been made but 
often lead to further confusion. James G. Kellas notes that an ethnic group is different 
from a nation as `they are usually smaller; they are clearly based on common 
ancestry; and they are more pervasive in human history, while nations are perhaps 
more specific to time and place' 15. Though Kellas did not make a clear-cut 
generalization, using size as a criterion to differentiate ethnic group from nation can 
be misleading. If the Han Chinese were considered as an ethnic group, we would find 
that the Han Chinese population of 1,040 million people would far exceed those many 
nation-states such as Barbados (pop. 255,000) or even Slovenia (pop. 1,940,000). 
16 
Using common ancestry is not always helpful as nationalisms (the ideology of the 
14 Ibid, p. 17-23 
15 James G. Kellas, The Politics of Nationalism and Ethnicity, (London: Macmillan, 1991), p. 4 
16 Steve Fenton and Stephen May (eds. ), Ethnonational Identities, (Basingstoke: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 
2002), p. 1 
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nation) can be categorized into civic or territorial nationalisms that are associated with 
heterogeneity or boundaries of the state; and ethnic nationalisms that coincide with a 
particular ethnic group. 17 Finally, differentiating ethnic group and nation by noting 
that an ethnic group is generally more persistent, more or less highlights the debates 
between the primordialists on one hand, and those who argue for the fluidity of 
ethnicity and nationalism on the other, rather than identifying the differences between 
an ethnic group and nation per se. The primordialists would maintain that the origins 
of an ethnic group and nation are natural and fixed while the modernists would agree 
that both categories are socially constructed or invented in a particular context. 
Distinguishing the two concepts, ethnic group and nation, is no easy task as both share 
a number of characteristics. Both are collectivities whose members presume a 
particular identity and draw boundaries vis-ä-vis `the other'. Both are often viewed as 
political acts. On the other hand, though both concepts may overlap in many ways, the 
boundaries of a `nation' and `ethnic group' become clearer once the nation is referred 
to in respect of its relationship with the state. As Eriksen notes: `A nationalist holds 
that political boundaries should be coterminous with cultural boundaries, whereas an 
ethnic group do not demand command over the state. When the political leaders of an 
ethnic movement make demands to this effect, the ethnic movement therefore by 
definition becomes a nationalist movement' 18. Horowitz notes that the demands for a 
separate state or secession partakes many characteristic of an ethnic conflict. 19 
However, Eriksen continues to note that this can also be problematic when the 
objectives of a collectivity are not unified. When some may demand full 
17 See Anthony D. Smith, National Identity, (London: Penguin, 1991), p. 82 
18 Thomas Hylland Eriksen, Ethnicity and Nationalism Anthropologist Perspectives, (London: Pluto 
Press, 1993), p. 6 
19 Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict, p. 230 
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independence, others may be content with something less. As such, the distinction 
between nation and ethnic group become blurred. 20 
As such, ethnicity is a political construction of an ethnic group which does not 
necessarily mobilise its population or seek independence over a certain territory. In 
this respect, ethnicity shares similarities with the concept of separatism. 
Nationalism 
The act of claiming a separate state is based on nationalism. Despite claims made by 
the modernists that nationalism will soon die down along with the process of 
modernisation, it has continued to disrupt and have profound effects on security. 
Surprisingly, nationalism was adopted as a topic of academic interest with the upsurge 
of anti-colonial movements in the 1960s. 21 Contemporary debates began searching for 
explanations as to the origins, causes and types yet there is very little consensus on 
these issues as well as defining the boundaries of the concept itself. In fact, defining 
nationalism is difficult. Difficult because the term is used to cover an array of social 
phenomena that widely differ in terms of objectives and characteristics. Hence, like 
many other concepts, nationalism cannot be reduced to a single meaning. 
Many scholars including John Breuilly propose categorising the various types of 
nationalisms. On the other hand, Umut Ozkirimli adopts an umbrella definition. He 
notes that there cannot be `one nationalism' but many as different members of the 
20 Eriksen, Ethnicity and Nationalism Anthropologist Perspectives, p. 119 
21 John Hutchinson and Anthony D. Smith (eds. ) Nationalism, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1994), p. 3 
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nation construct different concepts of the nation. Hence, there can only be discourses 
of nationalism, consequently, giving three common dominators among nationalist 
discourses. 22 In this respect, it would also be impossible to come up with a single 
grand theory to explain the many types of nationalisms. Though these issues are still 
contested, it should be noted that it has been widely accepted, with the exception of 
the ethno-symbolists23 and the primodialists24, that nationalism is a modern 
phenomenon with its roots in the process of modernisation. 
Is this to give up any attempt to build on any theoretical explanations of nationalism 
and its causes? Instead, Craig Calhoun approaches the study of nationalism with a 
number of theories to study the various aspects of nationalism. As he notes: 
Nationalism is a rhetoric for speaking about too many different things for 
a single theory to explain it- let alone to explain each of those different 
movements, cultural movements, state policies or other projects shaped 
in part by the rhetoric of nationalism. This does not mean that theory is 
not needed, but rather that grasping nationalism in its multiplicity of 
forms requires multiple theories. 25 
Calhoun makes a useful starting point for approaching nationalism. However, to go 
through the exhaustive list of the various types of nationalisms and theories put 
forward by the many scholars in the field is beyond the scope of this study. Rather, 
this study will adopt Ernest Gellner's definition of nationalism: `Nationalism is 
22 Umut Ozkirimli, Theories of Nationalism: a critical introduction, (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2000), 
p 228-230 
23 For example, Anthony D. Smith 
24 For example, Clifford Geertz and Edward Shils 
25 Craig Calhoun, Nationalism, (Buckingham: Open University Press, 1997), p. 8 
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primarily a political principle, which holds that the political and the national unit 
should congruent'26. This appropriately fits the types of nationalisms discussed in this 
study. It is what should constitute the boundaries of the `national' that has led to 
contentions between the government and the secessionist movements in Indonesia. 
The government holds that the national should include all within the boundaries of the 
former Dutch Indies. This is consistent with Anthony D. Smith's definition of 
territorial nationalism which he equates with post-independent movements that seek 
to integrate a population of diverse ethnic groups of a former colony. 27 On the other 
hand, secessionism would fit the definition of ethnic nationalisms that coincide with 
an ethnic group. Hence, a part of the problem is the different constructions of the 
`national' of the respective agents which has introduced the contention between the 
government and the respective secessionist movements. 
This tells us that nationalism in this respect is a subjectively constructed principle. 
However, though nationalism is a modern phenomenon, the ideas of the nation are 
often not as new as the concept itself. 28 Nationalism is commonly constructed on 
claims of ancestral territories, ancient language, religion, myth or a recent common 
past. 29 It is common that the nation should draw on ethnic elements yet the nation 
does not necessarily have to coincide with an ethnic group as noted earlier. If 
conceptions of the nation are constructed, the members of the nation may give a faint 
or hazy picture of the constructions of the nation and even national identity. However, 
some form of togetherness still exists. As Smith quite rightly notes: `National identity 
26 Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism, (Oxford: Blackwell, 1983), p. 1 27 Smith, National Identity, p. 82 
28 Calhoun, Nationalism, p. 29 
29 Eriksen, Ethnicity and Nationalism, p 67-75 
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involves some sense of political community however tenuous'30. This has led some 
modernists such as Gellner and Hobsbawm to make claims that constructions of the 
nation are fabricated or artificial. However, this has been disputed by Anderson who 
claims that `imagining' or constructing nationalism does not necessarily imply that it 
is any less real . 
31 As Anderson notes `... over the past two centuries, for so many 
millions of people, not so much to kill, as willingly to die for such limited 
imaginings' 32. 
It also should be noted that having a faint idea of the conceptions of the nation and 
having different conceptions of national identity does not correlate with the intensity 
of the nationalist movement. As Vernon Hewitt argues on-going conflict in Kashmir 
is not simply a matter of India and Pakistan making claims over the region `but the 
overwhelming difficulty of defining a stable Kashmiri identity, either within India and 
Pakistan, or within any future independent sovereign state'33. Many such as Anderson 
and Gellner hold that language is often constructed as an element of a nation. 
However, often those who claim their identity within a particular nation may not even 
speak the language. National identity becomes important when it seems under threat 
due to the processes of modernization such as migration, economic change34 or worse, 
violence and injustice. Yet, the process of constructing or re-producing the nation will 
remain. As Siegel rightly notes: ... `to feel propelled out of an original situation and 
to find a resolution to that effects of that push that confers a certain identity. '35 
30 Smith, National Identity, p. 9 
31 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and the spread of 
Nationalism revised edition, (London: Verso, 1991) 
32 Ibid, p. 7 
33 Vernon Hewitt, `An Area of Darkness, Still? The Political Evolution of Ethnic Identities in Jammu 
and Kashmir, 1947-2001' in Fenton and May (eds. ), Ethnonational Identities, p. 129 
34 Eriksen, Ethnicity and Nationalism, p. 68 
35 Siegel, The Rope of God, p. 366 
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Nationalism is an ideology which believes that the boundaries of the nation should 
coincide with the boundaries of the state. 36 Though the basis of the struggles of the 
East Timorese and the Acehnese are nationalistic, the aim of this study is not so much 
concerned with the constructions of contesting nationalisms but rather the act and 
struggles of claiming statehood and the containment of these struggles by the state. 
Nationalism is an important background term but it has relatively little purchase on 
the mechanisms used for managing the territorial integrity of the state. East Timor 
gained in its independence after the downfall of Soeharto. In Aceh, there has been a 
departure from the sole use of military means to suppress secessionism used during 
the New Order. Under the post-Soeharto governments, the centre has responded to 
secessionism with a mixture of concessions and military operations. After years of 
mixed policies from the Indonesian government, both sides have finally agreed to a 
peace settlement which includes the offer of self-government and local elections. The 
different outcomes in the two secessionist regions of East Timor and Aceh beg the 
following question: what determines the state's effectiveness in managing 
secessionism? 
The state-in-society approach holds that the interactions between the state and societal 
forces shape state effectiveness to carry out its goals in managing ethnic relations. 
Furthermore, the state is not autonomous from external pressure. It is these two forces 
that determine the state's effectiveness to act. It is based on these assumptions that I 
form the central hypothesis of this study: where social control by the state is high and 
36 Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism, (Oxford: Blackwell, 1983), p. 1 
12 
there is an absence of external pressure to support the secessionist movement, the 
state will have more manoeuvrability to achieve its goals, or in other words, maintain 
the boundaries of the state regardless of how it wants to achieve this goal. 
Hence, I propose to examine the characteristics of state response to secessionism 
through the interactions of the three clusters of power: society, the state and external 
pressure. More specifically, I will examine the changes in the independent variables: 
the relative strength of the secessionist movement and external pressure which in turn 
affects state effectiveness to achieve its goals. The success or failure of the state to 
maintain the boundaries the state are the central dependent variables. 
I will examine the cases of East Timor and Aceh which have been long-standing 
secessionist movements in Indonesia. However though East Timor is now currently 
known as Timor Leste, I will continue to use the term `East Timor' as it was known 
while it was fighting for independence and for the sake of consistency. There have 
been secessionist movements emerging in other regions such as Riau. However, these 
movements were often short-lived and never gained much support from the 
population they claimed to represent. Though ethnic identity is fluid and `changes 
intensity over time'37, these cases are deemed unsuitable for this study because they 
lack unclear support and demands for a separate state. It is also for this reason I do not 
include the case of Papua, which at the start of this project, did not have substantial 
support for independence. The two secessionist regions also differ from other regions 
such as Ambon where ethnic discontent is not aimed at the government but 
channelled towards another ethnic group. 
37 Bjorn Hettne, `Ethnicity and Development-an elusive relationship', Contemporary South Asia, Vol. 
2, No. 2,1993, p. 125 
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In the following sections of this chapter, I will first locate the problem within the 
discipline. Then, I will explain why the state-in-society approach is a useful analytical 
tool to explore centre-regional relations. Thereafter, I will examine the existing 
literature on Indonesia in general and how this study contributes to the existing 
literature. 
Locating the Problem in the Discipline 
Secessionism has posed a problem to the Indonesian state since independence. 
However, only one territory, East Timor, has achieved its goal of declaring an 
independent state. Aceh had been fighting for independence until the Free Aceh 
Movement (GAM) had reached a peace agreement with the government after the 
tsunami devastated much of the region. The success of one secessionist movement in 
declaring an independent state shows that the state has been less effective in 
maintaining its territorial boundaries in comparison to the Aceh as well as other cases 
that are fighting for independence. This begs the question what determines state 
effectiveness in achieving its goals? 
Models of secession are abundant and have been used to explain center-regional 
relations. Eric Eugene Morris' PhD on center-regional relations in Indonesia focusing 
on uses the reactive system model to explain `the emergence or absence of a 
subsystem solidarity in opposition to the policies of the encompassing the center'38. 
The theoretical model used in Morris' PhD is perhaps suited for his research question: 
38 Eric Eugene Morris, Islam and Politics in Aceh: A Study of Centre-Periphery Relations in Indonesia, 
Thesis submitted to Cornell University, 1983, p. 9 
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`why do the Acehnese act the way they did in the context of the Indonesian state? '39 
Though the topic of inquiry in my own thesis is the struggle between secessionist 
movements and the state, the models of secession used by Morris are unsuited for the 
research question posed in this thesis. 
The literature on secessionism is heavily influenced by the literature on ethnicity and 
nationalism. This includes scholars who can be characterised as primodialists, ethno- 
symbolists and modernists. All engage in the question of what causes ethnicity and 
nationalism to emerge. Whereas models of secession are focussed on explaining 
causality of secessionism, it is modernist theories exploring the complexities of 
ethnicity and nationalism which have claimed dominance in the field. In general, 
models of ethnic mobilisation towards the centre are premised on the idea that nations 
and nationalisms are a product of the onset of modernity and are produced by modern 
forces such as capitalism, industrialisation, and the bureaucratic state. 40 To believe 
that nationalisms never occurred in the pre-modern era ultimately meant modernists 
would agree that `nationalisms come before nations'41. 
Among other contending models of ethnic conflict, theorists have also sought to 
underpin the causality of ethnic conflict with class analysis. Class analysis is a 
popular explanation for the root cause of secessionism and the issues of class and 
ethnicity have been subject to debates. 
Class can be used to offer explanations of structural change. Linking the conception 
39 Ibid, p. 2 
40 Anthony D. Smith, Nations and Nationalisms in a Global Era, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995), p. 
89 
41 Eric Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality, (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1990), p. 10 
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of class and ethnicity would examine how one ethnic group is subordinate to the 
other, and the competition between the subordinate and the superordinate for power in 
the economy and the polity determines the redistribution of resources. Horowitz's 
comparative model of ranked and unranked groups captures these elements of class 
exceptionally well. 42 Unranked groups transpire when boundaries of an ethnic group 
transcends class. Consequently, conflicts between groups take form of what Horowitz 
labels the politics of inclusion and exclusion. When class and the boundaries of an 
ethnic group overlap, it is possible to refer to this hierarchal ranking as ranked groups. 
Here, one ethnic group is subordinate to another. Within the context where class and 
ethnicity coincide, social revolution can potentially break out when the subordinate 
group competes for power and resources. 
Similarly, Michael Hechter's model of `internal colonialism' incorporates a neo- 
marxist point of view and makes an impact on the field of nationalism. 43 Hechter's 
internal colonialism has focussed on the importance of economic factors to the 
emergence of nationalism. He argues that the centre exploits the periphery which 
causes the periphery to mobilise against the centre. This model assumes that the 
unevenness of development creates a gap between the advanced and less advanced 
groups. The advanced group then allocates high-ranking positions to members within 
its own group. It is the sense of deprivation that ignites a sense of nationalism 
whereby the less advanced group demands a separatist state. 44 
The idea of secession is in line with the idea of class that stresses the importance of 
42 See Donald L. Horowitz, `The Three Dimensions of Ethnic Politics', World Politics, Vol. 23, No. 2, 
January 1971; and Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict, p. 21-32 
43 Michael Hechter, Internal colonialism: the Celtic fringe in British national development, 1536-1966, 
(London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1975) 
44 Ibid, p. 9 
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domination and subordination as well as the redistribution of resources and power. As 
the Javanese constitute almost half of the Indonesian population and during the 1970s 
and 1980s held key positions in the military and the bureaucracy, leaders of the 
secessionist movements such as GAM often cite Javanese dominance and colonialism 
in their cause for independence. However, equating a secessionist movement with a 
particular class is problematic. Firstly, unlike class, secessionist regions are rarely 
uniform in their interests and their goals. Though class interests can be redefined to 
incorporate the interests of the subordinate class interests, groups within one 
secessionist region differ fundamentally in terms of goals ranging from territorial 
separation to status quo. Thirdly, not all secession regions are entirely subordinate to 
the centre especially Aceh which is internally stratified. Unlike East Timor and Papua, 
Acehnese elites are represented at the centre. For example, prominent Acehnese 
academic Sjamsuddin Nazaruddin currently holds the position of the head of the 
National Election Commission (KPU). Furthermore, goals are not identifiable with a 
particular class. While some Acehnese elites of the entrepreneurial class have aligned 
themselves with the centre, others have joined the secessionist movement, 
consequently, cutting across class boundaries. Finally, class analysis does not capture 
the dynamics, fluidity and popular support for independence. Though secessionist 
movements have erupted because ethnic groups are excluded from economic and 
political gains within the state, other factors such as the brutality of the military have 
also played a factor in increased popular support. Aceh, East Timor and Papua are 
examples of this. 
This is not to deny the importance of economic factors in ethnic conflicts. However, 
such explanations should not be given overall prominence. Economic deprivation is 
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an important causal factor for an ethnic groups to mobilise against another group or 
the centre, though is not sufficient. The close association between modernity and 
nationalism has been noted in the literature, though the nature of this connection has 
been subject to debate. 45 Ethnic discontent has emerged due to economic deprivation 
or lack of social mobility in the modern state. However, overemphasising economic 
grievances would attract criticisms of being reductionist. Though, his study is 
confined to the period between 1950-1958, Hans O. Schmitt has attributed the source 
of ethnic conflict to the unevenness of development between Java and the Outer 
Islands. 46 It might also be argued that the logic underlying the autonomy package first 
offered in 1999 reflected the idea among policy-makers in Jakarta that there was a 
strong correlation between the centralised system and economic disparity on one 
hand, and ethnic discontent on the other. 
Though policy-makers and academics have highlighted economic factors as a 
prominent cause of ethnic mobilisation against the centre explaining the problem in 
terms of class interests can be problematic. Such explanations have reduced the 
emergence of ethnic mobilisation to purely economic inequalities which fail to 
account for other rich regions that have not mobilised against the centre. As one 
economist has wryly observed that if Indonesia were to disintegrate, there would be 
`four oil-rich Bruneis', `a dozen or so Bangladeshes' and rest would just manage to 
get by. 47 Though Aceh and Papua are classified as Bruneis, this does not explain why 
the other two Bruneis have not mobilised against Jakarta. This also fails to explain 
45 Partha Chatterjee, The Nation and Its Fragments: colonial and postcolonial histories, (Princeton, 
New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 1993), p. 5-13 
46 See Hans 0. Schmitt, `Foreign Capital and Social Conflict in Indonesia 1950-1958', Economic 
Development and Cultural Change 10, no. 3, April 1962 
47 Harold Crouch, `The Key Determinants of Indonesia's Political Future', Trends in Southeast Asia 
August 2002, (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2001), p. 3 
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why East Timor, which has been excluded from the list of the rich regions, has 
engaged in a long fight for independence until it gained its independence. 
The main purpose of theories of nationalism with Marxist elements or class analysis is 
to explain why nations and nationalisms emerge. Consequently, they do not give an 
explanation to why states respond differently to secessionism. Neither do they give 
any useful insights as to state effectiveness in achieving their goals towards 
secessionist movements. At most, it is based on these explanations that theories of 
ethnic conflict management attempt to suggest a possible fix to the situation, for 
example, autonomy, consociationalism, or federalism. However, there is a possibility 
that the state may not remedy the situation by accommodating nationalist sentiment. 
Instead, the state may opt to suppress ethnic conflict through military means. As such, 
these theories fail to capture the dynamics beyond the emergence of nationalism. 
They fail to explain why some secessionist movements have seceded while others 
have failed. Or explain why in some cases the implementation of autonomy has 
lessened ethnic discontent while in other cases autonomy have failed to make a 
positive impact on the conflict. 
Secession is about a national movement that struggles with the existing to state to 
form a state of its own. At the very least, it is about the struggle to redefine the 
distribution of power within the state. With success, the struggle redefines the 
boundaries of state. However, when ethnic conflicts become explosive and threaten 
stability, the international community may intervene on humanitarian grounds; 
hereby, limiting the state's autonomy to carry out policies to manage ethnic relations. 
As such, the study of secession is situated where domestic politics meet international 
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relations. 8 
However, there is a lack of convergence between the two disciplines on the theoretical 
level. Issues surrounding ethnic politics involve debates in the areas of nationalism 
and power-sharing arrangements to lessen ethnic grievances. Both are confined to 
centre-regional relations. Theories of nationalism explore the causal factors of ethnic 
mobilisation. Studies of ethnic conflict management explore mechanisms such as 
federalism and autonomy which provide possible solutions to ethnic grievances. 
Scholars of the field of international relations have argued that the term `international 
relations' no longer suits or defines the expanding scope of the study which has 
formerly centred around the state as the main unit of analysis; consequently, arguing 
for the term to be replaced with `global politics'. 49 Though recent development of the 
field has expanded, incorporating non-state actors, no theory of international relations 
provides an insight as to what inhibits and enhances the success of secession at the 
international level. 
Do theories of secession have any useful implications for the interplay between 
secessionist movement and the state? Theories of secession are formulated around the 
normative issue of whether a right to secede exists and under what condition. 
Margaret Moore's edited volume discusses the issue of self-determination from two 
perspectives: from the claims of normative theorists of secession and from the 
48 Donald L. Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict, (Berkeley and London: University of California 
Press, 1985), p. 230 
49 Scott Burchill, Richard Devetak, Andrew Linklater, Matthew Paterson, Christain Reus-Smit and 
Jacqui True, Theories of International Relations 2`1 Edition, (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2001), p. 9 
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perspective of nationalists. 50 It is the relationship between liberalism and nationalism 
that underlies the philosophical debates of whether a nation should have the right to 
form its own state and under what conditions may this permission be made. 5 
Similarly, Percy B. Lehning's Theories of Secession examines the issue of secession 
using existing western political theories. 
However, there is a significant gap between what ought to be and reality. Political 
theorists have generally allowed more leeway for secession, more than are allowed by 
states and international norms. 52 In other words, normative political theories do not 
recognise the constraints that have a bearing on the right to secede or the international 
legal right. As Allen Buchanan argues political theories lack an institutional 
dimension. 53 His concern is developing a just international legal framework. Still, this 
innovation does not address the issues of what enhances or limits the success of 
secession. 
Why State-in-Society Approach? 
So far I have established that theories of ethnicity and nationalism are unsuitable for 
this study because the majority of these theories aim to explain causality of the 
emergence of nationalism as opposed to the on-going dynamics between the state and 
the secessionist group in question. Secessionism is a study of where domestic and 
so Margaret Moore (ed. ), National Self-Determination and Secession, (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1998) 
51 Ibid, p. 2 
52 Percy B. Lehning (ed. ), Theories of Secession, (London: Rouledge, 1998), p. 27 
53 Allen Buchanan's arguments have appeared in a number of edited volumes including `The 
international institutional dimension of secession' in Lehning (ed. ), Theories of Secession; and 
`Democracy and Secession' in Moore (ed. ), National Self-Determination and Secession. His argument 
can also be found in his work, Secession: The Morality of Political Divorce from Fort Sumter to 
Lithuania and Quebec (Boulder, Colorado: Westview, 1991) 
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international politics become entangled. It also needs to acknowledge that both the 
state and the secessionist possess the ability to act, though their capabilities may vary 
in achieving their goals. In the section above, I have illustrated how existing theories 
of international relations, secessionism, ethnicity, and nationalism often fail to 
incorporate the three levels of analysis. Because this study poses the question: what 
determines state effectiveness in managing secessionism and for the reasons above, I 
will explore the main schools of state theory that acknowledge the capability of 
secessionist movement and the state. 
Elitism is premised on thought that the characteristics of society are shaped or 
determined by its elites. Thus, the assumptions of elitism challenge the core beliefs of 
liberalism and the relationship between the state and society premised on western 
liberal thought; and reject Marxian assumptions that the state is an instrument of the 
working class. 54 The nature of Indonesia's institutions such as Golkar during the New 
Order (which will be later discussed in Chapter Three) does echo elements of 
corporatism, a strand of modern elitism. Corporatism occurs when the interests of the 
state and private interests converge. However, though elites in many non-western 
regimes as well as Indonesia under Soeharto come close to the elitist model, the 
model does not acknowledge the ability of society to carry out its actions especially 
secessionist movements of this study which were not incorporated within institutions 
of the Indonesian state. Rather, these movements formed a group independent of the 
state in order to challenge state policies and the territorial boundaries of the state. 
Likewise, statist or state-centric approaches which argue for the autonomy of the state 
also run into the same problems of neglecting the capability of society to carry out its 
54 Mark Evans, `Elitism', in David Marsh and Gerry Stoker (eds. ), Theory and Methods in Political 
Science, (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1995), p. 228 
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actions. 55 
On the opposite side of the spectrum, Marxism views the state as a tool of society. 
The dynamics between society and the state are determined by economic power 
relations and are played out during two junctures: the first being between the feudal 
lords and capitalist bourgeoisie that is followed by the bourgeoisie and proletariat. 
The state takes on the role as a regulator of class conflicts and accumulates capital. By 
regulating class conflict the state is an arena where class conflicts occur, thus, 
reducing the state as a passive actor of the dominant classes. 56 Consequently, 
conventional Marxism does not fully acknowledge the capacity of the state to act. 
Furthermore, elements of class conflict and economic determinism are found in 
theories of ethnicity and nationalism which can be found in the works of Nairn and 
Hecter. Earlier, I have devoted attention to these theories which only partially explain 
the root grievances of ethnic groups. Economic deprivation though crucial cannot be 
taken as a sufficient explanation for ethnic grievances. Furthermore as the main 
purpose of these theories is to explain causality of the emergence of nationalism, these 
theories do not give an explanation to why states respond differently to secessionism. 
Thus, such explanations fail to capture the on-going dynamics between the state and 
secessionist movements in question; consequently, are deemed unsuitable for this 
study. 
Finally, the pluralists argue that no group can dominant society. The state poses the 
55 See Peter B. Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer and Theda Skocpol (eds. ), Bringing the State Back In, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985) 
56 Michael Mann, The Sources of Social Power Volume 11 the rise of classes and nation-states, 1760- 
1914, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), p. 45 
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role of a regulator of conflicts within society as opposed to being a dominant actor 
with aims to carry out its aims and interests . 
5' Both society and the state are perceived 
as fragmented. This fragmented society possesses different resources in order to carry 
out its different interests. Pluralist theories recognises diversity in society as well as 
institutional and ideological practices. 58 However, it has often been the case that the 
state can carry out its initiatives that fail to reflect societal demands. 59 As a 
consequence, pluralism refuses to recognise the autonomy or relative autonomy of the 
state to carry out its own initiatives. Power lies within society where it is diverse, 
comprising of varied interests possessing the power to influence or control the state. 
As Michael Mann rightly notes, the state becomes an arena and not an actor in its own 
right. 60 
On the other hand, the general literature surrounding the issue of state capability to 
carry out actions in developing countries are premised on the concept of the `weak 
state'. Weak state analyses generally exemplify a state that is on the verge of 
becoming a failed state and is more or less dependent on foreign intervention. This 
characterisation has very few implications for Indonesia. 
Weak state analyses are mostly associated with Barry Buzan's influential study, 
People, States and Fear. The weak state refers to a state that lacks the legitimacy in 
the western liberal sense in two fundamental aspects: the idea of the state and the 
institutions. When the state has failed to create an atmosphere of social and political 
57 Martin Smith `Pluralism', in David Marsh and Gerry Stoker (eds. ), Theory and Methods in Political 
Science, (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1995), p. 211 
58 Patrick Dunleavy and Brendan O'Leary, Theories of the State the politics of liberal democracy, 
(Basingstoke: Macmillan Education, 1987), p. 13 
59 Evans, Rueschemeyer and Skocpol (eds. ), Bringing the State Back In, p. 4 
60 Mann, The Sources of Social Power Volume II the rise of classes and nation-states, 1760-1914, p. 47 
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cohesiveness, the state's main security concerns are domestic. Buzan also 
differentiates weak and strong states with weak and strong powers which refers to a 
state's military and economic capability in relation to one another. 61 
The arguments are convincing. What is commonly shared amongst former colonies is 
the construction of the state that preceded the construction of the nation, hereby, 
making `the idea of the state' weak. At the time of emotionally charged nationalism 
that drove out the western colonialists, the leaders of the newly independent states 
enjoyed the support of the people. However, this source of legitimacy did wear down. 
Various regions in Indonesia supported the nationalist movement against the Dutch; 
even the Acehnese played a strong role and supported the movement financially. The 
unity of the nation continued after the Dutch left as the majority of Indonesians were 
united against wiping out the Dutch imposed federal system. 62 The hostile reaction 
was not against the political system as such but against the 'alien-imposed '63 one. 
However, a hostile reaction to the Dutch was not the only reason why the diverse 
nation came together. As Michael Leifer notes: `... Indonesian nationalism developed 
not only in a characteristically negative reaction to the colonial rule but also a positive 
reaction to the territorial bounds of the colonial state which were assimilated 
wholesale into nationalist claim'64. Yet what initially bound the diverse nation 
61 See Barry Buzan, People, States and Fear, (London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991) 
62 There were some regions they did not join the Unitarian movement. These regions had strong 
attachments to the Dutch such as the South Moluccas. 
63 George McTurnan Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia, (Ithaca, New York: Cornell 
University Press, 1952), p. 452; For a selection of arguments made by regional leaders against the 
Dutch imposed federal structure see Herbert Feith and Lance Castles (eds. ), Indonesian Political 
Thinking 1945-1965, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1970), National Unity and the Ethnic and 
Regional Groups 
64 Michael Leifer, The Changing Temper of Indonesian Nationalism' in Michael Leifer (ed. ), Asian 
Nationalism, (London and New York: Routledge, 2000), p. 158 
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together gradually lost its importance and secessionism in various regions has 
emerged and disappeared and have re-emerged throughout post-colonial history. 
Similarly, the institutions of post-colonial states were weak. Did this lead to social 
and political chaos in Indonesia? Subsequently, was internal security the main 
concern of the state? 
Weak state analysis does represent a state on the brink of disintegrating which may 
depend on foreign intervention to maintain the survival of the state. According to 
Buzan's study, Indonesia does contain the elements of the weak state and internal 
security was its main concern especially during the New Order; however, this has not 
led to a lack of social and political cohesiveness where Indonesia is dependent on 
foreign support. This dependency in turn does not acknowledge state autonomy. 
Consequently, Buzan's analysis has failed to capture the dynamics of the weak state 
where in some situations the state possesses the ability to manage its own internal 
affairs despite the multiplicity of problems that the government is facing. On the other 
hand, in other situations the state may be less effective in carrying out actions. 
Furthermore, weak state theories are deemed unsuitable for this thesis because they 
are state-centric and do not account for the capacity of society to penetrate the state. 
Due to the diversity of states, Muthiah Alagappa notes that the term `weak state' 
portrayed by weak state analysts is `far from the prototypical Third World state 
described by these analysts'65. Furthermore, such studies place emphasis on the state 
while undermining social agency. Categorising states under the `weak' and `strong' 
65 Muthiah Alagappa (ed. ), Asian Security Practice Material and Ideational Influences, (California: 
Stanford University Press, 1998), p. 647-649 
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dichotomy fails to acknowledge that there is a long continuum of states. 66 Placing all 
these states under the same label has failed to take into account the differences 
between all these states as well as the various aspects within a state that may differ in 
terms of strength and weakness. Peter Dauvergne quite rightly argues that states are 
not ideal types and possess elements of strengths and weaknesses that are subject to 
fluctuation over time. 67 
The state-in-society approach offers an alternative explanation to the strengths and 
weaknesses of the developing state or what Migdal terms as domination and change. 68 
The strength or weakness of the state varies according to how the state interacts with 
diverse social groups. The strength of the state is reflective of the state's ability to 
impose policies, rules and norms. On the other hand, a state becomes weak when 
society possesses the ability to push forward its demands which in turn transforms the 
state's policies, rules and norms. 69 
The state-in society approach explores the patterns of domination or `the recurring 
ways in which some may use violence, threats, and other means to make others 
behave in ways they would have not otherwise chosen'70 and the changes in those 
patterns of domination. The state, for state-in society theorists, differs from definitions 
that are closely associated with the Weberian model. For them, the state `is a field of 
66 Christopher Clapham, Africa and the International System The Politics of the State Survival, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 15; and Alagappa (ed. ), Asian Security Practice, p. 
647-648 
67 Peter Dauvergne (ed. ), Weak and Strong States in Asia-Pacific Societies, (Canberra, ACT: Allen & 
Unwin in association with the Department of International Relations, Research School of Pacific and 
Asian Studies, Australian National University, 1998), p. 1-9 
68 My own emphasis. Migdal, State in Society Studying how states and societies transform and 
constitute one another, p. 3 
69 Dauvergne (ed. ), Weak and Strong States in Asia-Pacific Societies, p. 2 
70 Migdal, State in Society Studying how states and societies transform and constitute one another, p. 3 
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power marked by the use and threat of violence and shaped by (1) the image of a 
coherent, controlling organization in a territory, which is a representation of the 
people bounded by that territory, and (2) the actual practices of its multiple parts'71. 
The image of the state is that `of a dominant, integrated, autonomous entity that 
controls, in a given territory, all rule making, either directly through its agencies or 
indirectly by sanctioning other organizations- businesses, families, clubs, and the like- 
to make certain circumscribed rules'72. In turn, this image stimulates the perception 
that the state acts in a uniform manner. However, the actual practices of state agencies 
may be implemented in such a way that fortifies the cohesive image of the state. 
State-in-society assumes that segments of the state can ally with one another as well 
with groups outside official state borders to enhance their capability to achieve their 
goals. As such, the state and society are not necessarily on opposing ends but can 
mutually empower one another. The theoretical ideas brought forward by the state-in- 
society approach not only takes into account the fluidity of the state effectiveness to 
carry out actions but also recognises the secessionist movement as an actor in its own 
right. The main assumption is that states are embedded in their society. 
The state-in-society approach shares similarities with group theory such as the broker 
state model. According to the broker state perspective, public policy is a result of 
pressure groups interacting with the state apparatus. As Patrick Dunleavy and 
Brendan O'Leary sum up: `The broker `state' is not a distinct organisation, easily 
demarcated from society. It is not passive, neutral or indeed a `blackbox'. It consists 
of multiple formal and informal pressure group activities; of coalitions and bargains 
71 Ibid, p. 16 
72 Ibid, p. 16 
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struck, dishonoured and reconstituted; and extends into the interactions which take 
place amidst the equally multiple activities, coalitions and bargains amongst non-state 
pressure groups'73. Though pluralists using the broker state model do not exactly 
follow Migdal's perception of the state with practices that contradicts its image, they 
accept that the state is internally incoherent. Administrations, financial and military 
bureaucracies, or what Migdal would otherwise term as state segments, are 
fragmented and divided. 74 Likewise, the state-in-society approach argues that the state 
is fragmented and its various parts interact and ally with one another as well as social 
organisations to achieve their goals. 75 
What differs from the state-in-society approach is that group theorists such as David 
Truman and Arthur Bentley do not acknowledge that at certain times the state does 
not have its own interests and may posses the autonomy to carry out actions. For 
them, though both prefer the term `government' as opposed to `state', the state is 
viewed as a stage or an arena where organised groups interact with one another. 76 As 
such, the state-in-society approach though bearing considerable resemblance to 
pluralism, also takes into account the arguments of state-centric models which argue 
that the state possess autonomy or relative autonomy to carry out its actions. 
It is the relationship between the state and societal forces that determine the state 
effectiveness to carry out actions. Or more central to this study is the effectiveness of 
the state to fulfill its goals towards a secessionist movement. Hence, I propose to 
73 Dunleavy and O'Leary, Theories of the State the politics of liberal democracy, p. 47 
74 Ibid, p. 52 
75 Migdal, State in Society Studying How State and Societies Transform and Constitution One Another, 
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explore the dynamics of centre-regional relations through the state-in-society 
approach which may reveal some useful insights to the different outcomes of centre- 
regional relations. However, I also propose that an international dimension to the 
framework. These international factors include international organisations such as the 
World Bank and United Nations or other states that may pose to empower or limit the 
state in its policies in managing secessionism. The analytical framework will be 
discussed in detail in the following chapter. 
Harold Crouch has also applied Migdal's theoretical ideas to the Indonesian state in 
Peter Dauvergne's edited volume that specifically looks into Asia Pacific states. 
However though we use the same theory, Crouch's piece and my own thesis differ in 
terms of depth, focus, his contribution to and the application of Migdal's theory. 
Crouch, like the other contributing authors, is concerned with how states interact with 
their societies. He mainly focuses on the characteristics of the state namely its 
strength and weaknesses in relation to its society. He concludes that the dominance of 
the Indonesian state was never brought into question. This was due to the various 
strategies such as the amalgamation of political parties into two opposition parties, the 
military's repressive territorial structure which was complemented with its ideology 
dwifungsi and not to mention the distribution of patronage opportunities. 
77 In other 
words, Crouch looks at the overall relationship between the state and society but does 
not examine the state's capacity to act upon its policy goals. This differs from the 
focus of my own thesis which is more concerned with state effectiveness specifically 
in terms of managing secessionism. I specifically examine social segments with 
nationalistic claims for an independent state, namely East Timor and Aceh, and its 
77 Harold Crouch, ` Indonesia's `Strong' State', Dauvergne (ed. ), Weak and Strong States, p. 100-107 
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interactions between other social segments and the segments within the state in 
relation to these nationalistic claims. 
Contributing to the Existing Literature 
Existing comparative studies on the secessionist movements in Indonesia are rare. 
This is surprising considering the challenge of managing a multiplicity of the ethnic 
groups residing in a group of geographical scattered islands. However, the general 
literature up until the downfall of Soeharto has concentrated on politics at the centre. 
As a result, regional politics have been marginalized. The few existing studies, 
discussed below, are case oriented and debates on ethnic mobilization in Indonesia are 
more concentrated on causal explanations of the emergence of nationalism as opposed 
to the dynamics of center-regional relations. 
The downfall of the New Order and the transformation of the political system brought 
new issues for scholars to grapple with. The messy transition consisted of a 
multiplicity of problems. Rapid democratization, ethnic conflicts and economic 
turmoil ignited a wave of speculation that Indonesia was on the verge of 
Balkanisation. It was due to this revival of ethnic mobilization that, scholars have 
turned their attention to ethnic politics. However though there has been an increased 
scholarly interest in ethnic relations in the post- Soeharto literature, studies have been 
incorporated into more general studies. The few existing studies have been case 
oriented and ethnic relations have been rarely studied comparatively. The aim of this 
study is to contribute to the study of secessionism in Indonesia from the comparative 
perspective and to theoretically explore the dynamic of centre-regional relations. 
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The Dutch upon granting independence to the Dutch East Indies recognized the 
danger of a Javanese (who constitute roughly half of the population) dominated 
state. 78 Subsequently, the Dutch made federalism a condition for independence. A 
great majority of Indonesians were dissatisfied with the foreign imposed institutional 
arrangement as it failed to correspond with ethnic entities. 79 Most importantly, many 
saw federalism as `an instrument of Dutch control and an obstacle of the attainment of 
their independence' 80. Barely seven months later, the federal arrangement came to an 
end. 
The Dutch may have been right in insisting on federalism as preventive measures for 
ethnic divisions. Ironically, five decades on and the Indonesian state is returning to a 
similar political system they were so united against. The Dutch may have been also 
right in their fears that ethnicity could be problematic in post-independent politics yet 
the existing literature on Indonesian society and politics has concentrated on the wider 
picture which has come at the expense of regional politics. As the central government 
began to tighten its rule over the archipelago, written works were predominantly 
occupied with the emergence of the New Order81 and the pillars that upheld the 
regime. There was strong emphasis on factors that brought opposition against the 
regime under control such as the army82 and the state ideology Pancasila83. As 
78 Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution, p. 452 
79 Herbert Feith, The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia, (Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press, 1962), p. 72 
80 Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution, p. 450 
81 Michael Vatikiotis, Indonesian politics under Suharto: the rise and fall of the New Order, (London: 
Routledge, 1998); Also see Schwarz, A Nation in Waiting Indonesia's Search for Stability 
82 For the events leading up to the Soeharto's takeover of power and the army's gradual emergence see 
Harold Crouch, The Army and Politics in Indonesia, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988); for 
subsequent studies in the latter half of the New Order period see Robert Lowry, The Armed Forces of 
Indonesia, (St Leonards, NSW: Allen & Unwin, 1996) 
83 Douglas E. Ramage, Politics in Indonesia: democracy, Islam, and the ideology of tolerance, 
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Soeharto inherited an ailing economy with soaring inflation rates of 600 per cent, 
academics became intrigued and were drawn to the study of Indonesia's miraculous 
growth. 84 Though the rule of Soeharto and his generals remained uncontested, it was 
carelessly overlooked that the central authority could command such control without 
pockets of resistance forming in the periphery. It was the lack of studies of regional 
politics that made Indonesia unprepared and unaware of the explosion of ethnic riots 
at the downfall of the New Order. As Jacques Bertrand quite rightly notes: 
What were missed were the rising signs of "nibbling" at the regime's 
fundamental structure, much in the same way that society nibbled at the former 
communist systems of Eastern Europe and Soviet Union until they collapsed. 
Such nibbling at the edges is rarely studied, partly because it can not only reveal 
deep fissures in a regime or in society but it can also lead to many false 
assessments. Studying non-events or small-scale acts can be a risky venture. 85 
Though regional politics were much over shadowed by the elements of the New 
Order, there are a few existing studies that offer explanations of tensions between 
ethnic groups in Indonesia. The first prominent study on society and groups was 
Clifford Geertz's study, The Religion of Java. Geertz first brought the santri and 
abangan divide within the Muslim population to the forefront of Indonesian society 
and cultural studies. He studied three divisions amongst the Muslim population in 
Java: Priyayi, abangan and santri. 86 However, many Indonesian academics have 
pointed out that Geertz has misunderstood Javanese society. The Priyayi are 
(London: Routledge, 1995) 
84 Richard Robison, Power and Economy in Suharto's Indonesia, (Manila, Philippines: Journal of 
Contemporary Asia Publishers, 1990) 
85 Jacques Bertrand, Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict in Indonesia, (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2003), p. xii 
86 Clifford Geertz, The Religion of Java, (Glencoe: Free Press, 1964) 
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bureaucratic elite. As such, the Priyayi are not a religions group but a social one. 87 
Despite Geertz's misreading, he introduced the abangan and santri divide to the 
discussion of Indonesian society and politics. Though he confines his study to Java, 
the divide may be applied throughout the Muslim population which constitutes nearly 
90 per cent of the entire population. Abangan and santri can be defined in very simple 
terms as liberal and strict Muslims respectively. Due to the uneven penetration of 
Islam in the archipelago, santris dominate the Outer Islands. 88 These are crude 
categorisations which though accepted by a few are also rejected by many as divisions 
have become somewhat blurred over the decades. Leo Suryadinata has acknowledged 
that it is a crude divide, however, he has maintained that the abangan and santri has 
useful implications for explaining Indonesian political behaviour and voting in the 
1999 elections as well as the acceptance of the state ideology, Pancasila. 89 
The few existing studies on Aceh are case specific and have focussed on centre- 
regional relations in the past90 or are ethnographic studies91. Other authors 
specialising on other regions within Indonesia also acknowledge the lack of studies on 
centre-regional relations. In his book, West Papua & Indonesia since Suharto: 
Independence, autonomy or chaos? Peter King acknowledges the same problem with 
West Papua. He notes that only `four substantial political stud[ies]' have been written 
during the period since West Papua's Act of Free Choice up to the downfall of 
87 Suryadinata, Elections and Politics, p. 7 
88 Feith, The Decline of Constitutional Democracy, p. 31-32 
89 Suryadinata, Elections and Politics, chapter 1 
90 See Eric Eugene Morris, Islam and politics in Aceh: a Study of Center-Periphery Relations in 
Indonesia; Tim Kell, The Roots of the Acehnese Rebellion, 1989-1992, (Ithaca, New York: Modem 
Indonesia Project, Cornell University, 1995) 
91 See James T. Siegel, The Rope of God, (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2000) 
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Soeharto. 92 There have been a few empirical analyses on the emergence of the 
movement in East Timor. 93 Though a lot of studies have been produced following 
East Timor's independence. The depoliticised political system and media controls 
which barricaded regional politics from being known to the outside world explains 
why there is a shortage of studies on specific regions. These studies have touched on 
various aspects of the respective conflicts. None of which have explored the state 
effectiveness in managing ethnic relations. 
Indonesian society was depoliticised during the 32-year-rule of Soeharto which was 
supported by the military's strong role in the economy, society and politics. The 
military's rise to prominence was a long process which dated back to the military's 
involvement in the revolution against the Dutch. 94 The army's growing cohesion was 
accompanied by the weakening of the civilian regime unable to deal with crisis after 
crisis. The unified army was ready to step in when called for and exploited the 
situation to the full. The workings of numerous favourable events brought the army 
dangerously close to politics and later made it an integral part of the existing political 
order, bureaucracy and economy. 
The army's political role was formalised in General Nasution's (Chief-of-Staff of the 
Army 1955-1962) speech at the National Military Academy in November 1958 when 
he announced the Indonesian army would take the `middle way'95. This new role 
meant that the army would not take on a passive role as in the West nor would it take 
92 Peter King, West Papua & Indonesia since Suharto: Independence, Autonomy or Chaos?, (Sydney, 
NSW: University of NSW Press, 2004), Introduction 
93 For example, Jill Jolliffe, East Timor Nationalism and Colonialism, (Queensland: University of 
Queensland Press, 1978) 
94 Crouch, The Army and Politics in Indonesia, p. 22 
95 Daniel S. Lev, `The Political Role of the Army in Indonesia' in Pacific Affairs, Vol. 36, No. 4 
(Winter, 1963-1964), p. 359 
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the politically active roles of South America. General Nasution's speech was an 
attempt to direct the army's participation in the political process on terms other than a 
coup. 96 It was because of its gradual involvement in virtually all aspects of the state 
that encouraged its doctrine, `Dwifungsi' or `Dual Function' which has been 
entrenched in the law. 97 As such, the army perceived itself as legitimate and 
responsible not merely in the limited conventional sense of upholding and defending 
the territorial state but became intertwined in the polity and economy. 
The army has lost much of its credibility due to its association with the New Order 
and its involvement with pro-Indonesia militias in East Timor before the region 
gained its independence. 98 As a result, there have been public demands for the army to 
reform. A few far-reaching changes include the abandonment of dwifungsi, the 
phrasing out of military representation in parliament, scheduled for 2004, and the 
separation of the police from the armed forces. 99 
Regional politics were brought to wider attention after the downfall of Soeharto and 
in the light of rapid democratisation, economic upheaval, inter-ethnic violence and an 
upsurge of civil society calling for reformasi. Intensive studies have been conducted 
on East Timor100 while studies on other secessionist movements such as the Acehnese 
and the Papuan have been sparse. Though studies are gradually emerging, issues on 
Aceh have been incorporated in recent studies of social, political and economic 
96 Ibid, p. 359 
97 Vatikiotis, Indonesian Politics under Suharto: the Rise and Fall of the New Order, p. 61 
98 Angel Rabasa and Peter Chalk, Indonesia's Transformation and the Stability of Southeast Asia, 
(Santa Monica, C. A.: RAND, 2001), p. 59 
99 Ibid, p. 59 
100 For example, John Taylor, East Timor: the price of freedom, (London: Zed Books, 1999); and Irena 
Cristalis, Bitter dawn: East Timor, a people's story, (London: Zed Books, 2002) 
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conditions. 101 Jacques Bertrand's recent study, Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict in 
Indonesia, is perhaps the only existing study that has explored the present tensions of 
ethnic relations from a comparative perspective. His study examines ethnic violence 
in Indonesia in the late 1990s through historical institutionalism. He argues that ethnic 
responses to institutional evolution can provide useful insights to why ethnic conflicts 
emerge at specific times in specific spaces. It is these critical junctures of institutional 
transformation that shape the casual factors and processes that result in ethnic 
violence. 102 
Other studies have only explored the present crisis on the empirical level. Kingsbury 
and Aveling's edited volume provides insight into both inter-ethnic and centre- 
regional relations that have challenged Indonesia in the recent years. '°3 The volume 
also reflects on the issues concerning the state's plans to implement autonomy as a 
means of managing ethnic relations and prospects of success. 
It is the gap in the literature which has brought my interest to explore centre-regional 
relations in Indonesia. So far, I have established that theories of secessionism, ethnic 
relations, ethnic conflict management cannot fully offer an explanation to the research 
question of this thesis: what determines state effectiveness in managing secessionism. 
There have been an inadequate number of studies concerning ethnic mobilization as 
politics at the centre attracted the attention of the academia to the elements of the New 
Order. Literature on inter-ethnic conflict and secessionism in post-Soeharto Indonesia 
101 For example, Hadi Soesastro, Anthony L. Smith and Han Mui Ling (eds. ), Governance in 
Indonesia: challenges facing the Megawati presidency, (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian 
Studies, 2003) 
102 Bertrand, Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict in Indonesia, Chapters 1 and 2 
103 Damien Kingsbury and Harry Aveling (eds. ), Autonomy and Disintegration in Indonesia, (London: 
RoutledgeCurzon, 2003) 
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is gradually emerging. However, most case studies on secessionist movements 
examine the case of East Timor. Recent research on secessionist areas such as Aceh 
as well as Papua, on the other hand, has been incorporated in studies on the overall 
aftermath of the collapse of the New Order. Bertrand's study is perhaps the only 
existing comparative study that has explored secessionist movements as well as inter- 
ethnic conflict in regions. 
This study and Bertrand's study share similarities in research interests: the dynamics 
of ethnic relations. However, we differ in focus and approach. Bertrand's study covers 
ethnic conflicts, both secessionist and inter-ethnic in nature and develops an 
explanation for the dynamics of ethnic violence: the causality and why ethnicity 
emerges in specific times and spaces. His approach to the research problem is based 
on historical institutionalism. On the other hand, my focus is specifically on 
Indonesia's two long standing secessionist movements that have emerged during the 
New Order and endured to the post-Soeharto state: East Timor and Aceh, and why 
they have resulted in different outcomes. I explore the difference in dynamics and 
outcomes of centre-regional relations, or more specifically, the state effectiveness in 
managing ethnic relations through the state-in-society approach. The method will be 
comparative to enhance its theoretical significance. Such a comparative study on the 
two secessionist movements of this study does not exist as of yet. 
In this chapter, I have introduced the problematic and located it in the discipline of 
politics. I have also placed my own project within the existing literature. From the 
brief introduction to the state-in-society approach given earlier in this chapter, I will 
lay the theoretical grounds of the state-in-society approach in detail in the following 
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chapter. This will provide the analytical framework for the case studies of East Timor 




In the previous chapter, I have established that there are few studies of regional 
politics of Indonesia, though studies are gradually emerging since the downfall of 
Soeharto's New Order. Existing explanations of ethnic mobilisation in Indonesia are 
focused on sources of ethnic discontent rather than on the dynamics. Bertrand's recent 
work is the only comparative study on the dynamics of ethnic relations within 
Indonesia. He examines all ethnic conflicts including secession and inter-ethnic 
within Indonesia through an historical institutional lens. He argues that ethnic 
responses to institutional evolution can provide useful insights to why ethnic conflicts 
emerge at specific times in specific spaces. Hence, his focus is on causality of ethnic 
mobilisation which differs from my own study that examines the outcomes of the on- 
going interactions between external involvement, the state and the secessionist 
movements. 
Bertrand's study is more confined to domestic politics which leaves out the 
international dimension in ethnic conflicts. This is appropriate to incorporate all types 
of ethnic violence that is both inter-ethnic, which does not aim to attract international 
support in order to create a new state, and secession in nature. Secessionism is a 
phenomenon where domestic and international politics are intertwined. The 
conflictual relationship between the state and the secessionist movement also involves 
the capability to act. However, this ability is not confined to the state. In situations 
where the state has conceded to ethnic demands indicates that the capability of a 
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secessionist group cannot be underestimated. However, existing theories of 
international relations, secessionism, ethnicity, and nationalism often fail to 
incorporate the three levels of analysis. It is the relationship between the secessionist 
movement, state and external involvement in the conflict where I explore the 
transformations between the three which influences the characteristics of state 
response to secessionism. 
Figure 1: The Characteristics of State Response 
International Support Social Forces 
State Segments 
The aim is to explore differences in state effectiveness in maintaining its territorial 
boundaries. This is examined through the theoretical ideas put forward by state-in- 
soc theorists with an added international dimension to the framework. The 
assumption of this approach is that states are embedded within their societies. And it 
is the interactions between the two which affect one another's ability to carry out 
actions. State effectiveness is constrained by social forces coalescing with other social 
forces. Parts of the state can also join forces with other parts of the state or with other 
social forces to oppose the state's official action. With the ability to control social 
forces comes the effectiveness of mobilising the population. The greater the social 
control, the more the state can achieve in terms of their goals and how the rules of the 
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game should be. Hence, there is a mutuality of state-society interactions: `Societies 
affect states as much as, or possibly more than, states affect societies'. ' Because the 
state is managing a number of social demands from different social forces, the `multi- 
front war' can reduce state strength or may even result in the state's demise. 2 In sum, 
the claims that the state-in-society are asserting are as follows3: Firstly, state 
effectiveness varies according to its ties with society. Secondly, states are not 
monolithic organisations; hence, they must be disaggregated to reveal the interactions 
among state segments. Thirdly, political action among social segments is not 
predictable. Fourthly, relations between the state and society do not necessarily result 
in a zero-sum game. States may align themselves with one segment of society, hence, 
interaction between state segments and some social segments can be mutually 
empowering. 
In addition, the state is also a part of the world arena. Other states or international 
organisations may limit or enhance the state's effectiveness in what they can carry out 
domestically through the interactions and actions including support or sanctions. 
Based on the assumptions put forward by the state-in-society approach, I assess the 
state's effectiveness in carrying out its goals to maintain its territorial boundaries. 
State effectiveness is constrained by social forces and external constraints. In this 
thesis, I will explore the changes in the independent variables: the relative strength of 
the secessionist movement and external pressure which affects state effectiveness to 
1 Joel S. Migdal, Atul Kohli, Vivienne Shue (eds. ), State Power and Social Forces: domination and 
transformation in the Third World, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), p. 2 
2 Migdal, State in Society Studying How State and Societies Transform and Constitution One Another, 
50 
Migdal, Kohli and Shue (eds. ), State Power and Social Forces: domination and transformation in the 
Third World, p. 2-4 
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achieve its goals. The core dependent variables are the success and failure of the state 
to maintain its territorial boundaries. 
The aims of this study are as follows: 
1) To theoretically explain why the two secessionist movements within the same 
political context have resulted in different outcomes. 
2) To contribute to the empirical study of the respective secessionist movements. 
3) To address the lack of comparative analysis in the field of ethnic conflict 
specifically in Indonesia. 
In the following sections, I will define the keys concepts of the theoretical framework 
the state, social forces and external involvement and the how the interplay between 
the three limits or enhances state effectiveness to carry out its actions. 
The State 
To Migdal the various definitions of the state that draw on the Weberian model are 
problematic. Such definitions place emphasis on the state's institutional character and 
its monopoly over and legitimate use of force. The basis of these definitions are the 
crucial issues `of domination or authority in the state's claimed territory and the 
degree to which the state's institutions can expect voluntary compliance with their 
rules (legitimacy) or the need to resort to coercion'4. What is problematic about these 
definitions notes Migdal is that the focus of the attention is on one aspect of the state: 
4 Migdal, State in Society Studying How State and Societies Transform and Constitution One Another, 
p. 111 
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its bureaucratic dimension which tends to overestimate state capabilities and its 
effectiveness to carry out fixed and formal policy goals. Furthermore, a number of 
these definitions have insufficiently captured the formulation and transformation of 
state goals. 5 
However, the state does have its limitations to what it can carry out. Furthermore, 
what the state carries out is in constant change. One of the reasons, as Migdal points 
out, why the existing literature has drawn an invincible image of the state, its 
autonomy and the ability to act in a uniform manner is that the focus on the state has 
been the state elite. Yet `the state is far from the re-creation of the aims and wills of 
the state elite'6. 
Migdal's starting point is the paradoxical nature of the state. On one hand, the state 
can be viewed as a clearly integrated unit performing its tasks in a unified manner. 
This is termed by Migdal as the `idea of the state' which `through its law and 
regulations, to impose of a single standard of behaviour in a given territory, one that is 
legislated, executed, and adjudicated by the various parts of the state organization'. 7 
On the other, the state is fragmented with its segments loosely bound together. It is 
these ill-defined boundaries that often come into conflict with one another or the 
state's `official' action. Consequently, `the practices of state' may end up 
contradicting `the idea of the state'. 8 As such, the deviant outcome of state policies 
may not be due to poorly designed polices, inefficient officials or the lack of 
5 Ibid, p. 112 
6 Ibid, p. 116 
7 Ibid, p. 48 
8 Ibid, p. 49 
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resources. 9 As Migdal notes: `Theories that do not incorporate the two sides of the 
paradoxical nature of the state end up overidealizing its ability to turn rhetoric into 
effective policy or dismissing it as a grab-bag of everyman-out-for-himself, corrupt 
officials. ' 10 
State-in-society theorists such as Migdal and Peter Dauvergne argue that the constant 
interaction within the state and social segments in turn influences state policies, 
actions, and capacity or may go as far as changing the nature of the state itself. 11 On 
one hand, political leaders face challenges in carrying out their goals. On the other, 
both formal and informal social organisations have been struggling with the state 
unwilling to cave in to state initiatives. Social segments and parts of the state have 
often coalesced to develop initiatives or practices that contradict official law of 
regulations of the state. 12 
State segments and social forces are in environment of conflict over who has the 
rights and ability to change or make the rules of society. 13 To oppose the state's 
official action, state segments and social forces may ally with one another or join 
forces amongst themselves. As such, the state and society are not necessarily on 
opposing ends or are a zero-sum game but can be mutually empowering. However, 
state segments in alliances with other social forces may enhance the capability to act 
but it may also transform goals to accommodate the new coalition partners. Social 
control is key to understanding how these goals change. Migdal utilises the concept of 
9 Ibid, p. 12 
10 Ibid, p. 23 
11 See Dauvergne (ed. ), Weak and Strong States, p. 2; Migdal, Kohli, Shue (eds. ), State Power and 
Social Forces: domination and transformation in the Third World, p. 16 
12 Migdal, State in Society Studying How State and Societies Transform and Constitution One Another, 
p. 49 
13 Ibid, p. 49 
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social control similar to that of power which refers to `situations in which A gets B to 
do something he would not other wise do' 14. Both states and social forces, including 
informal and formal organisations such as neighbourhood groups to foreign owned 
companies, apply sanctions and rewards to induce others to follow different rules of 
the game. 
With the ability to control social forces comes the effectiveness of mobilising the 
population. The greater the social control, the more the state can achieve in terms of 
their goals and how the rules of the game should be. 15 In struggles where either the 
state or society has enabled to establish their power broadly, integrated domination 
occurs. In outcomes where neither the state nor society has been able to establish 
nationwide domination resulting in conflicts in multiple arenas, the result is dispersed 
domination. 16 Increasing social control is reflected in three indicators compliance, 
participation and legitimacy. 
1) Compliance. The strength of the state is dependent on the extent the 
population will comply with the state's demands. 
2) Participation. The strength of the state is also enhanced by the ability to 
organise the population into specialised tasks. 
3) Legitimacy. According to the state-in-society approach, legitimacy involves 
the acceptance of the state's rules and its social control as `true and right' 17 . 
14 See footnote in Migdal, State in society: studying how states and societies transform and constitute one 
another, p. 48 
15 Ibid, p. 52 
16 Migdal, State in Society Studying How State and Societies Transform and Constitution One Another, 
p. 100 
17 Ibid, p. 52 
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Legitimacy is also considered the most crucial factor in determining the 
strength of the state. 
In sum, the greater the social control, the greater the capacity the state has to carry out 
its actions. States operate in an environment of conflict where it is one organisation 
within the domestic arena as well as the in the system of states. 18 States do not 
necessarily act in a coherent fashion and its parts may ally with other social forces; 
consequently, contradicting the coherent image of the state. 
This has other implications for other main schools of state theory. The state-in-society 
theorists reject Marxist and structural claims that state action is just a mere 
consequence of social patterns of power. On the other hand, they also disagree with 
overly statist claims which present the state as dominant over society. The 
relationship between state and society is not one that seeks to establish the state as 
dominant over society or vice versa but holds that the both possess the ability to 
influence each other. As such, `to speak of overall autonomy of states, as much recent 
theory does, might not at all be the best initial point of inquiry of studying the state. 
Researchers must first ask about the autonomy of the various components of the state, 
for which the calculus of pressures differs so markedly'". We should ask ourselves: 
`What sorts of social forces predominate at different points in the state hierarchy and 
why? '2° 
In order to understand the modifications of state action, Migdal proposes one possible 
way of understanding the complex interactions between the state and society. He 
suggests that the state must be disaggregated into four levels. Each level will face 
18 Ibid, p. 50 
19 Ibid, p. 117 
20 Ibid, p. 117 
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different kinds of pressure from different components within the state and from social 
forces. The four levels including the trenches, dispersed field offices, agency's central 
offices and commanding heights will each face pressure from the other three sets of 
pressure from within the state as well as domestic and international. Pressure from 
within the state includes that from the supervisors, from the underlings and from staff 
from other agencies of roughly similar levels. Here, `the more diverse and 
heterogeneous the arrays of pressures that various components of the state encounter 
on their different levels, especially when strong pressures are applied by multifarious 
domestic and foreign social forces, the less likely the state is to end up with 
complementary behaviour by its many parts and the less likely it is to convey 
successfully a coherent system of "legitimating universes "'21. However in his edited 
volume, Dauvergne proposes that the state should be disaggregated to reveal `the 
internal tensions and competition among state sections significantly shape state 
policies, actions, and capacity'22 as opposed to examining the state in a hierarchical 
manner. 
v 
Dauvergne's method of studying the state is more suited to the politics of policy 
making in the Indonesian state. Soeharto was known for dividing and ruling his elites 
during the New Order. Specifically in the area of economic policy making under 
Soeharto, Adam Schwarz divides those involved in economic policy making into 
three components: the technocrats, the nationalists, and the cronies. 23 The technocrats 
were pro-market. The nationalists believed that the government should retain strong 
21 Migdal, Kohli, Shue (eds. ), State Power and Social Forces: domination and transformation in the 
Third World, p. 18 
22 Dauvergne (ed. ), Weak and Strong States, p. 2 
23 Schwartz, A Nation in Waiting Indonesia's Search for Stability, p. 52-53; Similar arguments have 
also been made by William Liddle, though framing it in a different way. See R. William Liddle, `The 
Relative Autonomy of the Third World Politician: Soeharto and Indonesian Economic Development in 
Comparative Perspective', International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 35, No. 4, December 1991, p. 407-411 
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control over the economy while assuring a helping hand for the indigenous population 
or the pribumi businessmen to catch up with their rich Chinese counterparts. The 
tensions between the three determined how economic policies took shape. Though the 
removal of Soeharto brought an end to divide and rule amongst the elites, I will later 
argue in Chapter Three that parliament has become an arena of genuine contestations 
amongst state sections. The cronies were less motivated by any particular ideology or 
policy options and were more driven by personal interests. Furthermore, hierarchy is 
prominent in Javanese culture. Top-down decision-making within the Indonesian 
bureaucracy reflects how power is concentrated in the hands of top officials. 24 As 
such, tensions are more likely to occur between state segments as opposed to between 
state levels. 
Though tensions exist among state sections, I hold that the Indonesian state is 
relatively more uniform in its goal in keeping the territorial boundaries intact but there 
is a disagreement about the methods used to achieve these goals. In terms of dealing 
with secessionism, states are unlikely to give up a part of their land. And it is not 
uncommon for a state to use force to keep its territorial boundaries intact. Indonesia is 
no exception. Mainstream Indonesian political culture upholds the concept of the 
unitary state. The concept of unity is also one of the five points of the Indonesian 
state's ideology, Pancasila. 25 Pancasila has been an integral part of people's lives. 
Civil servants attend courses on Pancasila. 26 Up until the changes of election laws in 
1999, the Pancasila ideology was imposed on mass organisations and political 
24 Colin MacAndrews (ed. ), Central Government and Local Development in Indonesia, (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1986), p. 9 
25 The principles of Pancasila are stated in the 1945 Constitution: belief in one supreme God; 
humanitarianism; nationalism expressed in the unity of Indonesia; consultative democracy; and social 
justice. 
26 Vatikiotis, Indonesian Politics under Suharto, p. xvi 
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parties. 27 The elites that support national unity and central control are most forcefully 
represented by Soeharto's political organisation, Golkar (from golongan karya or 
functional groups), which enjoyed dominance for three decades during the New 
Order. 28 Another important component of the New Order was the military which had 
always played a substantial role in dealing with ethnic unrest. 
The military's role in politics can be traced back to the revolution against the Dutch 
where the army fought side by side with the nationalist movement. Consequently, it 
never saw itself as an instrument of the state but a force that took part in the creation 
of the state. 29 It was the regional rebellion in the 1950s and the consequent imposition 
of martial law in 1957 that became the army's first initial step to its involvement in 
politics. In the late 1950s, General Nasution had a clear intention to seek a more 
permanent role for the military and a position in the state where it would sit 
comfortably between its counterparts in the West and Latin America or known as the 
army's middle way'. 30 This later formed the basis of the military's ideology dwifungsi 
(dual function) which legitimised the army's role as both the protector of the 
territorial state from external threats and its institutionalised involvement in politics. 
Dwifungsi was later enshrined in the law. 31 While dwifungsi supported the army's 
role as protector of national unity, this was reinforced by the territorial system. Here, 
the army had positions in the civil administration, polity and the economy from the 
national level down to the village. 
27 Suryadinata, Elections and Politics, p. 61 
28 David Bourchier, `Habibie's Interregnum' in Chris Manning and Peter van Diermen, Indonesia in 
transition. social aspects of reformasi and crisis, (London: Zed Books, 2000), p. 26 
29 Vatikiotis, Indonesian Politics under Suharto, p. 64 
30 Lev, The Army's Political Role', p. 359; Vatikiotis, Indonesian Politics under Suharto, p. 65 
31 Vatikiotis, Indonesian Politics under Suharto, p. 60 
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The New Order upheld the military's position as dominant over internal security and 
challenges to the boundaries of the state was dealt with via force. However, post- 
Soeharto Indonesia meant that the change in leadership also entailed a change in 
policymaking. Post-Soeharto governments have incorporated a variety of approaches 
from the offer of special autonomy to the use of force. The changes in policy have 
reflected those in power as well as tensions among state segments. These policies or 
actions may clash and accommodate the interests of the various social forces within 
the boundaries of the state. As such, to what extent the state can achieve its goals vary 
according to sector, time and the social forces that oppose or support state action. The 
politics between the various state segments involved in managing ethnic relations 
specifically to the Indonesian context will be explored in detail in Chapter Three. 
Social Forces 
Like states, society is not monolithic but consists of a multiplicity of social forces. 
The main focus of this study is the secessionist movements in Aceh and East Timor. 
However, I will also explore the interactions between the secessionist movements and 
other social segments. I will examine whether these other social segments support or 
oppose state action towards the secessionist movements which in turn will affect the 
state's capacity through mutual empowerment to carry out its actions towards dealing 
with secessionism. 
Social forces consist of both informal organisations such as patron-client networks 
and formal organisations such as businesses and churches. 
32 These social forces 
32 Migdal, Kohli and Shue (eds. ), State power and social forces, p. 20 
51 
operate within the context of other social forces which all vie to mobilise segments of 
the population. In this contest of `domination and accommodation', social forces 
interact with one another not only through struggles with social forces but also to 
form coalitions. 33 However, coalitions and accommodations with other social forces 
may enhance a social force's capability to act or achieve its goals but it may also 
transform the social force's original goals in order to incorporate new ideas to 
accommodate its new coalition partners. Like the state, social forces compete for 
social control in order to enhance a social force's domination. Also they can use the 
same currency, compliance, legitimacy and participation, as the state to expand their 
social control and determine how the rules of the game should be. 34 
The secessionist movement only makes up a part of society within the realm of the 
state. Assuming that decision-makers aim to gain as much popular support as they can 
get to enhance the chances for re-election, the capacity of the state to implement 
policies concerning secessionism is also shaped by the support or opposition or even 
indifference (which may be interpreted as support) from other social forces. As such, 
interactions between social forces and the state do not necessarily result in a zero-sum 
game, but the state and various segments of society could be mutually empowering. 35 
In other words, the interactions between the two could result in competition for 
relative autonomy to act according to their goals. 36 It is the interaction between the 
state and various segments of society which influences the outcome of state action. 
33 Migdal, State in society: studying how states and societies transform and constitute one another, p. 20-21 34 lbid, p. 53 
35 Ibid, p. 4 
36 Migdal, Kohli and Shue (eds. ), State power and social forces, p. 24 
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Challenges toward the state may also attract international attention that could 
potentially transform into international support for the state or social forces which 
may enhance the capability to act. However, international involvement does not 
necessarily mean support for an independent state but may only go as far as urging the 
sides to come to a peace agreement, such as autonomy deal, consequently, limiting the 
state's policy options. External involvement is less certain and often short-lived. It is 
perhaps logical to say that no foreign state will be willing to take the risk if a 
movement is weak and likely to be appeased by the state. 37 As such, the strength of a 
movement attracts attention and increases the potential of the third state's 
involvement. 
The strength of a secessionist movement is inextricably intertwined with power. 
Though power is difficult to measure and is relational, what is crucial to the study of 
power is how the state is affected by the action of the secessionist movement. 38 As 
such, though I propose the following factors that may indicate the strength of the 
movement, these factors only matter when they affect the state or limit the state's 
options to act in relation with the secessionist movement. 
Secessionist movements are rarely uniform groups, perhaps less so than states. States 
are uniform in their goals, which are to maintain its territorial boundaries, but state 
sections may differ on how to achieve this goal. A uniform goal amongst the 
supporters of independence also serves to strengthen a secessionist movement. In 
comparison, a weak movement is one with a small support base which in turn affects 
its ability to reshape or transform state action. Power struggles, and conflicting 
37 Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict, p. 273 
38 Stephen Lukes, Power, (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986), p. 8-9 
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interests amongst those who want independence can also weaken the movement. Most 
regions that harbour secessionist movements are ethnically diverse. However, ethnic 
heterogeneity does not inhibit the formation of a secessionist movement, unless the 
group opposed to secessionism is armed, but may serve to lessen the support for 
independence. 39 
The population of the secessionist region can be divided. Some may want 
independence. Among the supporters of independence, the means of achieving 
independence may vary. Some may hold that independence can only be achieved 
through force while others may seek more peaceful means to achieve independence 
such as via a referendum. Other segments of a secessionist region may not necessarily 
seek a separate state but lay out demands that fall short of territorial separation such 
as autonomy. These forces combined are crucial to the strength of opposition to the 
centre. A movement with little support only makes the state's position strong when 
managing secessionism. Also, the intensity and widespread nature of protests against 
the state within a rebellious region can also be used as a marker to the support for 
independence. 40 Here, identifying the secessionist movements' strongholds will help 
illustrate the extent of social support and challenge the secessionist movement poses 
towards the state. 
A strong secessionist movement is one that has not only has strong popular support 
amongst the population it claims to represent but also through mutual empowerment it 
can claim support from other social forces in areas outside the secessionist region. 
The case for independence strengthens further when international support is offered 
39 Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict, p. 267 
40 Ibid, p. 269 
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(from other states or international organisations) .4' The greater the support for 
independence, the greater the challenge posed against the state. 
External Involvement 
The concept of globalisation has been a fashionable way to investigate the interactions 
between the state and non-state actors and how these interactions affect one another at 
both the national and international levels. The `advances in technology and modern 
communications are said to have unleashed new contacts and intercourse among 
peoples, special movements, transnational corporations, and governments. The result 
is a set of processes which have affected national and international politics in an 
extraordinary way'42. The concept of globalisation draws attention to the complexity 
of interactions between the state and non-state actors at both the national and 
international level in the political and economic domains. However, the complex 
consequences of globalisation go beyond the scope of this study. What is more central 
to the secessionist movement and the state is the direct intervention of a third state or 
an international body that will either support the secessionist cause for independence 
or support the state to keep territorial boundaries intact. 
Contrary to its original implications, the conception of self-determination does not 
guarantee the right of a nation of cultural or ethnic basis to form a separate state. 
Rather, self-determination became a right confined to the former colonised people 
under Western rule. The idea was to allow such a right to be `exercise(d) once and for 
41 Kingsbury and Aveling (eds. ), Autonomy and Disintegration in Indonesia, p. 2 
42 Ngaire Woods, The Political Economy of Globalization, (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2000), p. 1 
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all and never again'43. Since the late 1960s the right had become internationally legal 
and despite its ambiguity, the United Nations Charter, Article 1 (2) and (55), has been 
supported by other UN resolutions that clearly work against ethno-nationalistic 
movements. Efforts have also painstakingly continued to make the colonial 
constructed boundaries sacrosanct once most colonies were declared independent. If 
such a right was given to all ethnic nations, and taking into consideration the number 
of ethno-nationalistic movements, the right would undoubtedly destabilise the 
international system. States supported by the international system which recognises 
states as sovereign, independent and free from outside interference. In other words, 
the third world state jurisdiction is a `formal-legal condition' or what Robert H. 
Jackson's terms as `negative sovereignty', 44 
This has been supported by the international tradition of non-intervention. The 
principle appears in the UN Charter Article 2 that discourages third states from 
interfering in another state's internal affairs. However, there have been exceptions 
made under circumstances where the situation has been seen as a threat to 
international peace and security as in the cases of the former Yugoslavia and 
Somalia. 45 Rather, the UN has adopted various preventive measures46 such as the 
1966 International Convenant on Civil and Political Rights which encourages states to 
respect minority rights which goes as far as supporting autonomy though still 
respecting the boundaries of the existing state. To sum up the international 
community's stance on the issue of secessionism, Boutros Boutros-Ghali notes: 
43 . ý---: _ T7. -__.. 1]. 7..., mr__ o_Irn -. '--- I... .,. "- . __"---. _ .: ». 
1 Pliti, c n 11 Hlexls rieracLLUCS, l. le Oey-r. 'ecerminuuon of minorities in miernuuu«µ, -.,. «...,,, Y" -- 
44 r_I__1 Ty T__I. ___ ý.. ___ _. _. ___ ... r n_7_.:,...... -a Ibn 
Th:,., ] id1,... 1.7 c+. _. _ ICoDeI"I ri. JacKJoI1, t`! Z[aS[-states: JOVeretgnty, International ttetutuu. - unu arw ý rur a rr vi tu Jtate, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), p. 26 
as Kamal S. Shehadi, Ethnic Self-Determination, Adelphi Paper 283, December 1993, p. 52-56 
46 Also see Jennifer Jackson Preece `Self-Determination and Minority Rights' in Ho-Won Jeong (ed. ), 
The New Agenda for Peace Research, (Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing Ltd., 1999), p. 204-206 
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The foundation-stone of this work (peace-keeping) is and must remain the state. 
Respect for its fundamental sovereignty and integrity are crucial to any common 
international progress. . . 
Yet if every ethnic, religious or linguistic group claimed 
statehood, there would be no limit to fragmentation, and peace, security and 
economic well-being for all would become ever more difficult to achieve... One 
requirement for the solutions to these problems lies in the commitment to human 
rights with a special sensitivity to those minorities, whether ethnic religious, 
social or linguistic. The League of Nations provided a machinery for the 
international protection of minorities. That instrument, together with increasingly 
effective machinery of the United Nations dealing with human rights, should 
enhance the situation of minorities as well as the stability of states... The 
sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of states within the established 
international system, and the principle of self-determination for peoples, both of 
great value and importance, must not be permitted to work against each other in 
the period ahead. Respect for democratic principles at all levels of social 
existence is crucial: in communities, within States and the community of States. 
Our constant duty should be to maintain the integrity of each while finding a 
balanced design for all. 47 
Preventive measures encouraged by the UN and the principle of non-interference are 
thorny matters. In practice, the principle of non-intervention is a completely different 
matter. The majority of post-war secessionist movements have had crucial 
international connections. Eritrean rebels received training from third countries such 
47 An Agenda for Peace Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-Keeping, Report of the 
Secretary-General pursuant to the statement adopted by the Summit Meeting of the Security Council on 
31 January 1992, www. un. org 
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as Syria; Bangladesh received support from India which was willing to go to war with 
Pakistan. 48 
External involvement may support the state or the secessionist movement which in 
turn will enhance the capacity of either side to act. There is a misconception that 
involvement is `either for or against, with no in-between positions being 
acknowledged or tolerated by the two involved parties'49. However, I hold that taking 
no position in turn favours the already advantageous position of state which possesses 
the military capacity as opposed to the secessionist movements. 
This leads us next question, who has the influence? According to Buzan, the status of 
a power is dependent on how it is judged by others and how actual significance of 
their capabilities is calculated. 50 For the former, the EU poses a good example where 
it is perceived as a great power regardless of its ambiguous political status. For the 
latter, Japan is an example where potential capabilities are calculated by others. 
Though Japan may not possess any nuclear capability, others may calculate its 
potential to develop one on the basis of its civil nuclear power and its space 
programmes. 
External involvement can take form in tangible support and political-diplomatic 
support. Tangible support include material aid such as arms; access to 
communications media and other networks; and services and assistance within or 
outside the secessionist territory such as sanctuary and a base for operations. Political- 
48 i. - r ,ý". n" . .. norowitz, Gtnntc vroups in t-onJncr, p. L 12 49 ., _ .1 11 . a. .-. --I i....... la. omv., ý' _. ___. I Hiexts neracnaes, -secessionist movements and txternai iiivvivliiiil. 
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Organizations, Vol. 44, No. 3, p. 345 
50 Barry Buzan, The United States and the Great Powers World Politics in the Twenty-First Century, 
(Cambridge: Polity Press, 2004), p. 68 
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diplomatic support includes verbal statements of concern from other governments as 
well as campaigns of the secessionist movements and their cause. 51 The findings of 
this study will show that Aceh and East Timor both received tangible support though 
each differed. Support for Aceh was more clandestine and covert whereas East 
Timor's support was more legitimate and open. GAM fighters received military 
training and aid from Libya during the 1980s but assistance was short-lived. On the 
other hand, East Timor received tangible support in form of a peacekeeping force 
post-referendum with the backing of the UN and many other states. Likewise both 
Aceh and East Timor have political-diplomatic support though to varying degrees. 
Aceh received support from HDC to take on the role of mediating talks between 
Jakarta and GAM. However in this case, HDC did not have the political clout to 
influence or limit Jakarta's policy options. Here, Jakarta was in control of when talks 
would start and when it would end. On the other hand, political-diplomatic support for 
East Timor started after the publicised 1991 Dili incident, though momentum 
increased at the demise of the New Order. 
The strength of a movement attracts attention and increases the potential of the third 
state's involvement. Third state involvement complicates matters and prolongs the 
conflict. It is the support of the international community on the whole that is a crucial 
factor for the maintenance or the redefinition of the existing boundaries. However, 
support from a third country may not necessarily translate into support for 
independence. The international community may support the secessionist movement's 
goal; hereby, creating a new member of the international community. It could support 
the existing state boundaries. As international norms reject the use of force, 
51 Heraclides, `Secessionist Movements and External Involvement', p. 368 
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involvement could result in pressure for peace talks or a power-sharing arrangement 
such federalism or autonomy. At the very least, external support will increase 
opposition to the central government. 
State output is a result of tensions among state sections. However, social and external 
forces further shape state output and rarely do the outcomes reflect the original goals 
of either of the actors. The state and social forces can be mutually empowering or the 
interactions between the two could result in competition for autonomy to act 
according to their goals. 52 To what extent social forces and external pressure shapes 
state output in turn reflects the strength and weakness of the state. 
The strength of the state is equated with the capability of the state to carry out its 
preferred policies, rules and norms. The more social control, the more 
manoeuvrability the state has to carry out its actions. However, the state may receive 
support from external factors for its actions in dealing with secessionism or there may 
not be any international interference at all which in turn would not limit the state's 
policy options. Likewise, the strong state is one that has either strong social support 
from social segments (other than the secessionist movement) or other social segments 
are indifferent to the state's action in the secessionist region which could be 
interpreted as support for the state; consequently, giving the state more 
manoeuvrability to carry out policies to manage the secessionist movements. 
It is the complex three-way relationship that determines the characteristics of state 
response towards a secessionist movement. Hence, the greater the autonomy, the more 
52 Migdal, Kohli and Shue (eds. ), State power and social forces, p. 24 
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power the state has to act on secessionism according to will. An examination of social 
forces in the two secessionist regions and their interaction with third countries as well 
as the state will be explored in Chapters Four and Five. Each case study will be 
divided into instances creating comparisons across both region and time. The 
instances are divided according to each of the presidencies. Both secessionist 
movements emerged when Soeharto was in power, though ended at different 
junctures. Events and policy changes in each instance will be used to test the 
hypothesis based on the state-in-society approach: the more social control and the 
more support the state receives at the international level in keeping its boundaries in 
tact, the more manoeuvrability the state will have to achieve its policy goals in 
maintaining the boundaries of the state. 
To test the hypothesis, I will trace the dynamics behind state action or policy to 
identify the factors that led the state to act towards the secessionist movements as well 
as the factors behind the transformation of state action. If the findings show that state 
action was a result of the interactions between the state itself, social forces and 
external pressure, this will confirm the central hypothesis based on the state-in-society 
approach. In the case studies, I will indicate which constellation explains what 
outcome if the instance confirms the theory. If other factors as well as the interactions 
between the state, social forces and external pressure played a role in transforming 
state action toward the secessionist movements, this will only partially confirm the 
theory. 
61 
The Advantages of Comparative Method 
The study examines the different outcomes of two secessionist movements, East 
Timor and Aceh by comparative method. The type of comparative method is `the 
most similar' systems. The logic underlying most similar research is `to isolate the 
effect of an independent variable by controlling for the effects of spurious and 
intervening variables'53. The most similar design entails establishing a cause that is 
found is the instances studied. The number of cases under investigation makes this 
study a few case comparison and is similar to a few country study or a small-N. The 
cases under study are secessionist movements and differ from other cases of ethnic 
discontent in various regions in the archipelago such as Ambon and Poso which come 
under the label of horizontal or inter-ethnic conflict. Though few-country studies have 
advantages, which I will discuss further in this section, their `biggest' weakness is in 
case selection. 54 The problem occurs when case selection is dependent on the 
outcome. However though the research question had developed from the interest in 
tracing the differences in outcome of secessionist movements within the same context, 
case selection was not entirely based on the dependent variable and choice was not 
entirely based on the most 'purposeful 555 to enhance the value of my own theoretical 
argument. Though Indonesia has faced the challenge of secessionism since the birth 
of the nation, the two case studies of this research have endured from the New Order 
to the present. This eliminates other cases of secession attempts such as the South 
Moluccas which emerged during the early years of independence and died down soon 
53 Peter Burnham, Karin Gilland, Wyn Grant and Zig Layton-Henry, Research Methods in Politics, 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2004), p. 63-64 
54 Todd Landman, Issues and Methods in Comparative Politics An Introduction, (London and New 
York: Routledge, 2000), p. 201 
55 B. Guy Peters, Comparative Politics: Theory and Methods, (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1998), p. 37 
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after or the short-lived secessionist movement in Riau which emerged after the 
downfall of the New Order. 
I have also omitted Papua from my study. Though Papua is a long-standing movement 
like Aceh and East Timor, support for the movement has been inconsistent and 
disorganised. 56 The Free Papua Movement (or OPM) and support for independence as 
more political than militant. 57 As such, the nature of the movement differs from 
Fretilin and GAM which pose a more security threat in relative terms to the 
Indonesian military. This is turn may effect the results of the comparison between the 
three. 
Regional studies have been marginalized and more often incorporated into more 
generalised analysis on the wider political context of Indonesia. The few existing case 
studies are predominantly on East Timor. Relatively little has been written on Aceh. It 
is this gap in the existing literature that has brought my attention to these secessionist 
movements in Indonesia. While mainstream politics have occupied the minds of 
academics and journalists, ethnic politics have only caught the attention of the 
academics and the media when ethnic violence in various parts of the archipelago 
exploded in the wake of Soeharto's downfall. 
While specific case studies are enriched with detail and can produce significant 
findings, cases studied comparatively broaden the number of analytical tools. 58 In 
56 Aspinall, `Modernity, history and ethnicity Indonesian and Acehnese nationalism in conflict', 
Kingsbury and Harry Aveling (eds. ), Autonomy and Disintegration in Indonesia, p. 144 
57 Based on various discussions with NGO workers. 
58 Dietrich Rueschemeyer, `Can One or a Few Cases Yield Theoretical Gains? ' in James Mahoney and 
Dietrich Rueschemeyer (eds. ) Comparative Historical Analysis in the Social Sciences, (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2003) 
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other words, examining a single case may not help to explain the trajectory of the 
other two regions, even though both regions are located in the same national political 
context. 
However, the debates between the advantages and disadvantages of conducting area 
studies and comparative analysis are not necessarily polarised. The divide shows that 
`social scientists do not seek to master the literature on the region but rather to master 
the literature of the discipline'59. Conversely, the area study specialist focuses their 
attention on context specific knowledge rather law-like regularities. The comparisons 
between many countries make substantive generalisations about key issues in the 
discipline of politics. They offer a considerable number of inferences that supports 
general theories. However, contextual detail is lost in many-country comparisons. The 
unease about this trade-off has led a number of scholars to turn to the few-country 
comparisons. 60 Comparing a few countries, allows the researcher to examine the 
historical processes and political contexts of the cases under study, which cannot be 
achieved in many-country comparison. Consequently, the strength of few country 
studies lies in their level of generalisation (though they do not intend to generalise 
beyond the cases under investigation) and their inclusion of contextuality. 61 In other 
words, few country comparisons merge the two sides of the debate. This study falls 
into the few-countries category or the small-N where area study is not necessarily 
compromised and theory is enhanced. 
59 Robert H. Bates, Area and the Discipline: A Useful Controversy', PS. ' Political Science and 
Politics, Vol. 30, No. 2, June 1997, p. 166 
60 Landman, Issues and Methods in Comparative Politics, p. 199 61 Ibid, p. 200 
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An old problem of comparative politics is seeking appropriate cases to compare or 
"matched comparisons". Conducting a comparative study based on the most similar 
design by employing two cases within the same political context (same state) has its 
advantages over cross-country comparison. The purpose of the most similar design is 
to manipulate[s] the changes in the independent variables through case selection and 
to control the extraneous variance by the same means'62. However, though case 
selection might bring together a group of countries that share similarities, there is 
always a possibility that there could be some differences between the countries that 
may affect the validity of the research. Results become misleading as the study that 
was under the impression of comparing `apples with apples' or conducting the most 
similar case research, has in practice, conducted a study that was a most different. 63 
As such, increasing and comparing the number of cases within the same political 
context has its advantages. Firstly, making comparisons within the same political 
context evades the problem of finding cases that share similarities in terms of political 
context that I wish to make a constant. 64 
Secondly, cross-country analysis confronts the problem of the validity of theoretical 
concepts and their indicators when conducting a cross-country comparison. 65 Specific 
concepts have relative meanings according to country contexts. The relationship 
between concepts is expected to differ accordingly. 66 As such, establishing 
equivalence of indicators in cross-country analysis can be problematic where different 
62 Peters, Comparative Politics, p. 38 
63 Richard Locke and Kathleen Thelen, `Problems of Equivalence in Comparative Politics: Apples and 
Oranges, Again', APSA-CP, Vol. 9, No. 1, Winter 1998, p. 11 
64 Burnham, Gilland, Grant and Layton-Henry, Research Methods in Politics, p. 56 
°' Landman, Issues and Methods in Comparative Politics, p. 41 
66 Adam Przeworski and Henry Tenue, `Equivalence in Cross-National Research', in Donald P. 
Warwick and Samuel Osherson (eds. ), Comparative Research Methods, (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice- 
Hall, 1973), p. 120 
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social and cultural settings may skew the functioning of these concepts and threaten 
the validity of the research. The most similar case design conducted within the same 
political context avoids this problem. 
Thirdly, the comparison of the two secessionist movements enhances the theoretical 
significance of the study and to a certain degree standardizes indicators. 
Consequently, the advantage of a comparative study will be that it will give a broader 
interpretation to other cases whether it be within or external to the Indonesian context. 
Fourthly, the comparisons are not confined to the contemporary situation but also 
trace the historical relationship between society and the state. I will divide the analysis 
of each case according to the policies under the various administrations starting from 
under Soeharto's rule to the post-Soeharto governments. I start my study with the 
Soeharto period as the two secessionist movements emerged during this period. The 
two periods are demarcated with common events. Regime change provided the 
division between the two periods. However while I make these divisions, I still 
acknowledge that the state-in-society approach is process-oriented rather than static. I 
also acknowledge Migdal's discomfort for rigid and static outcomes and fixed goals 
which can become too restrictive. ' The state-in-society approach is a continuing 
process of the interactions between the state and society and the state is constantly 
"becoming"68. As the relationship within the state and between the state segments and 
its society are generally the same in each period, I will still analyze the transformation 
between the state and society under each of the different administrations from 
Soeharto's to Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono's (SBY). This will reveal the different 
67 Migdal, State in Society Studying How State and Societies Transform and Constitution One Another, 
p. 23 
68 Ibid, p. 24-25 
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constellations of power; consequently, enhancing theoretical debate. 69 As the number 
of cases makes the study a small-N, by increasing the number of instances avoids the 
problem having a mismatch between the number of variables and the number of 
observations. 70 
Because the nature of what political scientists study cannot be gathered for 
experimentation, controlled and replicated as in the natural sciences, there are two 
methods to assess the viability of the hypothesis. Firstly, counterfactuals or "thought 
experiment" have been implicitly used in a number of studies to evaluate the casual 
hypothesis by supposing it absent in the situation. Secondly, actual cases that bear 
resemblance to the cases under study can be used for additional cases to support the 
analysts' positive claims to the hypothesis. 71 However, unlike single cases, the 
comparative study supplies the counterfactual situation. 72 To further assess the 
hypothesis, I have also used the second method of actual case studies. 
This study has covered similar ground to Edward Aspinall and Mark T. Berger's 
article. 73 They investigate how and when East Timor, Aceh and West Papua were 
absorbed into Indonesia. The `how' and `when' strongly influenced the appeals made 
by each of the secessionist movements for a separate state and how these grounds for 
a separate state appealed to the international community to support their cause. 
However, the article runs into the problem of having `too many variables and too few 
69 Dietrich Rueschemeyer, Evelyne Huber Stephens, and John D. Stephens, Capitalist Development 
and Democracy, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1992), p. 32 
70 Peters, Comparative Politics, p. 65 
71 David Fearon, `Counterfactuals and Hypothesis Testing', World Politics, Vol. 43, No. 2, (1991), p. 
169 
72 Landman, Issues and Methods in Comparative Politics, p. 12 
73 Aspinall and Berger, `The break-up of Indonesia? Nationalisms after Decolonization and the limits 
of the nation-state in post-cold war Southeast Asia', 
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countries'. The number of variables should be less than the number of countries or in 
this instance, regions. 74 As such, the authors have failed to come up with a cohesive 
argument. 
Data Collection and Data Analysis 
This thesis has examined whether social forces and opposition from state segments 
has influenced the Indonesian state effectiveness in managing secessionism in East 
Timor and Aceh. The research methods used to obtain information for this study are 
interviews, documents, media accounts, and an analysis of the existing literature. 
The information on state policy goals in managing the three regions has been obtained 
by interviews with the Indonesian officials involved. The interviews were semi- 
structured and complied with the University of Bristol guidelines. For ethical reasons, 
not all sources have been named. Permission for the sources that have been named 
was given prior to the interview. 
Information from interviews was complemented with press statements, media reports, 
official websites and official statements in the media. Only credible media sources 
such as Tempo News Magazine, the Far Eastern Economic Review and the Jakarta 
Post were utilized. 
Information on the secessionist movements was collected from personal accounts and 
published interviews in the media from those involved in the respective secessionist 
74 Gary King et al., Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research, (Princeton, 
New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1994), p. 119-122 
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movements. The official websites of the secessionist movements also provided a vital 
source of information. NGO reports and interviews from all parties whether for or 
against independence or even taking a neutral stance was explored. Due to the 
sensitivity of the conflict in Aceh, entering various parts of the region is problematic. 
I conducted online or telephone interviews as far as possible. 
Due to the nature and sensitivity of the topic, I acknowledge that each source of 
information had its own agenda. While the Indonesian government and aligned 
sources will downplay various issues of the conflicts such as the number of 
supporters, sources from the secessionist movements may have exaggerated certain 
aspects such as the intensity and the violence inflicted by the state on the people. 
Consequently, methodological triangulation was utilized to enhance the reliability of 
the data collected. Methodological triangulation involves the data collection through a 
number of different methods such as interviews, publications and press statements. 
This thesis utilized the state-in-society approach to offer a theoretical explanation to 
why two secessionist regions in Indonesia have resulted in different outcomes. The 
data collected was examined in the light of the assumed relationship of the 
independent variable: the coalitions between and among social forces and state 
segments which in turn influenced state effectiveness in managing secessionism and 
the dependent variables: the success or failure of the state in maintaining its 
boundaries. If the data collected showed that social forces and state segments did 
influence state effectiveness in managing secessionism, the central hypothesis was 
confirmed. If the findings showed the contrary, I explored the factors that did have an 
impact on the dependent variable. 
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Spelling 
As far as possible, I have tried to use a standard form of transliteration in my study. In 
1972 there were certain changes made to standardised the spelling in the Indonesian 
and Malay languages such as u substituted oe, j replaced dj and j becomes y. Unless 
the old spelling is preferred by an individual (for example `Soeharto' instead of 
`Suharto'), this study followed the 1972 standardised spelling. 
In this chapter, I have laid the theoretical grounds of the state-in-society approach. In 
the next chapter, I will explore the relationship between the Indonesian state and 
social forces. The relationship between the state and social forces within the 
Indonesian state will be explored according to two periods: Soeharto and post- 
Soeharto governments. Chapters Four and Five will specifically focus on the 




The Indonesian State 
The economic shock in Indonesia was a jolted by a wider regional crisis that began in 
July 1997 in Thailand. The much-weakened economy and the sharp devaluation of the 
rupiah from Rp 2,350 to the dollar in June 1997 to Rp 16,500 in January 1998 had 
seemingly brought the New Order to an end. The depreciation of the rupiah had made 
it impossible for Indonesian companies to import foreign goods or to pay off foreign 
debt. Businesses became bankrupt, unemployment rates jumped and prices rose. 
There are a number of diverse views of what caused the economic crisis. On one 
hand, the government was quick to point that the cause of the crisis was purely 
economic and inevitable in an economic cycle. On the other, many thought the 
problems came from within the regime. ' 
Whether the roots of the problem were due to a weak economy or a brittle regime, 
Indonesians definitely thought it was high time for change. Riots not only intensified 
but also multiplied in frequency. It had been reported that 30 incidents of social unrest 
occurred in the first seven weeks of 1998 alone. 2 Jakarta, Medan and main cities 
across Java all became hot spots where riots occurred on a daily basis while in other 
areas unrest was less intense. The Chinese dominating Indonesia's business seemed to 
be the most vulnerable and common target of all. 3 The situation mirrored the intense 
period of May 1967 when the Chinese in Malaysia had become targets which resulted 
1 Hal Hill, Indonesian Economy in Crisis, (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1999), p. 69 
'Far Eastern Economic Review, `Nervous Neighbours', 26 February 1998, p. 16 
1 Far Eastern Economic Review, `Shattered Confidence', 28 May 1998, p. 20 
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in a complete restructuring of the ethnic balance in the economy. 4 University students 
in both Java and the Outer Islands demanded political and economic reforms, the 
abandonment of the military's dwifungsi as well as to daringly call for Soeharto's 
resignation. In an attempt to cling on to power, Soeharto pegged the rupiah at Rp 
5,000 to the US dollar- a somewhat unrealistic move considering the levels of foreign 
reserves were at a mere US$14-17 billion in comparison to the colossal debt of 
US$137.4 billion. 5 The move indicated how Soeharto failed to grasp the seriousness 
of the situation. 
In defiance, Soeharto went ahead and announced his new `crony' cabinet, which 
included his eldest daughter, Siti Hardiyanti (Tutut) Rukmana, as well as long time 
business and golfing partner, Bob Hasan. Other appointments not only ignored 
popular dissatisfaction for KKN, an Indonesian acronym for corruption, collusion and 
nepotism (Korupsi, Kolusi, dan Nepotisme), it also further alienated the New Order 
elites. Soeharto's response to elite disunity bore no resemblance to his capability to 
manage his elites during his 32-year rule. Secure about his place in power or unaware 
of the situation, Soeharto went ahead and removed fuel and electricity subsidies. As a 
consequence, there was a 70 per cent rise in premium petrol prices, 60 per cent 
increase in electricity prices over the following five months and food prices soared. 
The inflation rate reached 60 per cent. In January, there were 14 million unemployed 
Indonesians or 15 per cent of the entire workforce. 6 Soeharto's actions seemed to do 
no good but harm. Demands for him to step down had become louder. However, the 
President insisted that: `It's not that I don't want to step down but doing so now 
4 For more details on the issue see, James Jesudason, `Chinese business and ethnic equilibrium in 
Malaysia', Development and Change, No. 28, p. 119-141 
5 Leo Suryadinata, `A Year of Upheaval and Uncertainty the fall of Soeharto and the rise of Habibie', 
Southeast Asian Affairs 1999, p. 113 
6 Far Eastern Economic Review, `A Sense of Disgust', 14 May 1998, p. 26 
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would only threaten stability'. On the 19 May, Soeharto promised to hold elections. 
After three decades of rigged elections, the president's offer was highly questionable. 
On 18 May 1998 House Speaker, Harmoko, called for Soeharto to tender his 
resignation and further threatened to impeach him if he refused. A once loyal military 
did nothing to intervene or stop the demonstrations. Soeharto's decayed power base 
finally collapsed when General Wiranto told the president the military could no longer 
guarantee security in Jakarta. Acknowledging that support was no longer there, 
Soeharto finally decided to comply. After a three-minute speech on 21 May, the New 
Order came to an end. Ironically, it was these similar conditions- political 
uncertainties, an economic crisis and mortified Chinese- which had eased Soeharto 
and his generals to power. 
It would not be a gross exaggeration to say that very few commentators on Indonesian 
politics had anticipated the end of Soeharto's rule and the New Order would come so 
soon. 8 The state-in-society approach maintains that coalitions and accommodations 
between state segments and social forces may enhance the coalition's capability to 
act. In the process of coalition building, original goals may be transformed to 
accommodate new coalition partners. Coalitions of social forces and state segments 
can only grow out of social control. Social control is getting coalition partners to 
accept the new rules of the game through rewards and sanctions. The greater the 
social control, the more manoeuvrability and strength the state possesses to carry out 
its actions. Indicators that show that the state possesses high levels of social control 
are compliance (to the extent the population conforms with the state's rules), 
'Far Eastern Economic Review, `Endgame', 28 May 1998, p. 13 
' Michael van Langenburg, `How might the Suharto era conclude? ' Inside Indonesia, No 48 October- 
December 1996, www. insideindonesia. org, accessed 13 January 2006 
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participation (organising the population into specialised tasks), and legitimacy (the 
acceptance of the state's rules of the game). However, the mere fact that Soeharto 
ruled Indonesia for 32 years with no substantial opposition or challenges to the state 
or its overall policies, rules and norms does indicate a substantial degree of social 
control throughout this period. 
The literature and analysis of the New Order also seems to support this. William 
Liddle has gone as far as concluding in his 1984 article that the New Order, unlike 
many Third World regimes, had become institutionalised and would likely to outlive 
President Soeharto. 9 Though the present situation has proven Liddle wrong, in 
retrospect, Liddle gave his analysis after the New Order had overcome extreme tests 
such as inheriting an ailing economy with inflation rates as high as 600% from former 
President Sukarno. Despite continued economic development throughout the decades, 
the regime only became increasingly authoritarian in nature. Such a combination is 
beyond the explanation of classical western political thought which cite a positive link 
between capitalist development and democracy. This begs the question, how great 
was social control? What structures were in place to ensure compliance and 
participation from the population? What ensured state legitimacy? How did the 
collapse of the New Order transfigure state and social relations? 
The first section of this chapter is dedicated towards, to use Migdal's term, 
disaggregating both the state and society and the interactions between the two during 
the New Order. State-society relations during this period can be classified as the state 
achieving integrated domination. This is followed by an analysis of state and society 
9 William Liddle, `Suharto's Indonesia: Personal Rule and Political Institutions', Pacific Affairs, no. 58 
Spring 1985), p. 70 
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relations in the period thereafter. The collapse of the New Order transformed state- 
society relations to what would also be classified as integrated domination which 
differs from the New Order in that this period society dominated the state. As the 
Indonesian state gradually consolidated and gained control over the situation, state- 
society relations would be categorised as dispersed domination where neither the state 
society had achieved complete domination over the other. 
The New Order 
There is little consensus to how the New Order should be labelled. Categories range 
from patrimonialism10 as to bureaucratic pluralism'1, from corporatism12 to repressive 
developmentalism13. Though differences remain in this regard, the point of 
agreement would be that the state remained dominant over social forces or had a 
considerable amount of social control. The power of the state during this period 
significantly differed from the early post-independence years when social forces were 
considerably stronger. 14 In comparison, the state versus society during the New Order 
has often been described as a pyramid. 15 Soeharto sat at the apex supported by his 
cronies including the military and the political elite, both of which rested on society. 
As such, political power was highly concentrated at the top, as Rizal Sukma neatly 
10 Harold Crouch, Patrimonialism and Military Rule in Indonesia, World Politics, Vol. 31, No. 4 (Jul., 
1979); Jamie Mackie, `Indonesia: Economic Growth and Depoliticization', in James Morley (ed. ), 
Driven by growth: political change in the Asia-Pacific region, (Armonk, N. Y.: M. E. Sharpe, 1993); Rizal 
Sukma, `Democratic Governance and Security in Indonesia', Japanese Journal of Political Science, 4 
(2), p. 243; Gerry van Klinken, `Out of Africa - Colonial roots of Indonesia's ethnic conflicts', Inside 
Indonesia, No, 95,25 January 2002 
11 Donald K. Emmerson, `Understanding the New Order: Bureaucratic Pluralism in Indonesia', Asian 
Survey, Vol. 23, No. 11 
12 See Dwight King, `Indonesia's New Order as a Bureaucratic Polity, a Neo-patrimonialist Regime or 
Bureaucratic Authoritarian Regime: What difference does it make? ', Benedict Anderson and Audrey 
Kahin (eds. ), Interpreting Indonesian Politics: Thirteen Contributions to the Debate, (Ithaca: Cornell 
Modern Indonesian Project, 1982), P. 104-16 
13 Herbert Feith, `Repressive-Developmentalist Regimes in Asia', Alternatives, No 7,1982, p. 491-506 
14 Mackie, `Indonesia: Economic Growth and Depoliticization', p. 70 
15 Liddle, `Suharto's Indonesia: Personal Rule and Political Institutions', p. 68-90 
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sums it up, the regime functioned on the premise of `rule of man' as opposed to `rule 
of law'. 16 How the state remained dominant over social forces had much to do with 
the various structures in place which contained social forces or state segments from 
challenging the state. The elites and business sector were co-opted through a network 
of patronage. While high growth rates had provided rewards for supporters of the 
regime, small pockets of resistance that emerged from time to time were suppressed 
swiftly. The main task of managing social unrest and secessionism in troubled regions 
were conferred on the military. The mixture of sanctions and rewards ensured 
compliance. Corporatist institutions indicated levels of participation. Popular support 
for a strong government which kept its place in power for three decades indicated had 
legitimacy. 
Soeharto himself carefully managed inter-elite relations. The power concentrated at 
the apex of the New Order pyramid enabled Soeharto to control his elites effectively, 
thus, preventing any disruption of state policies from within the state. There are three 
types of elites that were crucial to the running of his government: the military, the 
bureaucrats and the conglomerates. 17 The military was crucial to maintaining internal 
security including secessionist movements, intelligence, labour unrest and Islamic 
revivalism. The bureaucratic elites contributed to the day-to-day running of the state, 
implementation of government projects and the bureaucracy itself became a source 
for middle class employment. And finally the business conglomerates, predominantly 
under Chinese ownership, that provided the state with capital for its development 
projects and funding for its institutions, kept the economy running and became crucial 
"e Sukma, `Democratic Governance and Security in Indonesia', p. 241 
17 William Case, Politics in Southeast Asia Democracy or Less, (Surrey: Curzon Press, 2002), p. 37 
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business partners to the Soeharto family. Closely connected to the regime, the 
conglomerates took prominence over other social forces. 
Soeharto's relations with his elites were defined by divide and rule. Soeharto 
preferred to cultivate relations with individuals rather than groups. He was renowned 
for playing off one against the other so both would be preoccupied with distrust; thus, 
denying them cohesion or the chance to muster enough strength to challenge him. 
Examples of competing factions can be drawn from Wiranto and Major General 
Prabowo Subianto within the army; and the economically nationalist technologies led 
by B. J. Habibie and the liberalising technocrats apparent within the finance ministry, 
central bank and the Ministry of National Development Planning (Bappenas). '8 This 
was facilitated by the intelligence service that informed him what his elites were up 
to. Furthermore, he rewarded his cronies with benefits that ensured him loyalty 
towards his position and the New Order. 
The Emergence of the New Order- Legitimacy and Consent 
The process of easing Soeharto's predecessor, Sukarno, from the reigns of power 
starting from 1965 is key to understanding how Soeharto gained public consent for a 
change of leadership and the restructuring of the political landscape. How the New 
Order emerged was no simple matter, or as in most regimes with strong military 
backing, the result of an overnight coup. Such a disruption would only incite the 
nation against General Soeharto, then a relatively unknown and apparently apolitical 
ia Ibid, p. 40 
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general. '9 Sukarno enjoyed mass support as the nation's founding father and 
undoubtedly became the representative of Indonesian nationalism and the revolution. 
However in the latter years of Sukarno's guided democracy, Indonesia had the 
ingredients that were right for regime change. Sukarno's political position rested on 
the army while balancing its power off with the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI), 
the world's third largest communist party at the time and the army's archrival. Social 
and political conflict dominated the scene and Sukarno's nationalistic view on the 
economy only made matters worse. The economy deteriorated and inflation was at an 
exceptionally high rate of 600%, there were no foreign reserves and national debt was 
US$2 billion. 20 Consequently, not only did standards of living fall but the lack of 
funds also hindered the government's ability to function effectively let alone carry out 
development plans for the population. 21 As a result, tensions were on the rise. 
General Soeharto emerged in 1965 as a relatively unknown figure that carried out a 
campaign to `rid' Indonesia of members of the PKI which resulted in an estimated 
half a million deaths. 22 Some accounts even suggest two and a half million. 23 Though 
the military became one of the main pillars of the regime, the army was not alone in 
this campaign against the PKI, the rest of the left and Sukarno. The military drew on 
support from a coalition of anti-communists and anti-Sukarno groups including 
Islamic groups, the middle class, student activists and intellectuals. The formation of 
this alliance was known as the `New Order coalition'. This support not only gave rise 
to mass mobilisation against the Old Order but it also provided the military with 
19 Vatikiotis, Indonesian Politics under Suharto, p. 2 
20 Ibid, p. 33 
21 Mackie, `Indonesia: Economic Growth and Depoliticization', p. 74 
22 Case, Politics in Southeast Asia, p. 34, For a more detailed analysis see, Benedict Anderson and Ruth 
McVey, A preliminary analysis of the October 1,1965, coup in Indonesia, 
1971 
23 Stanley, `Opening that Dark Age', Inside Indonesia, No. 63, July-September 2000, 
www. insideindonesia. org, accessed 12 January 2004 
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subsequent legitimacy to take over the reigns of power. In 1966, he began easing 
Indonesia's nationalist hero out of power through the executive order of 11 March, 
Supersemar. A year later Soeharto became acting president and in 1968 retained full 
presidency. 
It was this transferral of leadership, which took almost three years that enabled 
Soeharto and his generals to create a facade of constitutionality and consent from the 
public 24 Soeharto and the army embarked on an anti-PKI campaign accusing the 
communists of being anti-national and anti-Sukarno. Their biggest crime of all was 
being atheist which immediately violated Pancasila's first principle 25, making them 
anti-Pancasila. The New Order Coalition demanded that the PKI be banned from 
politics. When Sukarno had rejected popular demands and called for the situation to 
be resolved peacefully, he immediately became associated with the whole affair. And 
as the army insisted that the coup had everything to do with the PKI, Sukarno refusal 
was perceived as an act of treachery. 26 
Soeharto kept the country in a state of emergency and took steps to prolong the crisis, 
uncertainty and confusion. It was these conditions which came to discredit Sukarno 
and his rule which resulted in the signing of Supersemar on 11 March, handing over 
certain powers to Soeharto to restore calm and order to the nation. Thereafter, the 
violence gradually subsided and the mass murders of PKI members and sympathisers 
quickly declined after March 1966. Amidst the chaos and uncertainty of the time, 
24 I Gusti Agung Ayu Ratih, `Soeharto's New Order State: Imposed Illusions and Invented 
Legitimations', Paper presented as the final paper for the Master of Arts in Southeast Asian Studies- 
History, University of Wisconsin, Madison, Spring 1997, p. 9-31 
25 Belief in the one and only God (Ketuhanan yang Maha Esa) 
26 I Gusti Agung Ayu Ratih, `Soeharto's New Order State: Imposed Illusions and Invented 
Legitimations', p. 18 
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Soeharto justified his gradual take over of power to be a necessity to defend the 
nation, Pancasila and the Constitution. Consequently, the removal of Sukarno became 
a legitimate non-coup. The bloody incidents of 1965-1966 both terrorised and 
convinced Indonesians to avoid political activity as well as to fear what the New 
Order elites were capable of. In turn, this fear helped the state maintain a relatively 
stable society and control challenges posed towards the state's policies, rules and 
norms. In other words, the incidents of 1965-66 helped create legitimacy for the New 
Order, a crucial factor for the state to maintain social control. 
It was this chaotic scene of unstable politics and an ailing economy which the New 
Order Coalition was committed to depart; thus, making economic development and 
political stability the catchphrases of the New Order. Furthermore, the New Order's 
obsession with stability can also be explained through the Javanese notions of power 
which sees powers being concentrated in the hands of the king and not his subjects. 
The power and authority of a Javanese ruler is determined by his capability in 
maintaining and controlling the surrounding areas of his kingdom. Once there are 
signs that the Javanese ruler can no longer maintain control over his kingdom, his 
legitimacy will wane in the eyes of his people. Hence in modern times, Javanese 
notion of power and legitimacy provides the basis for a highly centralised 
government. 27 This has also provided the basis of the relationship between Java and 
the outer islands during colonial times. Javanese court ideologies also reinforce 
hierarchical order in society which legitimises democracy led-by the wisdom of the 
27 For more on the Javanese concept of power see Benedict Anderson, `The 
Idea of Power in Javanese 
Culture', in Claire Holt, Culture and politics in Indonesia, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1972); and 
Benedict Anderson, Language and Power: Exploring Political Cultures in Indonesia, (Ithaca, N. Y: 
Cornell University Press, 1990) 
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elite (kerakytan yang dipimpin oleh hikmat kebijaksanaan dalam 
permusyawaratan/perwakilan). 28 
For Soeharto and the main architects of the New Order, stability and development 
were two sides of the same coin. While seeking to achieve these two crucial aims, the 
New Order elites envisioned state-societal relations that drew heavily from 
organicism or the integral state. The New Order Coalition also committed themselves 
to Pancasila, the five principles authored by Sukarno to unite the diverse young nation 
and the 1945 Constitution which endorses a strong executive. 
Organicism: the basis of state and society relations 
Initially, organicism or integralism was popularised by Professor Raden Supomo, a 
judge during the Japanese occupation, and Ki Hadjar Dewantara from the 1920s to the 
1940s. The concept of integralism sees the state and members of society as an 
integrated whole which in turn reflects patterns of authority found in a traditional 
family or an orderly village society. 29 The state is united with its people and should 
transcend all groups within society of which relations are to be based on mutual 
assistance (gotong rojong) and that of a family. 3o 
The concept of organicism was drawn from two sources. The first source derived 
from the principles of harmony and consensus which the New Order elite saw as a 
28 See The Preamble to the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia, www. indonesia- 
gateway. web. id/content, accessed 14 January 2006; Also see Liddle, `Soeharto's Indonesia: Personal 
Rule and Political Institutions', p. 81 
29 David Bourchier and Vedi R. Hadiz (eds. ), Indonesian Politics and Society A Reader, (London: 
RouledgeCurzon, 2003), p. 8; Schwarz, A Nation in Waiting, p. 8 
30 Supomo, `An Integralistic State', in Herbert Feith and Lance Castles (eds. ), Indonesian Political 
Thinking, 1945-1965, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1970), p. 190-191 
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characteristic from `Eastern' culture -a culture which also embodies the Indonesian 
4spirit'. 31 This spirit `is characterised by the ideal of the unity of life... [T]he state is 
nothing but the entire society or entire people of Indonesia, as an ordered, structure 
unity'32. This is in contrast to western societies which are based on individualism and 
liberalism. Such qualities according to Supomo, `[gave] rise to imperialism and 
exploitation, producing chaos and disruption in the world, physically and spiritually' 
which Indonesians should `shun' in the process of nation building. 33 The other source 
was drawn from Javanese political culture of which aristocrat officials or priyayi such 
as Supomo were representative. 34 The emphasis was on order, authority and hierarchy 
which became strong features of the New Order. 
As state and society were viewed as an integrated whole, there was no room for 
conflict between state and society. Integralism had denied the public of any political 
participation. Furthermore, it had also had been influential in reorganising state and 
society of the New Order which gradually portended a state which dominated society. 
As Soeharto stated in a historic state address in August 1967 on the eve of 
independence day that `... the New Order is nothing less than ordering of the entire 
life of the people... '35 
This begs the question, how did society view the concept of the organic state? The 
most crucial factor in determining the strength of the state is legitimacy. It involves 
31 See Colonel Abdulkadir Besar, `Abdulkadir Besar: the family state', in Bourchier and Hadiz (eds. ), 
Indonesian Politics and Society, p. 41-42 
32 Supomo, `An Integralistic State', p. 190-191 
33 Ibid, p. 188 
34 Richard Robison, `Tensions in state and regime', in Kevin Hewison, Richard Robison and Garry 
Rodan (eds. ), Southeast Asia in the 1990s: authoritarianism, democracy and capitalism, (St. Leonards, 
N. S. W.: Allen & Unwin, 1993), p. 42 
3s Soeharto, `Soeharto: Pancasila Democracy' in Bourchier and Hadiz (eds. ), Indonesian Politics and 
Society A Reader, p. 37 
82 
the acceptance of the state's rules and norms as true and right. It is the popular 
acknowledgement and acceptance of the social order. 36 As mentioned earlier, the 
chaos and breakdown of order during the period 1965-66 had a profound effect on 
many that no one wished for a repeat incident that resembled anything like the tragic 
events of 1965-66.37 Mass politics was also widely perceived to be a source of 
instability and according to the `New Order radicals' and political mobilisation that 
occurred during the Old Order was perceived as a major obstacle to modernisation. 38 
Therefore, a strong government was needed to remedy the situation of chaos and 
instability. And as a result, many members, even a few disgruntled ones, involved in 
the New Order Coalition continued to lend its support to the new government. 
Furthermore, the painful history of 1965-66 had a powerful impact on those who lived 
through it. The perceived need for a strong government in turn created legitimacy or 
what the state-in-society approach would define as the society's `acceptance of the 
state's rules and its social control as `true and right'. However, the gradual maturation 
of the middle class over the years transformed those fears of chaos which initially 
helped maintain the stability of the New Order. During the latter years of the New 
Order, students protests and social unrest within Jakarta and emerged in other areas 
showed that the middle classes no longer shared the New Order's ideals of how to 
maintain stability and order. 
36 Migdal, State in Society Studying How State and Societies Transform and Constitution One Another, 
52 
37 Michael van Langenberg, The New Order State: Language, Ideology, Hegemony', in Arief 
Budiman (eds. ), State and Civil Society in Indonesia, (Victoria: Centre of Southeast Asian Studies, 
Monash University, 1990), p. 126; Mackie, `Indonesia: Economic Growth and Depoliticization', p. 75; 
Edward Aspinall, `Indonesia: broadening oppositional base', in Garry Roden (ed. ), Political Opposition 
in Industrialising Asia, (London and New York: Routledge, 1996), p. 215 
38 Ibid, p. 222 
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Though in my final analysis I argue that the state during this period remained 
dominant over society, I deem it crucial to raise two incidents that posed challenges to 
the state that may indicate that social control had weakened. Though organicism 
defined the basis of state and social relations, denying that there was a complete 
absence of political opposition during the period in which the New Order was in 
power would be misleading. However, it is safe to make claims that there was no 
significant opposition to the regime. 
Though the New Order commanded much authority, the state did not possess this 
authority immediately when it resumed power. There were a few challenges to the 
regime that only later resulted in the closing down of political space for social forces. 
Opposition in the early period of the New Order derived from the rupture within the 
New Order Coalition itself. However, because these groups shared common interests 
with the regime- economic development and stability, which Sukarno was unable to 
provide- opposition did not seek to overthrow the regime but sought to correct it. As 
such, criticisms channelled towards the government were `reserved and respectful'39. 
They became critical of corruption and the aim was to save the government from 
going down the `wrong' path. Some even placed the blame on corrupt generals that 
surrounded Soeharto, rather than Soeharto himself. 40 In other words, opposition came 
from where the state was embedded in society or what Aspinall otherwise terms as the 
`grey area zone'41. 
39 Edward Aspinall, Opposing Suharto Compromise, Resistance, and Regime Change in Indonesia, 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005), p. 23 
40 Ibid, p. 24 
41 Aspinall, `Indonesia: broadening oppositional base', in Roden (ed. ), Political Opposition in 
Industrialising Asia, p. 215 
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The first signs of opposition came when discontent amongst the supporters-turned- 
critics soon turned into action that culminated in the Malari riots in January 1974. 
Later in the run up to the 1977 elections and the 1978 MPR's session, members of the 
New Order coalition protested against the government and called for Soeharto to be 
held responsible for the `deviations from the 1945 Constitution and Pancasila'42. 
Again, the government dealt with the situation via force and further restrictions were 
also imposed, consequently, closing down on political space and entering a decade 
which steadily enhanced state dominance. Jamie Mackie identifies the Malari riots as 
the `watershed' moment to the strengthening of the New Order regime. 43 The gradual 
dominance of the state thereafter, which took place during the 1980s, has also led 
Liddle to describe the New Order in 1987 `at the height of its power'44. The incident 
signified an end to relatively open politics and the beginning of a more repressive 
environment. Though there were subsequent challenges to the regime stemming from 
the military known as the `Petition of Fifty' and the Islamic quarter, like early 
opposition these incidents were swiftly dealt with by reinforcing the dominance of the 
state. 
The second incident came towards the end of the 1980s and early 1990s when there 
was a shift in the government's tone towards political liberalisation, thus, entering an 
era known as keterbukaan (openness). Openness during this period entailed the 
loosening of media censorship, the release of dissidents, and the toleration of protests, 
demonstrations and criticisms against the government, open discussion surrounding 
the question of succession as well as parliament calling for greater government 
42 Aspinall, Opposing Suharto Compromise, Resistance, and Regime Change in Indonesia, p. 24 
43 Mackie, `Indonesia: Economic Growth and Depoliticization', p. 79 
44 R. William Liddle, `Indonesia in 1987: The New Order at the Height of Its Power', Asian Sun'ey, 
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accountability. 45 Furthermore, Indonesia witnessed the creation of Komnas HAM or 
the Indonesian Human Rights Commission. However, these moves are not to be 
interpreted as the weakening of the state or transformations of state-societal relations 
in any form. Overall, the state during this period remained dominant over society. 
Openness was stimulated by then US Ambassador Paul Wolfowitz's farewell speech 
in which he called for greater openness to accompany the rapid economic growth at 
the time. It has been argued that this was also complemented by social forces and the 
growing tensions within the regime which called for openness and reform policies. 46 
However, I agree with Bertrand that social forces were weak due to a mixture of co- 
optation and the regime's coercive measures towards opposition. Furthermore, `[t]he 
president is fond of floating trial balloons to test the grounds for support'47. Though 
students protests intensified `surpris[ing] many observers in Jakarta'48 and there were 
increased levels of public discussion indicating a growing maturity amongst the 
population, the slow pace of political openness reflected the government's hesitant 
attitude towards liberalisation. 49 The extent to which liberalisation was allowed was 
controlled by the government indicated that the government still had a firm grip on 
the situation. 50 After the closure of the three prominent news magazines, the return to 
coercion accelerated. As such, liberalisation did not lead to a transition as in most 
cases but instead further strengthened authoritarian structures in place. Such a process 
is termed by Jacques Bertrand as `false starts'. 51 
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50 Donald K. Emmerson, `Indonesia in 1990 A Foreshadow Play', Asian Survey, Vol. 31, No. 2, P. 179 
51 Jacques Bertrand, `False Starts, Succession Crises, and Regime Transition: Flirting with Openness in 
Indonesia', Pacific Affairs, Vol. 69, no. 3, Fall 1996 
86 
Compliance 
That there were only two failed protests at the lack of freedoms indicates the 
Indonesian state had a considerable amount of social control throughout its 32-year- 
rule. While there is still much to be said concerning force and the main agent of force: 
the military, which I shall return to later in the chapter, coercion and force were not 
the only factors which kept the New Order in power for over three decades. Only 
those who stepped out of the boundaries deemed acceptable to the New Order elite 
were dealt with by force. And though the military was one of the main pillars of the 
regime, the New Order cannot be narrowly defined as military based. There was also 
less forceful ways of gaining support from the population through rewards. In the 
following section, I will further examine how the New Order co-opted or rewarded 
social forces. While integralism or organism defined state and society relations, 
economic development that brought about high growth rates assured continued 
support for the regime as well as an important source of funding for the creation of 
patrimonial ties. In comparison with the Sukarno's Old Order where there was much 
talk of sustaining the revolutionary spirit, Soeharto addressed the needs of the people. 
Many sectors of society were incorporated into state sponsored organisations. 
Elections and political parties also indicated participation on part of the population. In 
the following section, I will explore the New Order's repressive measures used to 
keep social forces under control and ensured their compliance with the state's 
demands. It was these two elements that kept social challenges at bay: rewards and 
sanctions which in turn ensured compliance. 
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Rewards 
The New Order regime emerged when the economy was on the brink of collapse. 
However, under favourable conditions, the economy gradually improved bringing a 
considerable amount of prosperity to Indonesians. The sharp increase in world oil 
prices in the 1970s became an almost overnight solution to the ailing economy. 
Indonesian crude oil in 1972 fetched less than $US 3a barrel but increased to over 
$US 30 a barrel by 1980. It was during this period that revenues from oil had 
increased by 45.5% that provided the funding for development projects and the 
installation of services and infrastructure. 52 This was complemented by an inflow of 
foreign aid. As western nations became concerned with the threat of communism 
engulfing Southeast Asia, a group of 13 western countries together with Japan and a 
few multilateral lending agencies established the `Inter-Governmental Group on 
Indonesia' or IGGI in 1967.53 The group agreed not only to reschedule Indonesia's 
massive debt but also pledged new loans to restore the country's battered economy 
and has held annual meetings thereafter. As a result, Indonesia's GDP expanded by 
7.7% rising standards of living of many; consequently, tackling one of the main 
problems that brought the New Order coalition together in the first place. 
This new source of wealth considerably alleviated poverty in Indonesia and provided 
the crucial funding for development projects across the archipelago. By the mid- 
1970s, there was a significant improvement in communications and the outer islands 
no longer seemed as isolated and as difficult to reach as before. 54 Development 
programmes were implemented in areas such as agriculture, education, health which 
52 Vatikiotis, Indonesian Politics under Suharto, p. 34 
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reached out to every level of society. As the New Order came into being in 1967, 
poverty afflicted on 67% of the population gradually eased and dropped dramatically 
to 15% in 1990.55 Income per capita was just above $US 260 in 1970 but rose to 
almost double to over $US 500 in 1980.56 However, development did more than raise 
the standard of living of most Indonesians. Development programmes were 
implemented by government agencies enhanced the strength of the role of the 
government over society. 57 As mentioned earlier, much of the population did not wish 
to return to the situation under the Old Order. As such, high growth rates became a 
crucial source of support for the New Order which in turn legitimised its rule. 
It was economic growth that also became critical to securing support from those, 
predominately the Chinese, civil servants and a few bureaucratic families, who 
profited from the distribution of benefits that came with it, creating a web of 
patrimonialism. It was these business groups that were given prominence over other 
social forces in Indonesia. Soeharto entrusted the Chinese with lucrative deals because 
of their ethnicity. The Chinese were vulnerable to resentment of other Indonesians 
and therefore were `in a position to have their capital exploited in return for 
protection'58. The Chinese only constituted a fraction of Indonesia's immense 
population but 70% Indonesia's non-landed wealth belongs to the Chinese. 59 
Close links between state segments such as the military and capitalism developed into 
a relationship Richard Robison terms as `bureaucratic capitalism'. 60 Bureaucratic 
55 Schwarz, A Nation in Waiting, p. 58 
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agencies possessed the authority to allocate import licences and distributorships such 
as oil drilling, forestry concessions, and government contracts for construction. For 
example, the state run oil corporation, Pertamina, had very little to do with drilling 
and was primarily responsible for distributing drilling concessions to foreign 
companies. Similarly, Bulog dealt with basic food commodities and allocated 
distributorships of these goods to local businessmen. 61 
Not only did the bureaucratic officials and the military allocate benefits to their 
cronies, but the president himself and his family were also involved in some of the 
most lucrative businesses. In an attempt to nurture the automobile industry, Soeharto 
launched a national car project in February 1996 which was awarded to his son, 
Hutomo "Tommy" Mandala Putra. The incentive included a three-year tax exemption 
from import duties and luxury taxes to Indonesian car manufacturers using a local 
brand name and parts. As a result, Tommy could sell his `Timor' brand of cars at 
duty free prices for 35.75 million rupiah which was half the price of other car models 
of similar type such as the Toyota Corolla which sold for 70 million rupiah. 62 
President Soeharto and his family were also closely connected to other prominent 
businessmen such as Liem Sioe Liong, who was reportedly one of the richest men in 
the world. Liem provided roughly half of Indonesia's cement used in various rural 
construction projects such as roads, schools and health centres known as INPRES 
(Presidential Instruction). 63 
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As the economy continued to grow at exceptional rates, expansion of the state ran 
along side with it. During the period of 1974-83, revenues expanded, the bureaucracy 
grew from 1.67 to 2.63 million civil servants, and state enterprises increased in 
number making the state the biggest employer. 64 The bureaucracy is ubiquitous in 
every part of society- from the capital down the village. As such, the authority of the 
bureaucracy cannot be underestimated. Because these groups were dependent on the 
state, little was done to disrupt or even correct it. `Who cares if there is a little 
corruption here and there. Consider it a bonus for those who brought prosperity to the 
country', someone had once mentioned to me in an idle conversation during a trip to 
Jakarta. It is this attitude that has led to conservatism among those who benefited 
from economic growth and feared the risk of regime change and continued their 
support for the New Order. 
Despite the corruption and cronyism that came with Soeharto's web of 
partimonialism, the New Order has made major transformations that have not only 
made an impact on the majority in terms of standards of living but also on the 
country's economic status on the whole. 65 There was no doubt that Indonesia's 
industrialisation placed Indonesia among the ranks of Asia's rapid growing and 
changing economies. The World Bank hailed Indonesia as a member of the group of 
countries with phenomenal growth rates who experienced the `Asian Miracle'. 66 High 
growth rates have in turn had a positive effect on the overall population as suggested 
64 Vatikiotis, Indonesian Politics under Suharto, p. 37 
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in the World Bank report. Poverty declined and on the whole, economic development 
raised the standards of living for Indonesians. 67 
Sanctions 
The Indonesian Military (or what known under the New Order as Angkatan 
Bersenjala Republik Indonesia or ABRI)68 has maintained itself as the defender of the 
Pancasila state and guarantor of the five Silas or principles which are not to be 
violated. 69 In practice, this means that the military does not respond to threats but 
responds to what it perceives as a security threat. Consequently, the military has not 
only become involved in external and internal security such as controlling separatism 
but it has also restricted the boundaries of governmental reform. Crucial to the 
military is the third sila or unity of Indonesia which embodies the slogan of `unity in 
diversity' but with more emphasis on the unity as opposed to the diversity aspect of 
the slogan. 
The military was one of the main pillars of strength that supported the New Order and 
Soeharto's position in power. It made sure that religious and ethnic unrest, Islamic 
revivalism and labour discontent did not threaten stability of the regime. However, not 
all security threats were met with the same military response. Different levels of 
coercion and repression were applied according to different types of opposition. 
Perceived threats against the state ideology, such as the PKI and secession received 
67 Ibid, p. 33 
68 TNI before April 1999 was formerly known as the Armed Forces of the Republic of Indonesia 
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the harshest response. Challenges from the lower classes received a harsher response 
in comparison to the middle classes. 70 
In the 1970s, dwifungsi justified the expansion of the military's control over key 
institutions of the state via transferring military personnel and placing them in civilian 
positions. The expansion of the military into civilian life reached the point where the 
military became by far Indonesia's largest political organisation. The military's 
organisational structure runs parallel with the civilian government at all levels. 
Positions such as cabinet ministers, member of parliaments, provincial governors, 
district heads, senior bureaucrats and ambassadors were reserved for both active and 
retired officers. By the late 1970s, half the cabinet, 56% of the district officers, 78% 
of the director-generals in the bureaucracy, 84% of ministerial secretaries and almost 
half of the country's diplomats were military officers. 71 The military's presence was 
also felt at the sub-national level. By 1983,20 out of 27 governors were military 
officials and up to 40% were district heads. 72 
The territorial structure made the military's presence conspicuous from the national 
down to the village level as if enabled the military to maintain control and respond to 
unrest effectively and as quickly as possible. The territorial structure in which the 
archipelago was divided into areas, each under control of the army, ensured that 
regional governments remained loyal to Jakarta. 73 The system that began taking shape 
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in the early years of the new republic gradually developed to the point where it had 
utmost control over the population. 
The military's role at all levels of society is justified by the military's doctrine 
dwifungsi or dual function but crucial to its strategy is the doctrine of Universal of 
People's Defence or Sishankamrata. This doctrine defines the relationship between 
the state and the army and most importantly with the people. In theory, the very basis 
of this strategy is the spontaneous help from the people when called for and in 
practice the army commands a great deal of influence over the population especially 
at the grassroots level even after the fall of Soeharto. 74 Illustrations of the strategy in 
use are the military's use of militias and informers used in both East Timor and Aceh. 
The use of force was used in situations such as 1965-66 purge against the PKI 
members and the challenge of secession. Details of how the military brought about 
social control will be discussed in Chapters Four and Five. 
Participation 
According the state-in-society approach, states also gain social control by organising 
the population into specialised tasks within institutions of the state. The regime's 
main political machinery, Golkar was based on an army formed-organisation of anti- 
communist groups in 1964. Though the army had appropriated the concept of 
functional groups, the concept itself had been part of Sukarno's National Front 
strategy which complemented the multiparty system. Later Golkar incorporated many 
74 Vatikiotis, Indonesian Politics under Suharto, p. 62 
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other functional groups representing farmers, labour unions and businesses. The 
reason for incorporating these groups and labelling Golkar as a functional group as 
opposed to a political party was that political parties in the past were seen as a source 
of political chaos. 75 Most importantly, it was perceived that the multiparty system 
encouraged political attachment to particular ethnic, regional or religious based 
identities. 76 
In 1973, the existing political parties were forced to merge into two groups, 
consequently, forming the United Development Party (PPP) that was an 
amalgamation of Islamic based parties and the Indonesian Democratic Party (PDI) 
that joined forces with nationalists and Christian based parties. The amalgamations of 
political parties were in line with the principles of musyawarah and mufakat, or 
consultation and consensus which reflected the New Order's attempts to de-politicise 
society and its distaste for mass politics. " This also echoes the general literature on 
civil-military relations which cites the military's aversion for mass politics. In many 
cases, establishing an association with universal membership becomes appealing to 
the military because of its potential to mobilise the population to achieve the goal of 
18 national development, 
At the same time, elections were held to portray an image of `democracy'. Contrary to 
this image, Pancasila had muted any form of competition between political parties. In 
1982, legislation was outlined which proposed that all social organisations should 
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accept Pancasila as the basis of their organisation, was formally enacted three years 
later, consequently, making Pancasila the sole ideology (asas tunggal) of the state. 
Pancasila ideology is a set of five principles pronounced by President Sukarno on I 
June 1945 which is also in accordance with integralist thought. Pancasila was first 
announced to the public in an attempt to establish a common ground within the 
diverse nation which would coincide with the boundaries of the Dutch East Indies and 
fend off demands for an Islamic state. 79 The elites of the New Order had kept the 
ideals of those who contributed to the formation of Indonesian identity and 
nationalism as well as the 1945 Constitution but presented their own interpretation in 
such a way that served to enhance their rule over society. One crucial element of 
Pancasila is its reference to the historical experience of Indonesians. As such, 
Pancasila does not become a foreign ideology imposed on the people but a tradition 
that has always been conspicuous in Indonesian society. However, Pancasila is static. 
There is much talk of development without any mention of social change and instead 
an emphasis is placed on order and stability. As Michael Morfit notes Pancasila, as 
perceived by the New Order, is `an ideology of containment rather than one of 
mobilization' with an emphasis on `unity rather direction'. 80 
Consequently, PDI and PPP were indistinguishable from Golkar. This had more of an 
effect on PPP. Having Pancasila as its ideological foundation had posed a serious 
handicap as the party aimed to represent itself as an Islamic party. Furthermore in 
1985, the PPP was required to change the party's emblem from the Ka'abah in Mecca 
79 Ramage, Politics in Indonesia Democracy, Islam and the Ideology of Tolerance, p. 2 
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to a star derived from the official symbol of Pancasila. 81 Most importantly, being 
elected did not necessarily confer an MP or parliament as a whole with the power to 
have a say in budgetary, control and legislative matters as stipulated in the 1945 
Constitution. The DPR was an asymmetrical and passive partner to the executive 
branch of the Indonesian political system. Its use was more oriented towards 
discussion for policy making but not as law-making body rendering it powerless. 82 
By holding elections while containing popular expressions, David Jenkins quite 
rightly notes: 
... the government up[held] the letter of the Constitution while steadfastly 
ignoring the principles and intent. The president went to great lengths to 
present himself as a strict constitutionalist and provided all the formal 
trappings of popular sovereignty, as specified in the Constitution. There 
was a People's Consultative and a People's Representative Council 
(Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat, DPR). There were periodic elections and 
secret ballots. The president was "elected" by the MPR, and his ministers 
and senior officials made routine appearances before the DPR's 
committees to report back to the people's representatives and answer 
questions about the government's policy. All of this meant very little. 
The Legislative branch lived very much in the shadow of the executive; 
in the MPR of 1978-83,86 per cent of the 920 representatives owed their 
positions in one way or another to their selection by bodies that were 
83 largely under the influence of the president or his chief lieutenants. 
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Various mechanisms were in place to ensure Golkar's landslide victory. As the New 
Order progressed, these smaller groups were soon marginalized and the bureaucracy 
and military dominated Golkar. The amalgamation of various political parties under 
the PPP and PDI banner had resulted in internal divisions and each party bearing no 
clear identity. Consequently, this prevented either party from becoming effective 
political organisations or a serious contender against Golkar. The `floating mass', a 
depoliticisation strategy, made sure that the two quasi-opposition parties, the PPP and 
the PDI, were prevented from campaigning at the village level. It was predominately 
aimed at appeasing the lower classes. 84 A group of Chinese Christian students close to 
Ali Moertopo, Soeharto's long time intelligence aide that supported the New Order in 
its early days had helped formulate the new concept in fear of an Islamic revival. 85 
The justification for the floating mass was noted by Ali Moertopo, one of the chief 
architects of the New Order was that politics should be confined to the centre down to 
the district level. As he notes: `... it is only right to attract the attention of mainly the 
village people away from the political problems and ideological exclusiveness to 
efforts of national development of their own rural societies'. He continues to 
emphasise `... people in the villages will not spend their valuable time and energy in 
the political struggles of parties and groups, but will be occupied wholly with 
development efforts', strongly indicating that the New Order elites placed economic 
development above political activities. 86 Civil servants played an active role in 
campaigning for the Golkar. Together with the reserved seats for the military and 
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appointed seats to various groups carefully screened, the New Order had a firm 
position in the political system. 87 
The military's involvement to ensure Golkar's victory cannot be stressed enough. As 
Rachmat Witoelar, Golkar's secretary-general from 1988-1993 noted in `the past 
elections the military was responsible for 50% of Golkar vote, the bureaucracy 25% 
and 25% from the party itself"'. The army's territorial structure, which ran parallel 
with Indonesia's administrative structure, not only warranted the army's control of the 
population from the capital down to the village level but also enabled it to keep a 
close eye on, and nudge its civilian counterparts when needed. 89 The military's 
presence was felt in many respects including travelling, which needed the military's 
permission. The military also made decisions on specific targets such as particular 
members of parties or local leaders within the community who drew too much 
attention from the people. Furthermore, the military decided on the type of operations, 
known as "Guidance Operations" or Opsgalagan that should be launched against 
them. Consequently, the military had control over nearly every aspect of political and 
social life of the population through its own territorial structure. 90 
While politics of elections closed down channels for any form of potentially effective 
opposition, the state made certain that social forces were also co-opted into a number 
of state corporatist organisations. This ultimately linked a governmental body to a 
specific segment within society through compulsory membership for all those 
concerned. Prominent corporatist organisations included Kadin, the Chamber of 
87 Case, Politics in Southeast Asia Democracy or Less, p. 48-9 
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Commerce and Industry which co-opted the business sector. Another example is the 
Majelis Ulama Indonesia (Indonesian Council of Islamic Teachers or MUI). 91 In most 
cases, at the very least a handful of members belonging to these corporatist 
organisations would aim to develop closer ties to the government. Like political 
parties or any state constituted body, corporatist organisations are also susceptible to 
state intervention in internal matters. 
As the bureaucracy grew, Soeharto also extended his control through the bureaucracy 
though compulsory membership of KOPRI (Indonesian Civil Service Corps) that was 
the only social organisation civil servants was permitted to join. KOPRI, in turn, was 
required to ally itself with Golkar. The state went as far to interfere into private 
matters in areas such as marriage and divorce. From 1978 onwards, P4 programmes 
were in place. They were used to indoctrinate the bureaucracy. Courses were also 
offered to businessmen and students to learn the importance of Pancasila. Any civil 
servant holding the rank below cabinet minister was required to undertake a two-week 
P4 course from eight in the morning to six in the evening that solely taught the 
importance of the state ideology, Pancasila as a justification for its policies. 92 Content 
of the courses echoed the buzzwords of the New Order or what was known as the 
`trilogy of development'. This included equal development, increasing economic 
growth as well as national security and stability. How the government perceived its 
utmost importance was exemplified in its strict regulations regarding the upgrading 
during the course. Attendance was compulsory and missing one class, the attendee 
had to start the entire programme from the beginning. Exams were taken to assess the 
91 Liddle, `Soeharto's Indonesia: Personal Rule and Political Institutions', p. 
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overall performance of each bureaucrat which was important in the consideration for 
promotion. 93 
Various strategies so far mentioned including patrimonialism and high economic 
growth rates provided rewards for many sections of society. Elections and 
corporatism which were utilised ensured participation from social forces. As 
mentioned earlier, integralism and Pancasila promoted harmony and unity; however, 
it also gave the military the legitimacy to respond to opposition with an iron fist. 
Fighting along side the nationalist movement against the Dutch, the army perceived 
itself creator rather than an instrument of the state. Its involvement also became its 
justification for its role in politics which was upheld by dwifungsi, the military's 
ideology. It was the only military organisation in Southeast Asia that has a legal and 
ideological basis for its role in politics. 
The state-in-society approach assumes that with the ability to control social forces 
comes the effectiveness of mobilising the population. The greater the social control, 
the more the state can achieve in terms of their goals and how the rules of the game 
should be. 94 Increasing social control is reflected in three indicators including 
compliance, participation and legitimacy. The military's territorial structure, high 
economic growth and patrimonial ties ensured compliance from the population. 
Corporatist institutions and political parties guaranteed participation from the 
population at all levels. Indonesians supported the highly centralised nature of the 
New Order; thus, giving the New Order the legitimacy to act in order to avoid a 
situation of political instability and economic turmoil similar under Sukarno. Overall, 
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the New Order had significantly high levels of social control. Only a few sporadic 
incidents of social opposition such as Malari riots, Petition of Fifty and social 
demands for openness during the late 1980s show that the Indonesian state dominated 
social forces. 
Post-Soeharto Indonesia 
In reference to Liddle's depiction of Soeharto's New Order as `all anchor and no sail', 
David Bouchier describes B. J. Habibie's interim administration as `a dingy in a storm, 
battered by the fickle winds of international capital and a domestic demanding 
political reforms, justice and food'95. 
It would be a gross misjudgement to say that the economic crisis was solely 
responsible for bringing an end to the New Order. Soeharto not only survived a severe 
test when he took over power but throughout the New Order he had also overcome the 
turmoil of economic ills which has only served to enhance his grip on power. While 
maintaining high growth rates, the New Order had a firm grip on politics and political 
opposition never posed a serious threat throughout its 32 years in power. However, 
placing too much importance on the Asian Financial Crisis as a causal factor of 
Soeharto's downfall does obscure other factors at play. The political system had 
grown brittle near the end. Factions among the elites were more apparent, the 
economy was not only dependent on foreign capital but was also monopolised by the 
president's family and cronies. 
95 David Bouchier, `Habibie's Interregnum: Reformasi, Elections, Regionalism and the Struggle for 
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What seemed like a deviant case beyond the explanation of classical political theories, 
capitalist development had perhaps gradually brought about a political conscience 
class under the extreme orderliness of the New Order. Consequently, a once strong 
government vis-ii-vis society began to unravel. 
The economic crisis stripped Soeharto clean of resources which he depended on to 
maintain his system of patronage and contain social forces. 96 As such, the economic 
crisis should be treated as a crucial precipitating factor which triggered a series of 
events. In the past, Soeharto had managed to keep his elites content and maintained 
support through a web of patrimonialism while pursuing a few technocratic 
necessities important for economic growth such as deregulation policies that were 
implemented during the 1980s. However, while flirting with deregulation, Soeharto, 
his family, cronies and bureaucratic families still benefited from monopolies, access 
to bank credits and industrial projects. 97 Unfortunately for the New Order elites, the 
IMF had imposed remedies for the country's economic ills which as a result placed 
Soeharto in a dilemma of continuing to support his cronies or adopting technocratic 
remedies. 
It soon became apparent how crucial strong economic growth was to the longevity of 
the New Order. Rival groups that had been cultivated and maintained by Soeharto had 
given way to elite disunity as tensions and cracks amongst the New Order elite began 
to surface. As early as 1997, Amien Rais, a university lecturer and a figure who had 
connections with a number of modernist Muslim organisations announced that he 
would stand to compete against Soeharto in the 1997 elections. He later played a role 
96 Case, Politics in Southeast Asia Democracy or Less, p. 52 
97 Ibid, p. 55 
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in supporting the opposition especially students groups in their bid to topple the New 
Order. 98 Military commanders had also allegedly been masterminding anti-Chinese 
violence. 99 Furthermore, disunity amongst the commanding ranks began to surface 
between General Wiranto and General Prawono Subianto, Soeharto's son-in-law. '00 
In the run up to Soeharto's resignation, five private channels began broadcasting daily 
pictures of angry protesters who took to the streets demanding for political and 
economic reform. In a once controlled information society, the population watched as 
the army shot students at Trisakti University on 12 May. Reports poured in on the 
mass human rights abuses in Aceh, West Papua and East Timor, tarnishing the 
reputation of the armed forces. As the media coverage poured in, calls for the military 
to abandon its dwifungsi doctrine became louder. '0' 
Though social forces were strong, opposition to Soeharto and the New Order lacked 
leadership and co-ordination. Amien Rais, the most vocal and confrontational of the 
three, was leader of the Muhammdiyah, a Muslim group claiming 28 million 
members. Abdurraman Wahid leader of NU, which boasted 34 million Muslim 
members, was less direct in calling for reform. Finally, there was Megawati 
Sukarnoputri, daughter of Indonesia's first president, who took on a more symbolic 
role as opposed to an active one. The three beacons of reformasi found it hard to unify 
themselves which left the only functioning institution with the role of the power 
broker: the army. The disunity amongst the civilian elite and an absence of civilian 
98 Ibid, p. 59 
99 Far Eastern Economic Review, `Playing with Ire', 5 March 1998, p. 18 
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leader to replace the former dictator prevented a total collapse of the regime and also 
set the trend for post-Soeharto politics. 102 
It is unclear what lay behind the army's uncharacteristic restraint. Apart from the 
incident at Trisakti University, the army had shown no sign of intervening. While 
trying to accommodate student demands, Wiranto did not side with the reformasi bloc 
to challenge Soeharto's authority. As the riots intensified, the situation forced the 
army to choose between its patron and the people. The military's restrained attitude 
towards the situation ignited speculation that loyalty was shifting. 103 Did the military 
perceive intervention as potentially harmful to its reputation as well as the nation? Or 
had the division amongst the ranks prevented the army from taking action? '°4 
Alternatively, perhaps a once defiant army had bowed to the pressures of the 
international community. 1 05 However, the wave of reformasi was strong and 
Soeharto's days were clearly numbered. Ultimately, the military had no choice but to 
comply and side with the victors. The reformers had prevailed over a fragmented and 
bewildered army, an unimaginable thought only a couple of months back. 
When Soeharto stepped down on 21 May 1998, the political system was not only in 
complete disarray but was also disoriented. The economy, which had once enjoyed 
high growth rates, was rapidly deteriorating. The dormant society of the New Order 
was calling for reformasi. The upsurge in ethnic conflicts in areas such Ambon and 
secessionism in East Timor, Aceh and Papua which had been long suppressed, ignited 
fears of `Balkanisation' amongst the elite and stimulated debate among Western 
102 Marcus Mietzner, The Politics of Military Reform in post-Suharto Indonesia: Elite Conflict, 
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academics. 106 The new political landscape was an extreme opposite of that of the New 
Order. The most significant difference was that state power had considerably 
weakened vis-ä-vis social forces. As illustrated in the first half of this chapter, the 
state had the ability to mobilise the population. State corporatist institutions ensured 
participation from the population and the bureaucracy. As the majority of the 
population did not wish to return to the same conditions of an ailing economy and 
political instability of that of the Old Order, this created the legitimacy for a strong 
centralised government. Overall, low levels of challenges and civil unrest throughout 
the archipelago indicated conformity and legitimacy during the New Order. Social 
forces demanding reformasi and Soeharto's removal signified a shift in state-society 
relations. The reformasi period clearly indicated a reduction of social control or the 
levels of participation, compliance and legitimacy the state enjoyed during the New 
Order. Once the calls for reformasi became louder, Habibie, Soeharto's hand picked 
successor, had no other choice but to accede to the demands of society. 
As one of Soeharto's cronies, Habibie lacked popular support. His plans to develop 
Indonesia's industry sector left international lenders astounded. 107 He had a strong 
role in extending state industries and was also a member of a politico-business family 
with links with the Soeharto family businesses and Chinese conglomerates. 108 Hence, 
his commitment to reform was questionable. Habibie was essentially Soeharto's 
choice and a consequence of Soeharto's Javanese style of divide and rule and 
therefore, lacked the support at the elite level. Most importantly, he failed to 
lob For example, Donald Emmerson, `Will Indonesia Survive'? ' Foreign Affairs, May/June 2000; Anne 
Booth, `Will Indonesia Break up', Inside Indonesia, No. 59 July -Sept 1999, www. 
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command the backing of the army. Only too familiar with Habibie's precarious 
position, before his resignation Soeharto bluntly mentioned: `If I step down and the 
vice-president takes over will this end the crisis? ' Finally, the army supported Habibie 
but only as a constitutional duty. In early June, Wiranto urged Indonesians to do the 
109 
same. 
According to Soeharto and the 1945 Constitution, Habibie was to complete Soeharto's 
term that would expire in 2003. On the contrary, many saw Habibie as a transitional 
figure until elections were held. Most importantly, his administration was perceived 
as an extension of the New Order which in substance it was. Dubbed as the New 
Order II, one prominent political and economic reform lawyer noted that `the only 
thing missing from the New Order II is Soeharto' 110. From the 1997 election, the 
highest legislative body (Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat, MPR) still consisted of 
500 appointed members; 325 of the seats in national parliament (Dewan Perwakilan 
Rakyat, DPR) belonged to Golkar, 75 to the military, 11 to the PDI and 89 to the 
PPP. 111 The cabinet approved by Soeharto was in tact and General Wiranto still held 
positions of the Minister of Defence and Chief of Armed Forces. The only minor 
changes were the replacement of Habibie's critics with his cronies. However, Habibie 
still lacked support at both the elite and grassroots levels. As the voices of the 
reformasi bloc became louder, he had no other choice but to go along with the tide of 
reform in an attempt to cling on to his presidency. 
109 Far Eastern Economic Review, `Getting on with it', 25 June 1998, p. 20-1 
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Habibie inherited a multiplicity of problems from his predecessor. Habibie's 
challenge was maintaining a balance between appeasing social forces demanding for 
reform, or at the very least appearing to be, while having to contend with and depend 
on various elements strongly associated with the former New Order. Taking on a 
multiplicity of problems including a rapid retracting economy and mounting debts, 
Habibie had no choice but to abide by the IMF prescription for the country's 
economic ills. Consequently, this meant the New Order elites were required to answer 
to corruption charges indicating a major shift in power relations. 112 
Reformasi 
Habibie immediately began a process of political liberalisation by easing state 
controls in various aspects ranging from the media to political parties. And at the very 
least on paper, Indonesia experienced a remarkably good start to democratic reform. 
In preparations for the first-ever democratic elections post-Soeharto, the number of 
seats of the MPR was reduced from 1,000 to 700; 500 of which were DPR seats. The 
allocated seats to the military had only reduced from 75 to 38 which proved to be a 
grave disappointment for the reformasi bloc. During first two decades of the New 
Order, parliament saw a steady increase of the number of military personnel. In 1967, 
43 seats out of the 350-member-DPR belonged to the military. The number increased 
from 1985 onwards, the military claimed 100 seats out of 500-member parliament but 
this was later reduced in 1997 to 75.113 Though for the time being the military retained 
some power in parliament, this was only temporary and the seats reserved for the 
army were phased out by the 2004 elections and replaced by a senate-like Regional 
112 Robison and Hadiz, Reorganising Political Power in Indonesia, p. 188 
113 Ibid, p. 159 
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Representative Council (Dewan Perwakilan Daerah, DPD). 114 In total, four 
representatives were elected from each of the 32 provinces. The DPD's function are 
limited to giving inputs concerning centre-regional issues, such as regional autonomy 
and regional budgets, and lacks any right to legislate. The DPD's limited powers must 
be seen in the context of the 17,500-scattered islands and a history of secession. For 
anxious nationalists and the military, more power devolved from the centre would 
mean a risky step closer to federalism and a step further away from the unitary state. 
Another pressing issue was making amendments to curtail the president's power once 
enjoyed by Sukarno and Soeharto. The president's term is now limited to two-five 
year terms. Bills passed by the legislature would become a law within a month 
regardless of the president's approval. ' 15 The president is also required to submit 
annual progress reports to the MPR. The summoning of former President Abdurraman 
Wahid by the DPR to answer questions concerning the sacking of two Cabinet 
Ministers, which was followed shortly by his impeachment over corruption 
allegations of Buloggate and Bruneigate in 2001, illustrates two clear examples of the 
amendments in practice limiting the power of post-Soeharto presidents. 
Another significant step towards electoral reform was dismantling the New Order's 
three-party-system to allow genuine competitive elections. Consequently, the various 
constraints imposed on party formation and parties were removed changing the face 
of electoral laws imposed during three decades of the New Order. Pancasila was 
abolished as the sole ideology imposed on mass organisations and political parties but 
114 Jakarta Post, `DPD set to play an important role in the political system', 10 March 2004, 
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still retained its status as the state philosophy. ' 16 As result, there was an upsurge in 
Islamic based parties. The PPP one of the former two quasi-opposition parties 
reverted back to Islam as the ideological basis of the party. As a result of these 
changes, Indonesia initially saw the birth of more than a hundred parties. However, to 
curtail the number of competing parties in the 1999 elections, parties were required to 
have branches in at least half of the districts in nine of Indonesia's 27 provinces. ' 17 
Further restrictions were made in time for the 2004 elections. Only parties that, in the 
1999 elections, won 2% of the DPR seats or 3% of the provincial government 
(DPRD) seats in half the provinces and districts were allowed to contest the 2004 
national elections. 118 Parties were also allowed to merge or dissolve to form a new 
party, but they had to meet the new criteria stated in the general election law. 119 The 
rationale for these changes was to reduce the number of smaller parties. 
Under Soeharto's New Order, various depoliticisation strategies such as `the floating 
mass' were in place to ensure landslide victories for the Golkar. Such restrictions 
were removed and political parties enjoy more freedom during the campaign period. 
However though freedom has been enhanced, political campaigning can hardly be 
called meaningful. Electoral campaigning during the Soeharto years was dubbed pesta 
demokrasi (fiesta of democracy) which more often focussed on the fiesta rather than 
the substance of democracy. Little has changed in this respect. During the 
campaigning period in post-Soeharto elections, political parties still make endeavour 
116 Suryadinata, Elections and politics in Indonesia, p. 61 
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to bedazzle their supporters with dangdut (local pop music) and shower them with 
giveaways such as t-shirts, bottled water, in some cases money, even though this 
violates the electoral law. ' 20 Little is spoken of ideology. Political parties lacked any 
form of ideological commitment instead were more concerned about horse-trading 
and forming alliances to ensure survival. Rather, the focus in elections was on 
familiarising voters with the party's emblems and the number on ballot papers. 121 
Campaigning were also characterised by money politics. Militia groups political 
gangsters closely connected to political parties are still featured during the 
campaigning period. 122 Major political parties have their own paramilitary groups. For 
example, the National Awakening Party (PKB) has Banser, the Indonesian 
Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P) has Satgas and PPP has Partai Pemuda 
Islam. 123 Because the parties of former Presidents Wahid and Megawati both continue 
to rely on paramilitary groups there has been no initiative to have them banned. 
Other areas of reform were more contentious. The active role of the bureaucracy and 
the military in politics and elections came under fire when radical reformers called for 
their complete withdrawal. Formerly, the Golkar had heavily relied on the support of 
Indonesia's estimated 5.1 million civil servants. ' 24 Both the PPP and the PDI strongly 
opposed the civil servants continue its role in this respect which would surely give 
Golkar the prolonged advantage over the newly established parties as well as 
relatively more established ones such as PPP. On these grounds, it was decided prior 
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March 2004, www. thejakartapost. com, accessed 26 March 2004 
121 Jakarta Post, 'Campaigners outshone by singers, rallies', 22 March 2004, www. thejakartapost. com, 
accessed 22 March 2004 
122 Robison and Hadiz, Reorganising Power in Indonesia The Politics of Oligarchy in the Age of 
Markets, p. 225 
123 Leo Suryadinata, 'Indonesia: Continuing Challenges and Fragile Stability', Southeast Asian Affairs 
2004 
124 Masters, 'Indonesia's 1999 Elections: A Second Chance for Democracy', p. 7 
111 
to the 1999 elections that civil servants on active duty were not to take part in 
campaigns nor were they permitted to take up a position in a political party. 
What bearings did democratic reforms have on power relations between state 
segments as well as relations between state and society? The New Order set out to 
achieve an organic state where there was no space for societal opposition against the 
state. The structures of cooptation and repression were in place to ensure compliance. 
The need for a strong government gave the New Order the legitimacy. Corporatist 
institutions guaranteed participation. Consequently, the Indonesian state under 
Soeharto had very little limitations in implementing its policies, norms or rules in 
most policy areas. 
However, society's domination over the state only lasted from Habibie's interim 
administration in 1998-99 to Wahid's administration in 2001. As the state began to 
gradually consolidate thereafter neither the state nor society dominated the other; 
subsequently, resulting in what Migdal terms dispersed domination. The extent social 
forces can transform the state's policies, rules or norms, was dependent on the 
strength of social forces which in turn affect the state's effectiveness. Demonstrations 
and protests challenging state policies have taken place in absence of repressive 
responses from the state indicating a more relaxed political context. Furthermore, 
corporatists institutions under the New Order that still remain' 
25 have to compete with 
organisations newly established ones outside structures associated with the state. 
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Likewise, political parties could compete freely in elections without interference of 
the state. 
The situation post-Soeharto bore very little resemblance to that of the New Order 
where the state could command participation from the population through its 
corporatist institutions. This is a stark comparison to the various mechanisms during 
the New Order which were in place to ensure that social forces posed very little 
challenge to the state. The economic stagnation brought about a reduction in 
compliance. The military's role in politics and society had been reduced after the 
introduction of the New Paradigm; though, in my final analysis I will argue that the 
military did manage to retain some influence in politics and decision-making. 
However though the new political context has brought about increased channels for 
collective action, Hadiz and Robison have argued that marginalised groups during the 
New Order still remain marginalised. Three decades under Soeharto's rule has 
hindered the ability to organise and capacity within these groups. 126 Similarly, 
Andrew Rosser et al. argue that formerly marginalised groups still lack the resources 
to influence policymaking. 12' Though some are sceptical, there is no doubt the once 
dominant state has dramatically transformed. 
In regards to relations amongst the elite, the contest between political factions or 
coalitions between elites have consequently made the DPR and MPR genuine areas of 
contest between political parties as opposed to the parliament under Soeharto where 
members were advised to closely abide by the 4 Ds: dafter, duduk, duit, diam, 
12b Robison and Hadiz, Reorganising Power in Indonesia The Politics of Oligarchy in the Age of 
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(register, sit down, take your pay and stay quiet). The increased role of parliament at 
both levels also had an impact on reducing the relative autonomy of the executive. 
However, competition in parliament may not be entirely what the reformasi bloc had 
envisioned or hoped for. Horse-trading and shifting coalitions have come to define 
post-Soeharto politics. This was clearly illustrated during the 1999 and 2004 
elections. As such, democratisation did not mean a complete overhaul of the old 
system rather elements of practices during the New Order still remained. Robison and 
Hadiz argue reforms only resulted in old predatory power relations within a new 
system of parties, parliaments and elections and within new alliances which are 
central to post-Soeharto politics. ' 28 In addition, the arrangements created new tensions 
that also had to contend with emerging social forces. In comparison to the New Order 
`pyramid', intra-elite relations are now more dispersed and have rarely been 
predictable. As having a close relationship with Soeharto guaranteed several benefits, 
the New Order elites were competing against one another partially as a result of 
Soeharto's strategy of divide and rule. Furthermore, politics at both the local and 
national level were dominated and influenced by the military and bureaucracy. After 
Soeharto, political power was no longer concentrated at the core power base but was 
dispersed amongst the emerging political parties. As a state bearing elements of 
corporatism, authoritarianism and patrimonialism had unravelled, businesses that 
formerly relied on the state for protection and subsidies had to turn to political parties 
and influential members in parliament as alternative sources of influence. 129 
Consequently, politics became a game of coalition building and an unpredictable 
game of shifting alliances. 
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The new rules of the game quickly became apparent in the run up to the 1999 
elections. Megawati's party PDI-P scored well in the elections, however, her party's 
victory did not guarantee her presidency. As the nation geared up for the first 
democratic election post-Soeharto, the popular choice, Megawati as a child of 
Sukarno and as a symbol of struggle against the oppression of the New Order, gave 
her party a great boost in the 1999 elections. 130 However, the nearly blind cleric, 
Wahid, and old time friend of Megawati's resumed the top position. Her party topped 
the polls with 34% followed by Golkar with 22%. Her party's success in the polls 
translated into 153 seats in the House when compared with Wahid's PKB which only 
managed to garner 12% of the votes placing his party with the fourth most seats in 
parliament. 
A few months after the downfall of Soeharto, Indonesian Muslim leaders both 
conservative and progressives threatened to issue fatwas forbidding a woman to 
become president due to Megawati's increasing mass popularity. Among the political 
leaders arguments varied. On one hand, the traditionalist Muslim leaders were 
divided. The PPP was extremely against the whole prospect of having a female leader 
while the PKB was more flexible. On the other hand, the modernists largely refrained 
from the debate. Amien Rais' PAN, PBB, and the Justice Party (PK) had doubts about 
her leadership skills and her commitment to reform the country as opposed to her 
gender. "' However by July 2001, many Islamic leaders who spoke against her had 
dramatically changed their stance. Many appeared in her cabinet, for example 
Hamzah Haz became her Vice President. Only a minimal amount of protestors 
10 Far Eastern Economic Review, `Mother Earth', 3 June 1999, p. 22-3 
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bothered to turn up when she became president. As such, Megawati's failure to 
become president after the 1999 election had less to do with a gender bias and more to 
do with her own inability to engage in political maneuvering. 
Though the PDI-P emerged as the strongest party, her party still did not enjoy the 
majority vote in parliament. Gaining 34% of the votes meant that she still needed to 
build a coalition among the reformist parties such as the PKB and PAN. ' 
32 Possibly 
the three reformist parties could have come up with a reasonable power sharing 
agreement. Instead, she continued to speak among close friends about having a similar 
government to that of her father's. Along with her own insistence that the top position 
was her natural birthright Megawati flatly refused to approach what she referred to as 
the small parties'. This indifference to politicking brought two long-term rivals 
Amien Rais and Wahid together. Rais assembled the Islamic parties calling it the 
Central Axis or poros tengah, and offered the presidency to Wahid. Indeed the 
alliance did achieve their goal and Wahid was sworn in as fourth president with 373 
votes against Megawati's 313. "' 
Similar elements of power brokering and shifting of coalitions continued to define 
elite dynamics in the 2004 elections. Though PDI-P and Golkar were the top two 
runners in the legislative elections, this did not guarantee their candidates success in 
the presidential elections. In 2001, the MPR made amendments to the Constitution 
which paved way for direct presidential elections. 
' 34 This proved to be a major 
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obstacle for a smooth running post-election period as the majority of votes had gone 
to larger and more established parties in the legislative elections. However, voters did 
not necessarily endorse the presidential candidates of these parties. Instead, the 
popular choice for president was Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (or now popularly 
known as SBY) whose party only managed to garner 8% of the vote in the legislative 
elections. 
As a result, the DPR was divided between two coalitions. The president is supported 
by the People's Coalition135 which secured a minority of the vote. On the other hand, 
the Nationhood Coalition holds 60% of the seats and vows to be an "extra-critical 
balance" to the SBY leadership, consequently, disrupting the workings of the 
government. 136 Despite a bumpy start, SBY and Jusuf Kalla have managed to 
consolidate their positions. 
Political reforms have removed the resources crucial to the New Order's control over 
society. The military has long had a crucial role in Indonesian politics and society. It 
was also important in ensuring opposition was kept under control. However, political 
reforms reduced though did not completely remove the military in politics as I will 
address in the following section. 
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Reforming the Armed Forces 
Reforming the armed forces has not been straight forward either. As one of the main 
pillars of Soeharto's New Order, public anger towards the military was high. Protests 
were aimed at the military's socio-political role and called for military officers to be 
held accountable for mass human rights abuse committed in the past. However, the 
context of political instability worked to prolong the military's role and political 
power during Indonesia's time of turmoil and consolidation. 137 After Soeharto's 
resignation, social forces shifted their attention to other concerns such as the removal 
of dwifungsi. 
However, putting promises of reform into practice has been no easy matter. Change in 
behaviour and Indonesian military culture that has been institutionalised for more than 
three decades will take time. The rush of initiatives to reform during the first six 
months after Soeharto's downfall indicates the institution's need to respond to public 
demands and to recover the public's trust in the military. Argumentatively, the 
military did not have much of a choice. 
The relationship between the military and President Habibie was that of mutual 
dependence. With the lack of popular support, Habibie depended on the military for 
stability. On the other hand, the military depended on Habibie to appoint military 
officers and the distribution of resources and most importantly, the manoeuvrability to 
set the pace and extensity of its own reforms. 13S Despite Habibie's limitations, he 
131 Jun Honna, Military Politics and democratization in Indonesia, (London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003), 
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dismantled several of the New Order practices which hindered the growth of 
democracy. As mentioned earlier in the chapter, several initiatives were implemented 
which set the pace for democratisation in the post-Soeharto era such as relaxed 
restrictions for political parties and the media and the removal of the bureaucracy 
from campaigning for Golkar. A few leading figures within the military led by then 
Lieutenant Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono developed a doctrine known as the `New 
Paradigm'. This entailed the disposal of the military's dual function which included 
the reduction of seats in the DPR reserved for the military, the separation of the 
military and the police, and the severance of the military's ties with Golkar. All these 
new initiatives had affected the military's hegemony and direct influence within 
Indonesian politics. 139 
Though the military's dominant position has been significantly reduced in post- 
Soeharto Indonesia, the military still had an important position within the Indonesian 
polity. The fragmentation of civilian politics resulted in continued military presence in 
politics that in turn affected the quality of reform. 14' And although reforming the 
armed forces had a good start, other areas were seriously neglected such as the 
military's territorial structure which guaranteed the military a considerable amount of 
funding independent of the central government. A study conducted by the Indonesian 
Institute of Sciences (LIPI) in 1998 estimated that the military business assets were 
more than US$ 8 billion in 1998.141 This revenue is utilised to support 75% of the 
1; 9 For more details on the New Paradigm see Angel Rabasa and John Haseman, The Military and 
Democracy in Indonesia: Challenges, Politics, and Power, (Santa Monica, C. A.: RAND, 2002), 
chapter 3 
140 Mietzner, The Politics of Military Reform in Post-Suharto Indonesia: Elite Conflict, Nationalism, 
and Institutional Resistance, p. 16 
141 Lesley McCulloch, 'Business as usual', Inside Indonesia, No. 63, July-September 2000, 
www. insideindonesia. org. accessed 5 February 2003 
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military's spending. 142 This is crucial to the military's capacity; thus, the reforming of 
the Indonesian armed forces. As I will mention in the next chapter, this enabled the 
military to retain a remarkable amount of capability to take its own initiatives as it did 
so to disrupt the referendum in East Timor. This also shows that reforms during this 
period were superficial and did not fundamentally transform civil-military relations or 
the military's influence in anyway. Though the removal of dwifungsi had reduced the 
military's direct role, failure to include the military's territorial structure in the reform 
agenda has failed to address the very reason why the military has become so 
embedded within Indonesian society and Politics. 143 Though some reform initiatives 
post-Soeharto reduced the military's hegemonic position, some become advantageous. 
The newly enacted decentralisation laws of 1999 had facilitated the transfer of power 
and financial resources to the regions. Consequently, the military already entrenched 
in the regions through the territorial structure benefited from the new initiatives of 
power devolution. 144 In sum, though the military had been stripped of its direct 
influence in politics, it still managed to remain influential. 
In August 1998, dwifungsi was formally replaced by the New Paradigm which 
enhanced the military's role in external defence and abolished its role in politics. One 
of the first few changes included the military formally changed its name from ABRI 
to Indonesia's Armed Forces (Tentara Nasional Indonesia, TN 1). 145 This signified the 
reduction of its socio-economic and political role and the separation of the police 
142 Sukardi Rinakit, The Indonesian military after the new order, (London: Taylor & Francis, 2005), p. 
167 
141 McCulloch, 'Business as usual'; Also see Rinakit, The Indonesian military after the new order, p. 
14 
144 Rinakit, The Indonesian military after the new order, p. 15 145 'TNI' portrays a good image in the eyes of the population and nostalgia when the army had a close 
relationship with the people. ABRI, on the other hand, is associated with the military's violent 
behaviour. 
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(POLRI) from ABRI. Consequently, the responsibility of maintaining internal 
security was passed on to the police while the military would take up the duties of 
external defence. However, exceptions have further complicated the reform of ABRI. 
Problematic areas such as Aceh and Papua, where the army's presence is justified by 
the on-going conflict provide an exemption to this new rule. 
There are two main reasons for this. Firstly, the TNI has built up the capacity to deal 
with conflict-prone areas after three decades of taking control of internal security 
matters during Soeharto's rule. Indonesia's internal security practices derive largely 
from the Soeharto years. To maintain strong control, Soeharto gave the army 
sweeping powers to manage Indonesia's internal security issues while the police were 
merged with the army in 1961 as a `junior partner'. The revenue that both the police 
and military derive from conflict areas intensifies the competition over who is in 
charge. Consequently, tensions have often arisen between the military and the police 
which have resulted in clashes. 146 Though various reforms are in place, the territorial 
structure of the army is still intact. The threat of disintegration has provided the 
military with a strong argument for retaining its privilege. Furthermore, rapid 
dismantlement of the structure would leave thousands of officers unemployed. It is 
generally known that officers find other means of substituting their inadequate 
salaries by both legal and illegal means. 147 The military's involvement in business 
started as early as 1957 when the military took control of the Dutch enterprises. As 
the government does not provide the military with sufficient resources to fund its 
basic functions, their businesses are crucial in specific regions such as Aceh where the 
military have a stake in the oil and gas field in Lhoksemawe, North Aceh. The 
146 Rinakit, The Indonesian military after the new order, p. 139 147 International Crisis Group, `Indonesia: Rethinking Internal Security Strategy', Asia Report No. 90, 
December 2004, http: //www. crisisweb. org, accessed 20 December 2003, p. 15 
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military's involvement in legitimate business does not violate the law and is a known 
"secret" which in generally accepted by the public. 148 
What impact had reforms had on TNI's role and position in the state? How does this 
affect its role in managing secessionist regions? The popular demands for the removal 
of dwifungsi showed a reduction in complicity within social forces. Though the 
military's position within the polity is no longer dominant as it was during the New 
Order, evidence shows that the military is not completely under civilian control either. 
In some situations, the TNI has exemplified itself as a relatively independent body. Its 
ability to instigate violence in some situations such as in East Timor showed its 
capability of carrying out its own agenda. Another example would be the sectarian 
violence between the Muslims and Christians in Poso, which occurred in 2000, where 
documents showed military and police providing sides with arms to fan the 
conflict. 149 The military is powerful because of its far-reaching territorial structure, 
yet fragmented due to Soeharto's legacy of divide and rule. 
As mentioned earlier, the context of continued political instability and ethnic 
violence, both inter-ethnic as in Ambon (in 1998) and secessionism in Papua, East 
Timor and Aceh has provided the military with a powerful justification to have a 
continued great say in internal security. Implementing reforms in the area of politics 
has also had little effect. As briefly mentioned, the military had to give up the 38 
reserved seats in parliament. Reforms also required the military to adopt an apolitical 
stance and sever all links with Golkar. The reduction in seats in the DPR reserved for 
148 Bradford, 'The Indonesian Military as a Professional Organization: Criteria and Ramifications for 
Reform' 
149 Jakarta Post, 'Police, soldiers 'fanned' Poso sectarian war', 2 February 2006, 
www. thejakartapost. com, accessed 2 February 2006 
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the military, which were finally phrased out in 2004, did not reflect the military 
weakened influence in politics. The military still commanded a certain degree of 
leverage in parliament and especially politics at the local level through its territorial 
structure. Furthermore, the military could also obtain seats from the DPD and political 
parties. Retired generals such as Wiranto and the current President Retired General 
Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono both featured strongly in the 2004 elections as 
presidential candidates. All in all, the military has adapted well to the changing 
dynamics and power structures within the new political environment. 
Dynamics between the military and the post-Soeharto presidents illustrate how 
reforming the military is no easy matter. What is problematic is how the military 
reserves the right to set the boundaries of what the military classifies as civilian 
interference in its internal affairs; hence, making the concept of civilian supremacy a 
far cry from complete. In the early stages of Wahid's presidency, the military had 
expected the president to allow some leeway in implementing its internal reforms. 
However, the military's expectations were a far cry from reality. Barely sworn in, 
Wahid began to interfere with the military's internal affairs when Wiranto conducted 
a reshuffle in November 1999. Both parties had conflicting views on who should 
become the new Chief of Staff. Though a compromise was reached, the new Chief of 
Staff was appointed, based on Wahid's presidential instruction. Consequently, this 
gave Wahid high hopes that this would ultimately provide him with the much-needed 
control over the military and enable him to speed up internal reforms. 150 On the 
contrary, this only led to an intense contestation between Wahid and the military, 
especially when Wiranto was removed as Coordinating Minister for Politics and 
150 Rinakit, The Indonesian Military After the New Order, p. 134 
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Security. Wahid's interference in what was perceived as the military's internal affairs 
was seen as too aggressive, particularly in relation to internal reforms. 
Wahid's effort to gain some control over the military has failed miserably. His 
attempts to promote officers who supported reform within the military had minimal 
impact on the military as an institution. 151 To make matters worse, Wahid had also 
alienated his allies and caused further controversy for his enemies creating an excuse 
to outmanoeuvre him. Wahid's PKB only managed to muster 10% of the seats in the 
DPR and though this did not seem a problem at the time when parliamentarians 
gathered their support for his bid for presidency, Wahid's own failure to share power 
amongst other political parties cost him his presidency as opposed to the actual 
allegations of corruption in 2001 per se. Wahid's interference with what was seen as 
the military's internal affairs and insistence on speedy reforms had not only 
diminished the military's support for his government but also heightened a sense of 
resentment towards him. The military influenced its own representatives in 
parliament, parliamentary members and political parties to censure Wahid in the 
alleged involvement in two graft scandals: Bruneigate and Bulogate. Wahid was 
suspected of embezzling funds from the Yanatera Bulog Foundation and accepting a 
grant from the Sultan of Brunei. 152 
Tensions rose to the point where there was speculation that a coup could take place 
which was subsequently denied by the officers. However, the prospect of such a coup 
did not seem to bother Wahid due to the military's battered image during the New 
Order in the eyes of the population and international pressure for Indonesia to 
151 
lbid, p. 199 
152 For more details see International Crisis Group (ICG), `Indonesia's Presidential Crisis', Asia 
Briefing No. 5,21 February 2001 
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democratise. 153 Though a coup never took place, Wahid was soon removed from 
office by the impeachment process on I February 2001 and replaced by Vice 
President Megawati Sukarnoputri. 
Mietzner argues that civilian fragmentation led to the consolidation of the military's 
self-confidence. The erosion of Wahid's civilian support base removed one of the 
major preconditions for the successful implementation of radical military reform"54 
as opposed to the military's working behind the scenes to sabotage the reforms. As 
the presidential crisis deepened, Wahid became increasingly isolated from those that 
had formerly backed his bid for presidency. In a last attempt to ensure political 
survival, Wahid threatened to declare a state of emergency. The military's refusal to 
back the president's wishes enabled the military to prove their `intentions' to uphold 
the TNI's New Paradigm, its neutrality and its repudiation to be an instrument of 
civilian bickering. 155 Similarly, the military back in the 1940s and 1950s presented 
themselves as apolitical institution above all partisan politics. The military has 
adapted well to the reforms in post-Soeharto era; consequently, has maintained a 
certain degree of influence, though it is not as a dominant as before. 
Megawati's harsh critics were quick to attribute her ascendancy to the popularity of 
her father's legacy. Many also argue that she lacked sufficient knowledge about 
policymaking, is politically conservative and is renowned to shy away from the 
53 Rinakit, The Indonesian Military After the New Order, p. 150 
154 Mietzner, The Politics of Military Reform in Post-Suharto Indonesia: Elite Conflict, Nationalism, 
and Institutional Resistance, p. 27; Rizal Sukma and Edy Prasetyono, `Security Reform in Indonesia: 
The Military and the Police', Working Paper 9, Netherlands Institute of International Relations 
`Clingendael' Conflict Research Unit, February 2003, 
www. clingendael. nl/publications/2003/20030200_cru_working_paper_9. PDF, accessed 8 Novermber 
2006, p. 29-30, 
155 Mietzner, The Politics of Military Reform in Post-Suharto Indonesia: Elite Conflict, Nationalism, 
and Institutional Resistance, p. 29 
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media. She declines any invitations to debate, citing that it is not the Indonesian 
way. ' 56 Despite her shortcomings, the economy gradually picked up and 
unemployment and inflation rates decreased during her presidency. And unlike her 
predecessor, Megawati had the backing of the military. The implementation of 
internal reforms started during Wahid's presidency but because of the tension 
between the president and the military as an institution, the military only reluctantly 
carried out partial reforms. Megawati learned from Wahid's experience that 
pressurising the military to go back to the barracks would only endanger her 
presidency. 
However, non-inference with the military's internal matters was not only a result of 
her predecessor's experience. Megawati was also widely known for nationalistic 
views and her own soft approach towards the military. In comparison to other political 
parties, PDI-P is one of the political parties that has the largest number of retired 
generals joining the party. Altogether 150 retired generals joined the PDI-P, a figure 
that only matched that of Golkar. Four generals were appointed as cabinet ministers 
under Megawati's administration. Hence, the change of leadership proved beneficial 
to both the new president and the military. Past experience has shown that obtaining 
the backing of the military has proven crucial to the survival of the president. The rise 
of Megawati provided the military an opportunity to regain its socio-political role. 157 
This also coincided with the dip in the public enthusiasm and euphoria for reform. An 
opinion poll conducted in August 2003 by the Indonesian Survey Institute (LSI) 
indicated that 58% voters believed their welfare was better looked after under the 
New Order. On the international level, the bombings in Bali 2002, at the Marriott in 
156 Far Eastern Economic Review, `Mother Earth', June 1999, p. 22-3 
157 Rinakit, The Indonesian Military After the New Order, p. 213 
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2003 and in front of the Australian Embassy in 2004 brought the war on terror to 
Indonesia. This factor, as Mietzner argues brought an end to international isolation of 
the Indonesian armed of forces since outrage of mass human rights abuses in East 
Timor became public. As a result, the war on terror became a factor enhancing not 
only the military's role internally but also as an international partner in the war on 
terror. 158 Furthermore, with the loss of East Timor and negotiations with GAM going 
nowhere, parliamentarians became increasingly supportive of military approaches in 
conflict areas. Subsequently, the change in attitude not only hindered the reform 
agenda within the military but it also brought back the military to the forefront of and 
policy making concerning internal security. 159 
The relevance of this relationship was that Megawati gave the army considerable 
influence over policy making in conflict areas. 160 This is illustrated in the case of 
Aceh which was placed under martial law in May 2003. Marital law was later 
extended in the form of civil emergency which continued to give the military full 
reign over the region for another year. In turn, this has prompted many activists to 
believe that the conditions under Megawati's policies did not differ when the region 
was placed under the notorious banner of a Military Operational Area (Daerah 
Operasi Militer, or DOM) during the New Order. The military's commitment to 
maintaining unity of the nation is a known fact and is exemplified in Sapta Marga or 
seven oaths which have remained untouched since the collapse of the New Order. The 
oaths confer the military the duty of defending and responding to attacks against the 
158 Mietzner, The Politics of Military Reform in Post-Suharto Indonesia: Elite Conflict, Nationalism, 
and Institutional Resistance, p. 40-41 
159 Harold Crouch, `Political Update 2002: Megawati's Holding Operation', Edward Aspinall and Greg 
Fealy (eds. ), Local Power and Politics Indonesia: Decentralisation & Democratisation, (Singapore: 
Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2003), p. 20 
160 International Crisis Group (ICG), `Rethinking Internal Security Strategy', p. 49 
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Pancasila state even those posed by civilian leaders. And it is the legacy of the 
dwifungsi mindset that provides an important justification to oppose the civilian 
supremacy over national-defence issues. 161 The 2002 Constitutional amendments 
further supported the military's duty of `defending, protecting and preserving the 
unity and sovereignty of the State', and thus, reinforced the military's authority to 
fulfil its role as protector of the Pancasila state. ' 62 The relationship between the 
president and the military will be discussed further in Chapter Five. 
Before his victory in the first ever-direct presidential elections in 2004, retired general 
Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono had gained himself a reputation of being a member of 
the reformist bloc within the military. Despite this reputation, SBY concentrated more 
on sidelining conservative military personnel such as General Ryamizard Ryacudu, 
who became one of the strongest critics of 2003 peace talks in Aceh, as opposed to 
initiating any further reforms. Consequently, the president sent out a strong message 
that he was prepared to remove any senior officer who had any potential to disrupt his 
policies. 163 
SBY was in a stronger position than his predecessors. Though his political party only 
gained a marginal 8 percent of the votes in the 2004 legislative elections, SBY has 
become popular in his own right. His popularity had gradually increased since serving 
under Megawati's administration as Coordinating Minister for Political and Security 
Affairs and further increased after a dispute with the president and her husband who 
161 Rinakit, The Indonesian military alter the new order, p. 200 
162 Bradford, `The Indonesian Military as a Professional Organization: Criteria and Ramifications for 
Reform' 
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described SBY's behaviour as `childlike'. 164 This was complemented by vice 
president Kalla's position within the Indonesian polity. Kalla, the chairperson of 
Golkar, and winner of the 2004 elections, has also formed good relations with major 
Islamic groups. Together SBY and Kalla have mustered a considerable amount of 
support from the DPR and Islamic groups for their intended actions. Further details of 
this will be given in Chapter Five. 
Decentralising the State 
Another crucial area of reform was a nationwide plan for decentralisation. Authority 
and power within local institutions has been greatly enhanced and formally 
acknowledged through decentralisation laws of 2001. The aim of decentralising the 
state was to appease social forces in the restive regions such as Aceh and Papua. Both 
Sukarno and Soeharto ruled a highly centralised political system. However, the 
transition in 1998 brought about a significant transformation in the distribution of 
power. Federalism as a system of governance is nothing new to Indonesians. Before 
departing the archipelago, the Dutch implemented federalism in Indonesia for fear of 
Javanese dominance. However, the foreign imposed system was quickly dismantled 
and the state continued to centralise before reaching its extreme form during the New 
Order. 
The debate on federalism as a means of managing ethnic relations in Indonesia was 
re-introduced by Amien Rais, one of the leading figures that backed student-led 
protests against Soeharto and the New Order. Soon after the country entered the 
'64 Far Eastern Economic Review, `Delivering the Message', 22 April 2004, p. 13; Jakarta Post, `Susilo 
quits after open rift with Megawati', 12 March 2004, www. thejakartapost. com, accessed 12 March 
2004 
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transition period, Amien Rais established his new political party, the National 
Mandate Party (PAN) which advocated federalism as a solution to the country's 
increasing ethnic unrest. ' 65 According to PAN as well as many academics166 , the 
extreme centralised state under the New Order gave rise to ethnic discontent 
especially in resource rich areas. Aceh illustrates the point. The federalists believe 
that there is a positive co-relation between decentralisation (especially economic) on 
one hand and eliminating ethnic discontent on the other. 
On the other side of the debate are PDI-P, Golkar, PKB and the Indonesian military. 
Furthermore, as the public did not endorse the idea, Amien Rais soon became less 
vocal in his bid for a federal state. The `unitarians' have instead argued that managing 
ethnic relations can still be achieved within a unitary state but granting the regions 
genuine autonomy. 167 
There are two laws on decentralisation which dismantled the excessively centralised 
state during the New Order. Firstly, Law No. 22/1999 which serves to give the 
regions a much greater say in administrative matters. For example this includes the 
right to elect regional executives. Secondly, Law No. 25/1999 indicates the financial 
relationship between the centre and the regions. However decentralisation via these 
two laws meant decentralisation of power to the districts and not the provinces. This 
is to prevent the administration at the provincial level from gaining too much power to 
the point where it can break away from the state. Paradoxically, this significantly 
165 CU Zenzie, Indonesia's New Political Spectrum', Asian Survey, Vol. 39, No. 2, p. 257-8; Gabriele 
Ferrazzi, `Using the "F" Word; Federalism in Indonesia's Decentralization Discourse', Publius, Vol. 
30, No. 2, p. 77 
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differs from special autonomy offered by the central government to Aceh and Papua 
which in turns strengthens the province and not the districts. Though the central 
government has been surprisingly generous with its offer, special autonomy has done 
little to dispel ethnic discontent in both regions. There are great many issues at hand. 
Little has been done to educate the population in Aceh as well as Papua concerning 
the offer. Very few of the elites support it. Most importantly, full effects of special 
autonomy have yet to be realised. For example, the implementation of martial law 
which was later reduced to civil emergency in Aceh, overrides special autonomy. The 
details will be discussed at length in the following chapters. 
Conclusion 
As I have argued in this second half of this chapter, the downfall of Soeharto and the 
New Order has brought about many changes, though the degree of these changes will 
vary from sector to sector. The most prominent of the changes are undoubtedly state 
and society relations. With the opening up of the media, heightened awareness as well 
as other democratic reforms has increased public scrutiny on how power is exercised 
amongst the elite. Competitive elections and the removal of restrictions on political 
parties have ultimately reduced the state's capacity to command participation from the 
population. Changes in the political system have enhanced the role of parliament as a 
genuine contest between political elites and parties. In this respect, political power is 
no longer concentrated amongst a few but dispersed amongst several shifting alliances 
or what Migdal would label as dispersed domination where neither society or the state 
possesses the ability to establish domination throughout the state. This in turn has 
reduced the influence of the bureaucracy and the military which formerly featured 
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strongly in politics during the New Order. A highly centralised state has also made 
way for nationwide decentralisation and special autonomy offered to Papua and Aceh, 
though the effect of autonomy has yet to be realised. 
Social demands for the removal of the military's dwifungsi indicate an increase in 
complicity from the population. Though various measures have been implemented to 
reduce the role of the military in politics, they have not entirely achieved the aim of 
removing military personnel from politics. The territorial structure of the TNI is still 
in tact. Consequently, the military subordination to the civilian government is far from 
complete. According to the state-in-society approach legitimacy involves the 
acceptance of the state's rules as true and right. As the population did not wish to 
return to the situation under former President Sukarno, the leaders of the New Order 
possessed the legitimacy to act. The situation post-Soeharto is a stark difference to 
that under the New Order where various structures were in place to ensure social 
stability. The downfall of Soeharto brought a reduction in social control and the 
state's ability to mobilise the population. Though varying to different degrees, post- 




This chapter explores the interactions between social forces, state segments, and 
external involvement. Based on the assumptions put forward by the state-in-society 
approach, state segments and social forces may join forces with one another or 
amongst themselves to support or contradict the state official action. International 
involvement may enhance or limit the state or a social force's ability to act. In the 
previous chapter, I have explored the relationship between the state and society in the 
light of the three indicators including participation, legitimacy and compliance which 
demonstrate the levels of social control within Indonesia from the Soeharto era to 
post-1998. Levels of participation, legitimacy and compliance or social control was 
high under Soeharto, was low during Presidents Habibie and Wahid, and dispersed 
under Presidents Megawati and SBY. The persistent demands for sovereignty in East 
Timor show that the state failed to gain any substantial social control. This lack of 
social control means that the Indonesian state had very limited impact in terms of 
Migdal's key indicators: participation, legitimacy and compliance. I will concentrate 
on act of resistance in East Timor. 
The case study of East Timor is divided into two instances: East Timor under 
Soeharto and Habibie. The first section of the chapter will show that social forces in 
East Timor posed very little limitations to the state's policy options. This was due to 
mutual empowerment or high levels of social control in other areas in Indonesia. 
However, the state would not have been able to carry out its action had other states 
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such as the US not supported the annexation of East Timor. Hence, the position of the 
dominant Indonesian state was enhanced by the international non-intervention 
response to the invasion. 
The latter half of the chapter explores the dynamics between the state segments that 
opposed state action in managing secessionism in East Timor in post-Soeharto 
Indonesia. After the collapse of authoritarian rule, the state was no longer dominant 
over social forces. It was an opportune moment where multiple conflicts occurred 
which sapped the strength of the state. Consequently, Habibie conceded and offered 
special autonomy. The majority of East Timorese deemed the offer insufficient. 
Habibie took it a step further by offering the East Timorese the chance to conduct a 
`popular consultation' to decide on the territory's future. The decision was deemed 
extremely unpopular amongst state segments such as the military and the PDI-P. 
However, it was the military that possessed the means to carry its own initiatives to 
disrupt the state's official action. However, it was a combination of opposition from 
society or low levels of social control within Indonesia and pressure from other states 
as well as Habibie's own agenda to position himself as a reformer which resulted in 
the change of policies towards East Timor. Details of this will be explored in the 
following sections below. 
East Timor under the New Order 
In this section, I will analyse the events in East Timor under Soeharto. There are two 
major state actions worthy of analytical attention. First is the 1975 annexation where I 
will explore the dynamics behind the Indonesian state's decision to incorporate East 
134 
Timor. Second is the 1991 Dili incident. The period between the two events will be 
briefly mentioned but will not be given much analytical attention due to lack of 
changes between the external, state segments and social forces. Details of these two 
events will be discussed below. 
Historical Background to the 1975 Annexation 
The island of Timor is situated north of Australia. In 1859, the Dutch and Portuguese 
divided the island. East Timor was administrated by the Portuguese while the western 
half of the island was colonised by the Dutch. East Timor has an area of 14,609 
square kilometres. There are currently close to a million inhabitants, 90% of which 
practise Roman Catholism. Since independence, Tetum and Portugese have become 
the official languages of East Timor. 
With the exception of the anti-communist campaign of 1965-66 that resulted in an 
estimated half a million deaths, the annexation of East Timor in 1975 has been a 
source of great embarrassment to Jakarta. The invasion of the half island was a task 
that the army set to complete within weeks. Reality was a different matter. What was 
initially thought to be a quick and easy task turned out to be a war that dragged on for 
decades. 
An unexpected window of opportunity for the East Timorese came during the month 
of April 1974 when the left wing leaning army staged a coup that brought an end to 
almost five decades of authoritarian rule in Portugal. The new government that 
replaced that of former dictator, Marcello Caetano was committed to dismantling the 
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Portuguese empire. Although still lacking a national movement, East Timor was 
incorporated in Portuguese decolonisation plans. ' However, the situation on the 
domestic front as well war in Angola and Mozambique was draining the Portuguese 
of its scanty resources, making East Timor the last of the Portuguese concerns. 
Consequently, this opened an opportunity for potential Indonesian intervention. 
The news of the coup in Lisbon travelled fast and within a matter of weeks several 
political parties, which were originally banned, were formed in East Timor. Each was 
based on the question of the territory's political future. The Timorese Democratic 
Union (UDT) that was founded by Mario Carrascalao and who later became the 
governor of East Timor was committed to forming a federation with Portugal for a 
certain period of time. This was to be followed by complete independence. A week 
later, the Social Democratic Association of East Timor (ASDT) was formed which 
included prominent figures such as Jose Ramos Horta and Xanana Gusmao. However, 
just months after its formation, ASDT changed its name to the Revolutionary Front of 
East Timor, popularly known as Fretilin. Fretilin was another major party that 
claimed much of its support from the younger generation of Timorese and middle- 
ranking officials. Similar to UDT, Fretilin wanted an independent East Timor. On the 
other hand, there was the Association for the Integration of East Timor into Indonesia. 
The name summed up the party's objectives well. It later changed its name to the 
Timor People's Democratic Association (Apodeti) but nevertheless failed to muster 
the same level of popularity of the former two parties. The two other parties, Kota and 
Partido, barely attracted attention let alone any substantial support for its agenda. At 
this stage, Apodeti's limited support, which was estimated at 5 per cent of East 
1 Hamish McDonald, Suharto's Indonesia, (Blackburn, Victoria: Fontana Books, 1980), p. 192 
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Timor's population, 2 was a clear indication that at the very least the majority in East 
Timor did not want to be incorporated with Indonesia. 
So what was the Indonesian state's response to the developments in East Timor? 
While political activity increased in East Timor, Indonesia officially remained firm 
that it would not interfere with East Timor's internal affairs. Indonesia had never 
shown much interest in the Portuguese colony. Before the Indonesian revolution 
against the Dutch, the 1945 Constitutional Committee had expressed interests in 
claiming East Timor on the basis of the ancient unity of the Majapahit Empire. 3 
However, the idea quickly dissipated during the revolution. Since independence until 
the incorporation of Papua in May 1963 (then known as West New Guinea), Jakarta 
had always made claims to the territory on the grounds that it should inherit what was 
formerly a part of the Dutch East Indies. As a result, Jakarta never made claims to 
other territories such as East Timor. Such claims would only counter the premise of 
Indonesian claims for Papua. As late as June 1974, Foreign Minister of Indonesia 
Adam Malik confirmed to Jose Ramos-Horta, one of the founding members of 
Fretilin, in a letter that, the independence of every country is a right of every nation, 
with no exception for the people of Timor. The government as well as the people of 
Indonesia have no intention to increase or expand their territory, or to occupy other 
territories. .. 'a 
2 Schwarz, A Nation in Waiting, p. 201 
` McDonald, Suhartoc Indonesia, p. 191 
° Excerpts of this letter from Indonesian Foreign Minister Adam Malik to FRETILIN's Jose Ramos 
Horta, 17 June 1974 can be found in Jose Ramos-Horta, Funu The Unfinished Saga of East Timor, 
(Trenton, N. J.: Red Sea Press, 1987), p. 43; the letter can also be found in full length in Jolliffe, East 
Timor Nationalism and Colonialism, p. 66 
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However, Adam Malik's statement was the official view. Other state segments in 
Jakarta had different ideas of how East Timor's political future should take shape. 
Shortly, after the overthrow of the former regime in Lisbon, John Naro, the Deputy 
Speaker of the DPR, raised the issue of returning `East Timor to the fold of 
Indonesia's. The military supported the idea. Ali Murtopo, Benny Murdani and 
Pangabean, then Defence Minister, all supported the incorporation of the former 
Portuguese colony. Based on the military's obsession with unity, an independent East 
Timor could set a precedent to other movements both within the country and the 
region. However, whether an independent East Timor would have an affect or set an 
example for Aceh and Papua to follow suit is questionable as East Timor was under 
Portuguese rule and not part of the former Dutch East Indies. 
Indonesia also had other concerns. After the fall of Indochina in April 1975, Jakarta 
had become active in building good relations with its neighbours to create a conflict- 
free zone. With East Timor's decolonisation process underway, Jakarta's fear was 
two-fold. Firstly, an unsettled East Timor could potentially attract a western power 
meddling in Indonesia's backwaters; thus, becoming an obstacle in achieving a 
conflict-free zone. 6 Secondly, there was a concern about having an unsettled region 
that not only had the potential to invite the Vietnamese government to intervene but 
also to become a support base for other communist insurgencies within the region. 
By late 1974, All Murtopo, one of Jakarta's top generals and key advisor to Soeharto 
and one of the strongest proponents of the annexation of East Timor, took charge of 
5 Ramos-Horta, Funu The Unfinished Saga of East Timor, p. 43; McDonald, Suharto's Indonesia, p. 
193 
`' Gary E. Hansen, `Indonesia 1975: National Resilience and the Continuity of the New Order', Asian 
Sun'ev, Vol. 16, No. 2, (1976), p. 156 
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Timorese affairs. Consequently, this marked the start of Indonesia's plans to 
incorporate East Timor under its wing. The odds were on Jakarta's side as Portugal 
which was still preoccupied with its own internal problems, had shown very little 
interest in the increasing political activity in East Timor; hence, turning a blind eye to 
Indonesia"s plans to expand its territory. 7 
Jakarta took a multi pronged strategy to the East Timor project. A full-fledged 
military operation was put on hold. Instead, Jakarta began Operasi Komodo which 
essentially included driving a rift between the Timorese. This strategy would be 
complemented by propaganda to discredit UDT as neo-fascist and Fretilin as 
communist via the radio and the newspaper, Berita Yudha (belonging to Ali 
Murtopo's group). On the international front, intellectuals at Murtopo's think-tank, 
the Centre of Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) set out on a diplomatic 
mission to inform other states of Indonesia's concerns and to gain consent for its plans 
for East Timor! 
Despite much preparation, it was a year later when Indonesia embarked on a military 
operation to incorporate East Timor into its territory. In January 1975, the UDT and 
Fretilin announced that they were joining forces in a coalition for national 
independence. However, the coalition was terminated in May by the UDT after two of 
its leading members paid a visit to Jakarta. Rumours had indicated that Fretilin had 
socialist and communist leanings. In June, talks were held in Macau by a commission 
on Timorese decolonisation in attempt to bring the three parties to an agreement on 
the timetable of the elections. Fretilin boycotted the Macau talks on the grounds that 
Schwarz, A Nation in Waiting, p. 201 
8 For details on Jakarta's non-military strategies to incorporate East Timor see McDonald, Suharto's 
Indonesia, p. 194-204 
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any discussion with Apodeti concerning self-determination would be worthless 
because of its political stance. 9 The absence of Fretilin provided the opportunity for 
Apodeti to pose itself as the leading party and the UDT to step up on its anti- 
communist attacks against Fretilin. 
In the meantime, Jakarta continued with its propaganda against Fretilin but it was not 
long until the government made its next move. In August 1975, the military instigated 
an UDT-led coup which soon broke into civil war. In the meantime, the Portuguese 
administration withdrew from the territory turning a blind eye to the situation in East 
Timor. The UDT had underestimated Fretilin's ability to respond and by September 
1975, Fretilin had gained control of the territory. The Portuguese Colonial Army, 
which predominantly consisted of Timorese after the majority of Portuguese had left, 
supported Fretilin. During the civil war the army quickly formed the Falintil (Armed 
Forces for the National Liberation of East Timor). 
Migdal argues that the mobilisation of the population can enable the state to carry out 
its action autonomous from other social forces but also gain strength when facing 
external foes. 10 As mentioned in Chapter Three, social forces within Indonesia other 
that then those in regions demanding independence were co-opted by corporatist 
institutions and the patrimonial system. Furthermore, social forces also upheld the 
concept of organicism for fear of political instability. In part, the Indonesian state's 
ability to carry out its actions in East Timor can be explained through the mutual 
empowerment of social forces. However, though the Indonesian state remained 
dominant over social forces which in turn increased its capacity to carry out its 
n Ramos-Horta, Funu the Unfinished Saga of East Timor, p. 52 
10 Migdal, State in Society Studying How State and Societies Transform and 
Constitution One Another, 
p. 52 
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actions, there is evidence to show that Indonesia would not have gone head with the 
invasion of East Timor had it lacked the backing of other western states. The delayed 
invasion of East Timor can be partially explained by the Pertamina crisis in 1974- 
1975. A few believe that Soeharto was reluctant to go along with the military's grand 
designs of annexing East Timor which had the potential to alarm overseas donors 
especially when the Indonesian military was dependent on American aid. " The 
situation changed in favour of Jakarta once it started to play on western fears of a 
potential addition to the communist bloc. 
This begs the question of what role did external forces play? On 28 November 1975, 
Fretilin declared the Democratic State of East Timor. Though receiving recognition 
from a handful of states, it failed to receive any acknowledgment from Portugal. As a 
result of this, the UN has continued to recognise Portugal as the legitimate 
administrative authority of East Timor up until the territory had gained independence 
more than two decades later. On the other hand, most governments gave their backing 
to Jakarta's annexation of East Timor, even if implicitly. Five journalists including 
two Australians, two British and a New Zealander, reporting on the 1975 invasion 
were murdered in Balibo on 16 October while covering the situation. The incident 
failed to draw out any reaction from the reporters' respective governments. Jakarta 
took the silent response as a green light to go ahead with the invasion. 12 
Following the announcement, Jakarta reacted immediately by creating the UDT- 
Apodeti alliance and declaring that East Timor was integrated with Indonesia. The 
11 Ramos-Horta, Funu the Unfinished Saga of East Timor, p. 1; McDonald, Suharto 's Indonesia, p. 208 
1' For a personal account of one of the relatives of the murdered Briton, Brian Peter, who lobbied for a 
formal inquest of the circumstances surrounding his death see Maureen Tolfree, `Balibo: The Cover-up 
that Led to Genocide', Paul Hainsworth and Stephen McCloskey (eds. ), The East Timor question: the 
struggle. for independence from Indonesia, (London: I. B. Tauris, 2000), p. 41-50 
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military attack on Dili was planned for 5 December coinciding with US President 
Gerald Ford and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger's arrival in Jakarta. Though there 
was no opposition to the military invasion per se, Jakarta was asked to postpone its 
plans to 6 December until after the president had left. 13 The US ambassador to Jakarta 
reiterated Washington's position but expressed concerns that the invasion should be 
conducted 'quickly, efficiently, and don't use our equipment' 14. However, Kissinger 
later clarified the matter by pointing out that it all depended on how we construe it 
whether it is in self-defence or is a foreign operation' 15. On 7 December, plans went 
ahead. 
To fully understand why East Timor never received any support for independence 
during this period despite the on-going decolonisation process in Africa, it is crucial 
to realise the context of international events. Firstly, governments were prepared to 
overlook Indonesia's incorporation of East Timor for the sake of a few economic 
returns. 16 Secondly, at the height of the Cold War, Indonesia had no trouble getting 
the blessing from other countries such as the United States and Australia. As 
mentioned in the previous chapter, Soeharto came to power by eradicating Indonesia's 
some half a million communists in 1965- a move that clearly indicated Soeharto's 
distaste for the western opposed ideology. Consequently, Soeharto's Indonesia 
became of important strategic importance to the western bloc. 
1` William Burr and Michael L. Evans (eds. ), `East Timor Revisited Ford, Kissinger and the Indonesian 
Invasion, 1975-76', National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 62, www. gwu. edu, 
accessed 4 September 2005, p. 2 
Ibid, p. 5 
13 Embassy Jakarta Telegram 1579 to Secretary State, 6 December 1975 containing the text of Ford- 
Kissinger-Suharto Discussion, Gerald R. Ford Library, www. gwr. edu, accessed 4 September 2005 
16 Taylor, The Price of Freedom, p. xi 
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During the mid-1970s, the US had suffered from its own losses in Indochina and it 
began withdrawing troops from the region. At the time, Ford and Kissinger were keen 
on strengthening US relations with anti-communist governments in the region. " 
Consequently, convincing the US of Jakarta's plans for East Timor was not difficult 
while the experience of the Vietnam War was still fresh in mind. It came as no 
surprise when Soeharto received support from Ford after informing the President that 
'those who want independence [in East Timor] are those who are Communist- 
influenced'. 18 Furthermore, the Americans also wanted to maintain its access to deep- 
water straits running through Indonesia so its submarines could pass freely through 
the Indian and Pacific Oceans. With such an agenda, the US abstained from any UN 
resolution condemning Jakarta's invasion of East Timor. 19 President Ford was also 
suspicious of the new regime in Lisbon which replaced Salazar's dictatorship. The US 
government had gone as far as considering the idea of expelling Portugal from 
NATO. As far as President Ford and Kissinger were concerned, Portuguese interests 
were of little consequence to Indonesia's potential plans for East Timor. 20 
Australia's concerns were keeping good relations with Indonesia and had doubts 
about East Timor's viability as a state should it gain its independence. Then Prime 
Minister Gough Whitlam also went as far as telling Soeharto that the best possible 
option for East Timor would be integration with Indonesia. 21 Not long after the 
invasion, Canberra under Malcolm Frazer's administration formally recognised 
17 Burr and Evans (eds. ), 'East Timor Revisited Ford, Kissinger and the Indonesian Invasion, 1975-76', 
2 
Memorandum of Conversation between Presidents Ford and Suharto, 5 July 1975,12.40 P. M. - 2.00 
p. m., Gerald R. Ford Library, National Security Adviser Memoranda of Conversations, www. gwr. edu, 
accessed 15 April 2004 
19 Schwarz, A Nation in Waiting, p. 207 
20 Memorandum of Conversation between Presidents Ford and Suharto, 5 July 1975,12.40 p. m. - 2.00 
Q. m. 
1 McDonald, Suharto :s Indonesia, p. 195 
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Indonesia's jurisdiction over East Timor in exchange for concessions on the Timor 
Sea dispute. At the time of the 1975 annexation, negotiations on seabed rights and oil 
exploration were underway. 
On the other hand, Portugal's stance during the late 1970s up to the 1980s was less 
predictable. Despite having severed all diplomatic relations with Jakarta following the 
invasion of East Timor, Lisbon failed to file any official reports or complaints to the 
UN. 22 At the time, it had its own internal problems to manage and several 
independence movements within its African colonies to deal with. As such, it was too 
pre-occupied to ensure a smooth transition for independence. It has been argued that 
during this period, Portugal was applying to become a member of the European 
Community (EC). 23 As such, it was reluctant to take on a strong stand on the issue. 
Since the UN began issuing resolutions in 1976, most EU (then EC) countries 
abstained from voting. However, this changed in the course of the late 1980s when 
Portugal began pushing the East Timor agenda within the EU. It has even been 
doubted that EU would have devoted any attention to East Timor had Portugal 
lobbied for it. 24 
With Indochina now fallen to the communist bloc, Jakarta took a more active role in 
building good relations with non-communist governments in Southeast Asia as well 
as other governments outside the sub-region to form a sense of solidity. 25 The main 
fear was that communist governments in the region could support insurgency 
22 Ramos-Horta, Funu The Unfinished Saga ofEa. st Timor, p. 57 
'-t Schwarz, A Nation in Waiting, p. 207 
'° Eilis Ward, The Local Meets the Global: East Timor and Ireland's Presidency of the European 
Union', Hainsworth and McCloskey (eds. ), The East Timor Question The Struggle for Independence 
from Indonesia, p. 152 
25 Hansen, 'Indonesia 1975: National Resilience and the Continuity of the New Order', p. 155 
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movements which could potentially destabilise Southeast Asia. As a result of this fear, 
a series of meetings took place during 1975-1976 with ASEAN heads of states 
including the Philippines, Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand. 
As stability was a main concern of ASEAN member states, the content of the 
meetings involved discussions of military and political relations within Southeast 
Asia. An ASEAN meeting was held in May 1976 to discuss the neutralisation with 
Indochina governments and closer military cooperation with ASEAN countries. By 
September, Indonesia had established military ties with Malaysia and Singapore. 
26 
However, security was not only a concern of Indonesia's immediate neighbours but 
trade also made them ignore what was going on internally to avoid jeopardising trade 
relations with Indonesia. 
The UN denounced the Indonesian occupation of East Timor just two weeks after the 
1975 invasion of the territory. The only support East Timor received was from the UN 
General Assembly that adopted annual resolutions from 1976 to 1982 demanding the 
withdrawal of Indonesian troops and supporting the right of self-determination for 
East Timor. 27 As Ramos-Horta argues, most that abstained from the UN resolutions 
on East Timor did so in order to not offend Soeharto and Portugal at the same time. 28 
From 1982 onwards, the UN had been facilitating talks between Jakarta and Lisbon to 
find an acceptable resolution to the East Timorese question. However, talks had never 
brought any substantial agreements to the table. Though the UN repeatedly 
condemned Indonesia's illegal occupation, the permanent members failed to come up 
with any form of resolution on the matter unlike the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. Saddam 
2" [bid, p. 155 
27 Schwarz, A Nation in Waiting, p. 206 
28 Ramos-Horta, Funu The Unfinished Saga of East Timor, p. 107 
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Hussein had every right to question the inconsistencies of international conduct when 
he bluntly asked why Indonesia could make East Timor its 27`h province and why he 
could not make Kuwait the 19`h province of Iraq. 29 
During this period, the Indonesian state possessed high levels of social control within 
Indonesia as shown in Chapter Three and low levels of social control in East Timor. 
However, the Indonesian state's capability to invade East Timor was not only 
dependent on its dominance over social forces, but also the support from many states 
as well as the indifference of many others. The states supported the annexation of East 
Timor included the US, Australia as well as neighbouring ASEAN states supported 
the annexation of East Timor due to the Cold War imperative. 
Continued Warfare 
While Apodeti and UDT leaders had been co-opted by Jakarta, Fretilin was able to 
thrive on popular support. The military had the might to crush a relatively small 
rebellion; however, guerrilla tactics and support from the local population helped 
sustain Fretilin even in large areas of inner East Timor. Indonesian troops were 
estimated at 30,000 in comparison to Fretilin fighters which were estimated at roughly 
2,500 men along with 10-20,000 militias. 30 This is an indicator that a considerable 
bulk of the population supported independence. 
A sense of nationalism did not become a salient feature within East Timor until the 
Indonesian annexation. The Timorese did not fight a liberation war against the 
29 Theodore Friend, Indonesian Destinies, (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University 
Press, 2003), p. 431 
30 Schwarz, A Nation in Waiting, p. 205 
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Portuguese. As such, a sense of nationalism was only constructed in response to the 
Indonesian invaders. Under Portuguese rule, East Timor remained relatively 
untouched by economic development, education as well as Portugal's `civilising 
mission'. Consequently, Timorese rituals, animism and culture still remained a part of 
the Timorese way of life. 31 The Indonesian incorporation of East Timor into its fold 
has prompted a surge in Catholicism. The perception of the church is a dramatic 
change since Portuguese rule when the church was perceived as an ally of the 
Portuguese colonialists. 32 This draws on similarities with the way the Acehnese 
constructed their own sense of nationalism which was aimed to differentiate its 
nationalism from that of the oppressors. While the Acehnese drew on its glorious 
historical past, the East Timorese have drawn on religion as point of unification 33 
This in turn formed a sense of nationalism and identity that differed from that of 
Indonesia. During the first ten-year period under Indonesian rule, the Church saw a 
sharp increase in its membership from 200,000 in 1974 to 400,000 in 1983.34 In 
comparison to the period at the end of Portuguese rule, one third of Timorese were 
Roman Catholic and the rest practised animism. 35 The sharp increase in members of 
the Catholic Church also indicated the need to move away from anything associated 
with Indonesia and drawing closer to Portuguese symbols. Similar findings were also 
noted by prominent journalist Hugh O'Shaughnessy who during a visit experienced a 
bond and gained trust from the East Timorese because of his ability to communicate 
in Portuguese. 36 As in Aceh, resentment towards the military had developed following 
deaths inflicted upon its people, personal accounts of abuse and the forced 
31 Ramos-Horta, Funu The Unfinished Saga of East Timor, p. 14 
32 Schwarz, A Nation in Waiting, p. 218 
33 Friend, Indonesian Destinies, p. 431; Cristalis, Bitter Dawn East Timor a people 's story, p. 66 
34 Ramos-Horta, Funu The Unfinished Saga of East Timor, p. 2 
35 McDonald, Suharto's Indonesia, p. 191 
36 Hugh O'Shaughnessy, `Reporting East Timor: Western Media Coverage of the Conflict', Hainsworth 
and McCloskey (eds. ), The East Timor Question The Struggle for Independence from Indonesia, p. 35 
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relocations. 37 As such, discontent and opposition that had the potential to transform 
into a sense of nationalism cannot be simply eliminated. 
East Timor social forces that supported independence were relatively more unified 
than that in Aceh. According to one NGO worker, this had much to due with the local 
economy of each region. 38 Aceh was rich in natural resources which resulted in a 
stratified society. As I will explore in the following chapter, the business community 
and elites in Aceh were divided. Some benefited from the spoils of the New Order 
while the disgruntled rest formed GAM, Aceh's secessionist movement. 
Unlike the case of Aceh, East Timorese and Papuans were unable to gain positions 
from the New Order. Consequently, this created unity amongst the population in 
Papua and East Timor against Jakarta. 39 The bond of unification in East Timor was 
the common enemy. The division between the supporters for independence and 
supporter for integration with Indonesia disrupted in 2001 in clashes and has 
continued until recent times. 40 
In the previous chapter, I have shown that the state under Soeharto possessed high 
levels of social control which resulted in integrated domination or the state 
establishing dominance over social forces. Migdal predicts if the state has more social 
control, it has more capability to carry out its actions. Due to high levels of social 
control over other social forces which in turn enhanced the Indonesian state's 
capability, social opposition in East Timor failed to disrupt state action. In other 
Based on numerous discussions and personal accounts. 
3' Telephone Interview with NGO worker frequenting East Timor, 27 January 2007 
39 Bertrand, Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict in Indonesia, p. 170 
40 BBC Online, `E Timor ex-PM accused on unrest', www. bbc. co. uk, 17 October 2006, accessed 17 
October 2006 
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words, the state possessed relative autonomy over social forces through mutual 
empowerment with other social forces within the archipelago. The Indonesian state's 
effectiveness was further reinforced by external support. International support was 
firmly behind Jakarta up until the 1980s. There were two main reasons for this. 
Firstly, governments were prepared to overlook the sake of a few economic returns 41 
Secondly, at the height of the Cold War, Indonesia had no trouble getting the blessing 
from other countries such as the United States and Australia. As mentioned in the 
previous chapter, Soeharto came to power by eradicating Indonesia's political of some 
half a million communists in 1965- a move that clearly indicated Soeharto's distaste 
for the western opposed ideology. Consequently, Soeharto's Indonesia became of 
important strategic importance to the western bloc. 
This period shows that Jakarta was never short of new strategies to appease social 
forces in East Timor opposing the Indonesian state. In 1977, Jakarta adopted the new 
'encirclement' strategy which aimed to relocate the population to designated areas. By 
1979 it had been estimated that 300,000 Timorese were living in these camps which 
were located in poor agricultural areas where food was scarce. With this, the 
Indonesian military adopted another strategy called the fence of legs. This entailed 
forcing Timorese civilians to walk ahead of Indonesian troops while they advanced 
into Fretilin areas leaving Fretilin fighters the two options of shooting civilians or 
holding their fire and being shot at themselves. More than 100,000 civilians, including 
catholic clergymen, NGO workers and Timorese refugees, were estimated to have lost 
42 their lives as a result of this notorious approach. 
41 John G. Taylor, The Price of Freedom, (Bangkok: White Lotus Company Ltd., 1999), p. xi 
42 Taylor, Price of Freedom, p. 85-90 
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The Indonesian military also had an interest in keeping the conflict going which did 
not bear any relation with the strength of Fretilin's guerrilla wing or popular support 
for independence. First, the active region provided a good training ground for the 
Indonesian military. Secondly, like the case of Aceh, the region provided funding for 
military leaders. 43 This indicates that the state was not confined or influenced by 
social forces in East Timor but had the ability to control and manage the conflict 
within the half island. 
Eventually in 1980, the Indonesian military had come to the conclusion that Fretilin 
was of very little threat. To many observers this did seem to be the case. Many senior 
Fretilin leaders had been either killed or captured. Fretilin armed fighters were 
estimated at less than 200.44 Furthermore from the start of 1980, Soeharto introduced 
the resettlement programme which involved `voluntary' migrants being reallocated 
from over-populated areas such as Java and Bali. This transmigration policy aimed to 
'de-Timorise' the territory and neutralise the independence movements. 45 The fence 
of legs strategy also had a profound affect on the movement's supply networks. By 
the late 1980s, equipped with only a few hundred armed men, the Indonesian 
government labelled Fretilin as security disturbers and were more of a nuisance than a 
challenge to the government. 46 The measure of confidence in the security situation 
can be seen in the government's announcement of East Timor as an open province in 
1988. However, the opening of the territory provided an opportunity for disgruntled 
East Timorese in exile to resume contact with people within. And it was not long until 
43 Haseman, 'Catalyst for Change in Indonesia: the Dili Incident', p. 760 
44 Ibid, p. 760 
45 McCloskey, 'Introduction: East Timor', Hainsworth and McCloskey (eds. ), The East Timor Question 
The Struggle for Independence from Indonesia, p. 5 
46 Schwarz, A Nation in Waiting, p. 209 
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Fretilin re-grouped and with the support of the population for food and intelligence, 
and the Indonesian military could do very little to eradicate the movement. 
As mentioned in the previous chapter, Jakarta had firm control over social forces in 
other areas; consequently, the state possessed a considerable degree of capability to 
carry out its actions. State segments did not oppose the state's official action either. 
Although this was the case, the Indonesian state action to incorporate East Timor was 
also supported by other states. Had Indonesia lacked this support, it would have most 
likely failed to do so. The case of 1975 annexation shows that the Indonesian state 
capability was not only enhanced by social control but also by the support of other 
states by their non-interference of the Indonesian state action. The turning point in 
Jakarta- East Timor relations was undoubtedly the Dili incident of 12 November 1991 
that brought East Timor's hidden presence to the attention of the international 
community. Furthermore, the Cold War had ended and the rationale for containing 
communism had disappeared along with the collapse of the Soviet Union. 
The Dili Incident 
The new phase of openness or keterbukaan (also briefly mentioned in Chapter Three) 
that Indonesia was experiencing at the time also affected the policies towards 
managing East Timor. In late 1988, Jakarta opened up the territory under the auspices 
of Operation Smile (Operasi Senyum). This entailed the removal of travel restrictions 
for both Timorese and Indonesians. A number of foreign dignitaries also visited the 
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territory under tight supervision including Pope John Paul II in October 1989.47 The 
change of policy reflected two important changes both in the domestic and 
international fronts. The resistance movement had become more reliant on political 
channels as opposed to guerrilla fighting. Consequently, the armed resistance had 
subsided during this period. On the international front, Portugal had gained 
acceptance in the European Union and was more inclined to push the annexation of a 
former European colonies as a European agenda. This resulted in EU calls for 
Indonesia to withdraw troops from East Timor. 
In November 1991, the Portuguese Parliamentary delegation was due to visit East 
Timor for its first-ever serious investigative mission. Consequently, excitement and 
tensions amongst the population ran high. However at the last minute, the Indonesian 
military cancelled the visit on the grounds that it was unwilling to accept the team of 
journalists that were to accompany the delegation. Members of the independence 
movement who were involved in the preparations for the visit were left exposed. 
The Indonesian military went on an offensive to capture 30 young independence 
supporters that were seeking refuge in the Motael Church in Dili. The military 
successfully arrested 25 in all and killed a student, Sebastiao Gomes. On 12 
November, a mass memorial for Sebastiao was held in the church. However, the 
relatively small gathering soon turned into a large crowd. The spark of the incident 
was a few amongst the large crowd that made their way to the cemetery had carried 
pro-Fretilin flags and banners bearing anti- Indonesian slogans. Without prior 
47 Douglas Kammen, The trouble with the normal: the Indonesian military, paramilitaries and the final 
solution to East Timor', in Benedict R. O'G. Anderson (ed. ), Violence and the State in Suharto's 
Indonesia, (Ithaca, New York: Cornell Southeast Asia Publications, 2001), p. 162 
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warning, the military opened fire indiscriminately on the unarmed procession which 
resulted in 273 deaths. 48 
Many lives have been lost before this incident. In fact, there was very little fuss when 
the brutal occupation took place and the worst human rights abuses occurred which 
carried on until 1982. However, what made the massacre at Santa Cruz different to 
any previous incidents was that it was captured on film by British photojournalists 
and smuggled out of the country. The scene was televised worldwide which resulted 
in a public outcry. Public outrage towards the incident pushed governments of the EU 
and the United States to consider their stance on the issue. 49 Consequently, 
international sympathy for East Timor, though not necessarily support for 
independence, had increased and continued throughout the years. Finally, the 
international community had begun to the see the reality of the situation in East Timor 
rather than taking Jakarta's word for it. 
East Timor had been under a media blackout which was at times nearly complete. The 
accuracy of the very small amount of reports that were released in the public domain 
was highly questionable. Though a videotape of the Dili massacre was smuggled out 
of the country, the image was not shown on Indonesian television. 50 East Timor 
formerly was not open to travellers, not even to Indonesians unless special permission 
was obtained. As such, other social segments within the Indonesian state had very 
little knowledge of what was occurring in East Timor. Though there was a slight 
change in international support, the Dili incident did not affect the support from other 
social forces within Indonesia for the Indonesian state's dealings with East Timor. 
4' Taylor, The Price of Freedom, p. xiii 
49 Ibid, p. xiii 
30 Friend. Indonesian Destinies, p. 448 
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In the light of the changing dynamics at the international level and increased level of 
social opposition in East Timor, the military changed its tack dramatically. Rather 
than bowing to criticisms, Indonesia ignored it. The main explanation for this was that 
though international sympathy had increased, it was not enough to influence Jakarta 
to change its policies towards managing secessionism in East Timor. Though some 
governments began voicing their criticisms, trading and military assistance continued. 
At this juncture, states were more concerned about trade. It was not until later when 
military intervention in the conflict in Kosovo in 1999, led by NATO in absence of a 
formal blessing from the UN Security Council mandate, shifted concerns from 
economic and trade relations to more humanitarian grounds. The NATO intervention 
in Kosovo highlighted the defects of UN Charter which did not account for 
intervention on humanitarian grounds or moral legitimacy. 51 
Support for East Timor went as far as raising the issue of human rights and awarding 
Bishop Belo and Jose Ramos-Horta the Nobel Peace Prize in 1996. As a response to 
East Timor's newfound attention, new tactics were employed to deal with the second 
generation of Timorese that were supposedly educated and socialised the `Indonesian 
way'. For most Indonesians, East Timor is a sensitive subject. East Timorese students 
attending university in other parts of Indonesia have often dropped out not only due to 
language problems but also because of how they are constantly reminded of how 
ungrateful they have been. On the other hand, other regions, which have rebelled 
against the centre especially during the 1950s, have never endured the accusation of 
51 David Chandler, `The Responsibility to Protect? Imposing the `Liberal Peace', International 
Peacekeeping, Vol. 11, No. 1, p. 59 
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being 'ungrateful'. 52 During this period covert operations increased and the use of 
premen (thugs) was employed to intimidate or act as agent provocateurs. 53 The brief 
opening that had allowed limited accessed to the region from 1989-1991 was now 
completely closed. Operations were now handed over to the Special Forces Unit 
(Kopassus). The ability to open and close the region at will showed the state's 
autonomy over social forces in East Timor. 
In 1992, the military captured the guerrilla leader Xanana Gusmao and Major General 
Prabowo, then commander of Kompassus set out the task of crushing what remained 
of the movement. Irregular troops such as ninjas, militias under the auspices of 
Kompassus as well as gangs, which mainly operated at night, were deployed to carry 
out the mission. 54 Consequently, this resulted in a reduction of clashes between the 
military and freedom fighters. Subsequently, the military began to focus its energy on 
civilians and supporters of an independent East Timor. It was during this period that 
the infamous militias that disrupted the 1999 referendum on autonomy were created. 
And despite the growing criticisms of Jakarta's handling of the renegade province, 
East Timor witnessed and lived through worsened conditions due to the creation of 
paramilitary groups. The name the military gave the operations for 1997 sums it up 
well: Operasi Tuntas or `Operation Eradicate'. 55 
The Dili incident shows that state effectiveness was enhanced in its initiatives towards 
East Timorese resistance through the mutual empowerment of other social segments 
within Indonesia. Though the media blackout in East Timor and media censor in the 
52 Benedict Anderson, `Imagining East Timor', 
www. uc. pt/timor/imagin. htm, accessed 22 April 2005 
53 Taylor, The Price of Freedom, p. xiii 
5' Friend, Indonesian Destinies, p. 433 
55 Taylor, The Price of Freedom, p. xv 
Arena Magazine, No. 4, April-May 1993, 
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rest of the archipelago deprived the population of any information concerning East 
Timor, it is doubtful that any social segment would have supported East Timorese 
resistance. The reasons for this are evident in the material discussed in Chapter Three. 
I mentioned that there were various structures in place to keep social forces at bay. 
These included the state's ability to co-opt social forces through rewards such as 
corporatism and repressive measures which were carried out by the military. 
Consequently, high levels of social control enabled the state to carry out it actions 
independent of social opposition in East Timor. This instance confirms the central 
hypothesis. 
Criticisms from other states began to emerge following the Dili incident which in turn 
increased positive action. Ramos-Horta being awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1996 
illustrates the point. However, the state's capability to defy international criticisms did 
not necessarily correlate with the high levels of social control. While the economy 
was strong and situation stable making Indonesia attractive to foreign investment, the 
issue of human rights would not pushed be to the extent that would offend Indonesia. 
Trade and military relations continued and no other sanctions were imposed that 
would have any affect on Jakarta's effectiveness to act on its policy options in East 
Timor. 
Though in 1988, Jakarta decided to 'open up' East Timor, this did not reflect a change 
in social forces or international support for Jakarta. The change in policy was related 
to the wider context of 'openness' and the diminishing armed opposition. The Dili 
incident increased international support and the opening up of the territory provided 
the opportunity for the resistance movement to re-group itself. Though international 
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interest increased in the aftermath of the Dili incident, there were no positive changes 
in Indonesia's dealings with East Timor. The instance shows that external factors 
played a role in the East Timor conflict but cannot be given overall importance as a 
determining factor. This in turn questions weak state analysis which portrays 
developing states as incapable of self-rule and dependent on the international system. 
Secondly, mutual empowerment between social forces and state segments cannot 
alone account for state capability. 
East Timor under Habibie 
In 1998, Jakarta was facing a multiplicity of problems which played to the advantage 
of resistant movements in East Timor and other areas. Nationwide unrest gained 
momentum which resulted in what Migdal terms as a total transformation of the state. 
East Timorese activists seized this rare opportunity to stage its own protests against 
Jakarta. The events during this period transformed state-society relations where the 
state could no longer maintain integrated domination. Concessions such as conducting 
`popular consultation' on the future of East Timor was a result of social forces 
engaging in multiple struggles which in turn limited the state's policy options. The 
use of militias to disrupt the popular consultation and later the acceptance of an 
international peacekeeping force also deserve analytical attention. Details of these 
events will be explored in the following sections. 
In June 1998, students boldly demanded the release of Timorese political prisoners, 
the right for East Timor to vote on its future via referendum and the correction of 
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KKN in the provincial government. 56 Pro-independence supporters took advantage of 
the visit of European Union Ambassadors and gathered in large crowds. 57 Like the 
Acehnese at the time, groups of East Timorese students staged demonstrations in front 
of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. There were campaigns throughout August and 
September calling for all-inclusive talks between all segments of East Timorese 
society to resolve the 23-year-old conflict. How did the state respond to this new 
wave of social opposition? 
Amidst the mass protests for the removal of Soeharto and his generals and the 
subsequent call for democratisation, once a strong pillar of the New Order, 
Indonesia's military had shown a considerable amount of restraint towards what 
would have been labelled during the days of the New Order as `civil disobedience'. 
The Ainaro (in East Timor) military commander, Lt. -Col. Paulus Gatot Rudianto 
commented: As long as they don't disturb other people, we're not going to limit their 
activities'58. From June to September there was a minimal military response to the 
upsurge in the activities supporting independence despite the gradual increase of 
troops during the period prior to Soeharto's downfall. 
The state response to recent developments in East Timor was similar to the 
concessions granted to the Acehnese and Papuans at the time, including the release of 
political prisoners. Another immediate effect was the removal of Soeharto's son-in- 
law, Lt. Gen. Prabowo Subianto, who managed military operations in East Timor after 
Soeharto's resignation. The wave of the reformasi movement and the new found 
S6 Kammen, `The trouble with normal', p. 171 
57 Ian Martin, Self Determination in East Timor The United National, the Ballot, and International 
Inten"ention, International Peace Academy Occasional Papers Series, (London: Lynne Rienner 
Publishers, 2001). p. 20 
58 Far Eastern Economic Review, `Crack in the Wall', 3 September 1998, p. 22 
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freedoms of the press had brought other charges to light such as the disappearance of 
students during the New Order. As a result of these charges, he was demoted to head 
the Bandung Military Academy and later took self-exile in Jordan. 59 Protests emerged 
outside Cipinang Prison where guerrilla leader, Xanana was held. 60 In June, Habibie 
announced that he was willing to enhance the provincial status of East Timor to 
`special status' though remaining with the republic. This meant that matters of 
defence, foreign policy and financial affairs were to be directed by Jakarta with 
remaining internal matters to be managed by the Timorese. Following Habibie's offer 
of autonomy announced in mid 1998, the details were discussed later between 
Indonesia and Portugal under the auspices of the UN in August. The sheer fact that 
the Indonesian state was making concessions at the time illustrated a transformation in 
state-society relations with the state no longer dominant over social forces. 
In July 1998, Habibie requested the withdrawal of troops. Meanwhile, there was 
increased activity from the militias. In June, then Governor of East Timor, Albilio 
Soares, attempted to organise pro-integration/pro-autonomy rallies (with connections 
with the military) to counter the demonstrations calling for a referendum. Though the 
military remained hesitant to take direct action against increased protests calling for 
independence, it was still active in organising counter activity to the pro- 
independence faction. 
Calls for a final solution to the East Timorese conflict continued into the later months. 
In September, the political parties that originally established themselves prior to the 
1975 invasion had set up an umbrella organisation known as the National Council of 
59 Far Eastern Economic Review, `Soldering on', 18 March 1999, p. 28 
60 Taylor, The Price of Freedom, p. xvi 
159 
Resistance of the People of East Timor (CNRT, Concelho Nacionale de Resistencia 
Timorese) with Xanana as president . 
61 The parties had their differences in the past but 
were willing to overlook these for the sake of unifying the population against Jakarta 
while taking advantage of the explosive situation. 
In October, Governor Soares demanded that all civil servants that refused to support 
government plans for autonomy would be required to resign from their positions in 
the civil service. As a response to this demand, thousands of people took to the streets 
in support of the civil servants and demanded the resignation of the governor 
himself. 62 Mass protests that continued into the months of November and December 
paralysed East Timor. In November, East Timorese gathered to commemorate the 
Santa Cruz massacre which occurred in 1991. In December, streets were blocked and 
Christmas mass was held in Dili and Baucau. 
The situation in East Timor had become simply unmanageable. The initial offer of 
wide-ranging autonomy was firmly rejected by Bishop Belo and Xanana Gusmao. 
Social momentum was strong; Habibie and Alatas had no choice but to go further. 
Jakarta's main challenge was resolving the East Timor problem without setting 
precedence to other movements in areas such as Aceh and Papua. However, Jakartan 
elites such as Foreign Minister Ali Alatas have maintained that East Timor was a 
`special case' and the solution `takes into account that it has a different history and 
different factors that all warrant a special autonomous region... '63 This point was also 
61 The East Timor and Indonesia Action Network (ETAN), `East Timor's Flag', 
http: //www. etan. org/timor/CNRTflag. htm, accessed 21 August 2003 
62 Kammen, `The trouble with normal', p. 173 
63 Far Eastern Economic Review, `A Special Case', 6 August 1998, p. 29 
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noted by many prominent Indonesian academics. 64 On 27 January 1999, the 
government announced that it would ask the MPR to `let East Timor go' if the 
majority rejected the offer of autonomy. 
One of the strongest factors prompting the change in Jakarta's policy towards East 
Timor was the change of President and the transition. Unlike a few military officers 
and the Soeharto children, Habibie had no direct personal stake in East Timor. 
Furthermore, the Association of Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals (or ICMI) led by 
Habibie, also questioned Indonesia's persistence in holding on to half an island whose 
population was predominately Christian. 65 It has been argued by John Taylor that 
Jakarta's decision to grant East Timor independence came from President Habibie's 
own quest to distance himself from Soeharto and his own determination to establish 
himself internationally. 66 Habibie also had another ulterior motive: the upcoming 
elections in April 1998. Habibie's attempts to settle the conflict would position him as 
someone serious about democracy and human rights; hence, appealing to the 
international community while at the same time portraying himself as a reformer to 
the reformasi bloc. Aides close to the president claim that the one-time technology 
tsar is taking a personal interest in political reform. `Habibie wants to be remembered 
as a president who brought Indonesia out of an authoritarian system and into a 
democratic era where human rights is a guiding principle', said adviser Dewi Fortuna 
Anwar. 67 
64 Interview with Arbi Sanit in Jakarta Post, `Let Timorese decide their own fate', 26 June 1998, 
www. thejakartapost. com, accessed 26 June 2006 
65 Far Eastern Economic Review, `Sudden Impact', 11 February 1999, p. 19 
66 Taylor, The Price of Freedom, p. xvii 
67 `Far Eastern Economic Review, Dawn of a New Age', 17 September 1998, p. 25 
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Habibie's performance as a reformer was mixed. His presidency showed positive 
steps towards democratisation such as the freedom of speech and competitive 
elections. However, Habibie has failed to try military officers for human rights abuses 
and Soeharto for corruption and theft of national wealth which also included his 
children and cronies not to mention Habibie's own involvement in the Bali Bank 
scandal68. Unfortunately for Habibie, what he has refused to do has undermined the 
positive steps he has made towards democratisation. Coined as a destroyer of national 
unity, Habibie's actions have failed to win him votes from the electorate and support 
from the political elite. 69 He has also been accused of attempting to gain international 
recognition as a reformer. 
Soon, signs began to emerge that Habibie would have to contend with state segments 
that opposed Habibie's decision which was viewed as potentially destroying the unity 
of the nation. It did become apparent that only handful of Jakartan elites supported the 
idea of a referendum or as termed by Jakarta as `popular consultation'. One of them 
being the presidential candidate, Amien Rais. 70 On the other hand, many other 
prominent political figures such as Wahid and the military especially the powerful 
factions were against the idea of an independent East Timor. Megawati also opposed 
the idea citing what the majority of Indonesians want is to see them (East Timor) as 
part of Indonesia' 7 1. Though his opinion did not really matter at this point, Soeharto 
opposed it. 72 
68 Several parties have accused Bank Bali of trying to fund former President Habibie's re-election 
campaign. See Far Eastern Economic Review, 'Habibie Feels the Heat', 9 September 1999, p. 18 
69 Bertand, Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict in Indonesia, p. 181 
70 Far Eastern Economic Review, 'Crack in the Wall, 3 September 1998, p. 24 
71 BBC News, 'East Timor's future: what they said', derived from www. bbc. co. uk, accessed 6 
February 2006 
72 Jakarta Post, 'E. Timor settlement: Referendum or autonomy', 18 September 1998, 
www. thejakartapost. com, accessed 18 September 1998 
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The army was furious and there was discontent amongst parliamentarians and close 
aides who had not been consulted on the matter. In fact, the President had allegedly 
thought of the solution during his slept. He then scribbled it down on a piece of paper 
and later gave the hand written note to Stapleton Roy, the US Ambassador to Jakarta 
and declared that he would be making the announcements soon. 73 Both Megawati and 
Wahid argued that Habibie, as head of a transitional government, had no right to make 
a decision as such. The main thing is that, as of 1 January 2000, we do not want to be 
burdened with the problem of East Timor any more', Habibie announced in February 
1999. Habibie made it no secret of his apathy towards the half island. In the past, 
Habibie has described the territory as nothing but rocks. He has also gone as far as 
describing the government's decision to annex East Timor as a humanitarian one. 
Finance was also an issue for Habibie as he has been quick to note that 93% of East 
Timor's development budget was funded by the central government. 74 
This has led a few commentators to argue that due to the economic crisis, a continued 
occupation was no longer financially viable. 75 The lack of funds reached the point 
where soldiers in East Timor were not being paid. After the rupiah plunged in January 
1998, maintaining control over a half an island did not seem as worthwhile as it did in 
the past. The government has reportedly been spending half of East Timor's $113 
million GDP. 76 East Timor had been putting a strain on Indonesia's financial budget 
for more than twenty years of its occupation. Funds which could have otherwise been 
73 Friend, Indonesian Destinies, p. 434 
74 Jakarta Post, 'Consequences of E. Timor ballot', 5 September 1999, www. thejakartapost. com, 
accessed 5 September 1999 
75 Friend, Indonesian Destinies, p. 433; Reports in the Sydney Morning Herald also indicate that the 
lack of funds played a factor in the decision to let East Timor go. 
76 Far Eastern Economic Review, 'Sudden Impact', 11 February 1999, p. 19 
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diverted to fund other government projects. Without the financial crisis crippling the 
once fast growing economy, Indonesia needed to relieve the financial burden of the 
operations in East Timor. Once famously described by Ali Alatas as a `pebble in the 
shoe'. One academic commented that East Timor has transformed into a `thorn in our 
flesh by demanding more money'77. However as mentioned earlier, the army had 
made considerable amounts of money from the province. In these terms, it would not 
have been a problem if the military had wanted to continue their operations. As the 
situation would later show, the military did obtain the resources to fund militia 
groups. 
What about other social segments outside East Timor? For most Indonesians, the 
initial offer of special status was `more than adequate'78. Much debate continued 
towards the end of 1998 on whether to grant East Timor autonomy or a referendum. 79 
The Indonesian nationalist rhetoric amongst the public in 1998 dissipated the view 
that East Timor should remain the 27 `h province of Indonesia regardless. RO 
What bearing did the situation have on the central hypothesis? There was an upsurge 
of social forces in East Timor in 1998 protesting against the state and calling for 
independence. This was made in tandem with nationwide protests though with 
different demands. The combination of a state in complete disarray, and an economic 
downturn subsequently transformed state and society relations from a state dominant 
over society to a society dominant over the state. The state-in-society approach 
" Interview with Arbi Sanit in Jakarta Post, `Let Timorese decide their own fate', 26 June 1998, 
www. thejakartapost. com, accessed 26 June 1998 
78 Ibid 
79 Jakarta Post, E. Timor settlement: Referendum or autonomy', 18 September 1998, 
www. thejakartapost. com, accessed 18 September 1999 
80 Far Eastern Economic Review, `Going it alone', 21 January 1999, p. 12 
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assumes that in situations such as these social forces possess the ability to change the 
nature of the state itself. This instance confirms the central hypothesis. 
However, it is crucial to note that social forces in East Timor alone could not exert 
pressure on Jakarta which eventually offered East Timor the right to decide its own 
future. Had the upsurge in social forces in East Timor not been in the context of the 
multiplicity of problems, there would not have been a change of policy towards East 
Timor, even though East Timor's independence did not receive support from other 
social forces. Had the transition not taken place and Soeharto had still been power, the 
Indonesian state would have had the capability to quell rebellion as it had done so in 
the past and in many other areas in Indonesia regardless whether there had been an 
increase in protests in East Timor. 
On the international front, the offer of autonomy and later referendum would serve to 
repair Indonesia's battered image from gross human rights employed by the military 
as well as enhancing its credibility. The financial crisis has put a toll on Indonesia's 
resources and pleasing the international community would increase aid from 
developed countries to overcome the economic crisis. 
There is a considerable amount of literature on the international dimension of the 
conflict on East Timor. Some have been critical of the actions of some governments, 
which have been perceived to do too little. 8' On the other side of the debate are the 
foreign dignitaries, ministers and heads of states that have opted for a more defensive 
81 Joseph Nevins, `The Making of "Ground Zero" in East Timor in 1999', Asian Survey, Vol. XLII, 
No. 4, July/ August 2002 
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tone. ` Though there were increasing criticisms from many states, Australia and 
Portugal were the two most involved states at this juncture. 
Australia was the only western nation to recognise the Indonesian annexation of East 
Timor in 1976. From 1978, Australia moved from abstaining to supporting the UN 
resolution against Indonesia's invasion of East Timor to voting against it. By early 
February, Australia, which originally backed the autonomy package, indicated that it 
wouldn't mind independence as a `second best option', though still showing 
preference for special autonomy. 83 Australia has its reservations towards an 
independent East Timor. Firstly, maintaining regional security has always been a 
driving force behind's Australia's foreign policy towards Southeast Asia especially 
Indonesia which is situated immediately north to Australia's borders. The Agreement 
on Maintaining Security signed by Indonesia and Australia signed in 1995 illustrates 
the point. And if East Timor were to gain independence, this may ignite a wave of 
Balkanisation. 84 Secondly, East Timor's independence does threaten an economic fall 
out between Indonesia and Australia. Independence will force Australia to re- 
negotiate the Timor Gap treaty, a deal worth potentially billions of dollars in oil and 
gas. Though Canberra has significantly shifted their original position on the East 
Timor question, the public heavily support East Timor's independence. Thirdly, an 
independent East Timor could be a financial burden to Australia's budget as noted by 
82 For example, Alexander Downer, `East Timor-Looking Back on 1999', Australian Journal of 
International Affairs, Vol. 54, No. 1,2000 
83 Jakarta Post, `Australia shifts stance on Timor', 13 January 19994 February 1999, 
www. thejakartapost. com, accessed 4 February 1999 
84 Jakarta Post, 'Australia fears free Timor may fracture RI', 4 February 1999, 
www. thejakartapost. com, accessed 4 February 1999 
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Prime Minister John Howard, though saying that Australia would still be 
appropriately generous. 85 
Portugal argued that the East Timorese have not exercised their right to self- 
determination. This contradicts the Indonesian view that East Timor have exercised 
this right when their chose to integrate with Indonesia in 1976. Since the upsurge of 
political activity in East Timor, Portugal and Indonesia have been engaged in talks 
under the auspices of the UN. 
As mentioned earlier, a number of key political figures did not support Habibie's 
decision. Most importantly, Habibie lacked the support from the military. Though, 
Wiranto was not among the generals that had great interests in East Timor, his 
concerns were more about the legitimacy of the armed forces in territory should not 
be questioned. Consequently, the military had a different view on how to do deal with 
East Timor. A solution that the world would witness and the East Timorese would 
live through in the months to come. As early as November 1998, these factions within 
the military had strategies to undermine Habibie's plans for East Timor's future. 
Senior military figures had launched Operation Clean Sweep (Operasi Sapu Jagad) 
which aimed to get rid of the independence leaders and portray a picture of civil war. 
Civil war would show that the population was neither anti-integration nor pro- 
Indonesia, but essentially a region incapable of self-rule. This in turn would show the 
international community that the province did not have great support for 
independence as it had set out to have. 86 Unfortunately at the time, many news 
85 Jakarta Post, `Australia concerned by East Timor moves', 13 February 1999, 
www. thejakartapost. com, accessed 13 February 1999 
86 Taylor, Price ofFreedom, p. xx; Friend, Indonesian Destinies, p. 434 
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agencies such as CNN and BBC fell into this trap and assisted the military by 
reiterating this image. 87 And though many were taken by surprise by Habibie's shock 
decision, the military had at the very least suspected that Habibie would take things a 
step further. There was an increase in the number of militias in an attempt to prepare 
for a decision such as this. Three new militia groups were formed during December 
1998- January 1999 included Mahidi (December 17), Besi Merah Putih or Red and 
White Iron (December 27) and Aitarak or Thorn (in early 1999) headed by the much- 
feared Eurico Guterres. 88 
The militias disrupt the state's policies 
The use of militias was nothing new in East Timor or to the wider Indonesian context. 
The 1965-66 massacre of the members of the PKI mainly in the countryside of Java 
and Bali were conducted by militias. Though an old practice, there was a sharp 
increase in the number of militias immediately after Habibie's proposed solution to 
the conflict in January 1999.89 Though some reform-minded military officers were 
willing to accept Habibie's decision, powerful factions were not prepared to release 
East Timor. The military had invested heavily in East Timor both financially and 
emotionally. No one had any reason to doubt the links between the Indonesian 
military and the militias. In March 1999, Kompassus had obtained US$ 2 million to 
finance the operations. 90 And as early as November 1998, troops and trained militias 
87 Cristalis, Bitter Dawn, p. 149; For example, BBC Online, No let-up in Timor violence', 28 August 
1999, www. bbc. co. uk, accessed 28 August 2006, BBC Online, `MP warns of East Timor'civil war", 3 
September, 1999, www. bbc. co. uk, accessed 3 September 1999; BBC Online, Timor unrest: More 
pictures, 26 August 1999, www. bbc. co. uk, accessed 26 August 1999 pictures, 
Kammen, `Trouble with the Normal', p. 183 
89 Jakarta Post, `East Timor mayhem a lesson for TNI', 17 September 1999, www. thejakartapost. com, 
accessed 17 September 1999 
90 Friend, Indonesian Destinies, p. 435 
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prepared itself for Operasi Sapu Jagad. Operations were coordinated under the 
command structure of pro-autonomy militias (milisi pro-outonomi). 
The ability of the military to mobilise the population to oppose the state's official 
action cannot be stressed enough. It had been reported that the military command 
incorporated an extra 1,000 civilian militias, therefore, adding to the 13,000 military 
personnel posted in the region. East Timor Military Chief Colonel Tono Suratman 
deemed the extra recruitment crucial to 'secure East Timor, not to fight (with pro- 
independence groups). Militias were required to sign a one-year contract and receive a 
monthly salary of Rp 200,000 equivalent to US$24.91 Different sources indicate a 
higher number of militias operating in the area. Figures that were leaked out from 
Cilankap, or the Indonesian Pentagon, indicated an additional 9,000 militia with ties 
to the Indonesian military suggesting some 21,000 pro-Indonesia military men in the 
area. 
92 
From the months running up to, during and after the referendum, militias were trained 
and financed by the military. The links between the military and the militias are clear. 
The police continued to turn a blind eye while the militias embarked on a campaign to 
terrorise the population into accepting the autonomy package initially offered by 
Habibie back in January. The International Force for East Timor (or INTERFET 
which maintained the security situation after the referendum) soldiers accused the 
military of joining in the looting and burning of buildings. 93 Further evidence of links 
between the militia and the state were also noted by United Nations Mission in East 
91 Jakarta Post, '1,000-Strong militia recruited in E. Timor', 8 February 1999, www. thejakartapost. com, 
accessed 8 February 1999 
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Timor (or UNAMET, brought in to manage the popular consultation in East Timor) 
officials who witnessed meetings where police, military, civil servants and militias 
were present at blood drinking ceremonies. The white and red flag was posted outside 
some houses for protection from the militias. Those defiant bore the costs. Civil 
servants were required to support autonomy and subsequently signed statements 
reaffirming their word. Refusal to do so resulted in dismissal, suspension or salaries 
withheld. `" 
The use of militias employed by the military in order to retain control over the 
territory has been described by Douglas Kammen as an attempt to `normalise' the 
territory. 95 This refers to the process of removing military troops and replacing them 
with militarised civilians. As a result, this would portray a false image that East Timor 
as governed under an administrative authority like any other province and most 
importantly not under military rule. The reluctance of some of the Indonesian political 
elite and some segments within the military to let go of East Timor can be traced back 
to economic interests in the region. Furthermore, East Timor has been portrayed as a 
showground for other cases considering independence. 96 The message was clear: any 
action that will disrupt the unity of the state will be responded with force regardless of 
any other plans the civilian government may have. 
Like other separatist regions such as Aceh and Papua, the military has invested a lot in 
these regions since the 1975 annexation. As such, it would be difficult to put a 
complete halt to military operations. Financially, these regions have generated funds 
94 Martin, Self-Determination in East Timor, p. 43 
95 Kammen, `The trouble with the normal', p. 158 
96 Jakarta Post, `Australia, RI starting again', 15 September 1999, www. thejakartapost. com, 15 
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for the under financed military. High-ranking officers based in East Timor have 
lucrative investments in commodities such as sandalwood, timber, marble, coffee and 
oil. `" Soeharto and members of his family also have a stake in the territory. 
Furthermore, soldiers, that fought and witnessed their comrades die in war, see East 
Timor as an investment of blood. Wiranto has also been quick to remind the nation 
that both soldiers and civilians have lost their lives in protecting the integrity of 
Indonesia. " With so many vested interests, Alatas has noted that it had been difficult 
to come up with plans for autonomy during the Soeharto period that would be 
`accepted by several groups'99. 
The use of militias illustrates the struggles between state segments. On one hand, the 
state can be viewed as a clearly integrated unit performing its tasks in a unified 
manner. On the other, the state is fragmented and these state segments are loosely 
bound together. It is these ill-defined boundaries that often come into conflict with 
one another or the state's `official' action. The situation leading up to the referendum 
and after confirms this assumption. The majority of political elites and the military 
opposed Habibie's solution to the East Timor question, however, only the military had 
the means to disrupt the `state's official action'. This also shows the military's 
capability to oppose the state's official action is not equal to other state segments 
which opposed the referendum. This began during the months running up to the 
referendum when the military aimed to intimidate East Timorese who were voting for 
independence. The mayhem also aimed to portray an image of a territory incapable of 
self-rule. After the vote, the militias refused to accept the results by creating violence 
97 Friend, Indonesian Destinies, p. 433 
98 Jakarta Post, `Australia concerned by East Timor moves, 13 February 1999, 
www. thejakartapost. com, accessed 13 February 1999 
99 Interview with Ali Alatas in Far Eastern Economic Review, ' A Special Case', 6 August 1998, p. 29 
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as well as setting out demands for East Timor to be partitioned. They also forced mass 
migration to West Timor. 
The Referendum 
'Integration or war. If we lose with 40 percent, it is enough to fight 100 years 
more' 100, were the words of Tito Baptista, chairman of the United Front for East 
Timor Autonomy. The bloodshed following the ballot rang true to his warning. 
Violence intensified immediately after the announcement of the ballot results at 9 a. m. 
on 4 September. 101 The first choice of target was UNAMET headquarters in Dili 
blamed for anything wrong about the present situation. Both the Red Cross and 
Bishop Belo's residence were not immune to prosecution. 102 Bishop Belo's compound 
where 5,000 East Timorese were taking refuge even came under attack and was later 
evacuated by the UN to Darwin, Australia. 103 Buildings set alight had become a 
common sight as the militias embarked on a spree of looting of what very little the 
feared East Timorese had left behind. The situation in East Timor had attracted 
worldwide condemnation. Australia, New Zealand and Canada have all had called for 
the Security Council to dispatch a peacekeeping force immediately. 104 
Armed pro-integration militias ran amok burning, looting and shooting the population. 
Some were lucky enough to escape and seek shelter in the UN complex. A number of 
100 Tito Baptista quoted in Jakarta Post, `Consequences of the E. Timor ballot', 5 September 1999, 
www. thejakartapost. com, accessed 5 September 1999; Also BBC Online, `East Timor's future: what 
they say', www. bbc. co. uk, accessed 6 February 2006 
101 Jakarta Post, `E. Timorese reporter tells of his great escape', 19 September 1999, 
www. thejakartapost. com, accessed 19 September 1999 
102 Jakarta Post, 'TNI fortified by West's approach to E. Timor', 20 September 1999 
www. thejakartapost. com, accessed 20 September 1999 
103 Jakarta Post, `Belo flees as East Timor sinks deeper into violence', 8 September 1999 
www. thejakartapost. com, accessed 8 September 1999 
104 `Consequences of the E. Timor ballot', Jakarta Post, 5 September 1999 
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East Timorese were forcefully driven to the western side of the island. Pro-Autonomy 
groups even began suggesting partition if autonomy was rejected. 105 Militias groups 
also blocked the airport and detained UNAMET personnel for several hours on 
journey to Dili. 106 They also prevented people from travelling in and out from certain 
areas such as Manatuto and the outskirts of western Dili. Eurico Gueterres, leader of 
Aitarak, announced that no political leader was to leave the territory and should be 
held responsible for the years of conflict in East Timor. 107 
The police were also sympathetic to the pro-integration groups citing that their actions 
were `understandable and conducted under police supervision'. As Provincial Police 
spokesman Capt. Widodo D. S. continued: `They just want everybody to remain in 
East Timor so they can share the burden of finding a settlement to their internal 
matters. But we have persuaded them not to act (excessively)' 108. Some were reported 
to have even helped the militias refuel their cars and motorcycles to continue their 
rampage. 109 There was no armed conflict between the pro-integration and pro- 
independence groups. It was only the militias firing at will were the words of one 
journalist. Falintil did not respond to the violence and kept their weapons in 
designated cantons. Many were disappointed with Frelintil's inaction. Between 5,000 
to 6,000 lives bore the cost of Habibie's announcement, a great many others were 
displaced while some were still being held in paramilitary camps. 110 The terror 
campaign reflected the army's loss of face over an overwhelming rejection of the 
105 Martin, Self Determination in East Timor, p. 88 
106 Jakarta Post, `Consequences of E. Timor ballot', 5 September 1999, www. thejakartapost. com, 
accessed 5 September 1999 
107 Jakarta Post, `Armed men patrol streets in Dili', 1 September 1999 www. thejakartapost. com, 
accessed I September 1999 
108 Ibid. 
1°9 Jakarta Post, 'E. Timorese reporter tells of his great escape', 19 September 1999 
www. thejakartapost. com, accessed 19 September 1999 
110 Taylor, East Timor The Price ofFreedom, p. xxiv 
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autonomy package or the army's failure in its role of maintaining the unity of the 
state. 
Indonesia's international standing and reputation suffered dearly from the exposed 
actions of the military and paramilitary during their occupation of East Timor. Yet 
despite the reign of terror that East Timorese had been accustomed to for the previous 
25 years, the majority of the population no longer feared the repercussions of 
choosing a future that went against the will of the military. An overwhelming 78 
percent of the population had chosen independence. However, little did they know 
that two weeks later some 330,000 people would have to take refuge in the 
mountainous areas and a further 150,000 would be forced across the border. " 
Intimidation did not stop with targeting the local population. The sustained violence 
intensified in June and worsened in the months running up to the direct ballot. In July, 
it had been reported that UN staff were evacuated after being threatened by pro- 
Jakarta forces. 112 Due to this sustained state of chaos caused by the militias, it was no 
easy task for the UN force which was relatively small in size. 113 The postponement of 
the referendum twice reflected the challenge of the task and the capability of the 
military to disrupt the Indonesian state's official policy. 
Ater the attacks on the Red Cross and Bishop Belo's residence, there was increasing 
pressure to intervene mainly due to mounting concerns expressed by the public in 
Australia and Portugal but also from high ranking international diplomats and 
111 Ibid, p. xii 
112 Jakarta Post, `Proindependence faction set to share power', 3 July 1999, www. thejakartapost. com, 
accessed 3 July 1999 
113 The mission consisted of 241 international staff, 420 volunteers, unarmed police of 280,50 military 
liaison officers and 4,000 staff recruited locally. See Taylor, Price of Freedom, p. xxii 
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politicians in the US. On the 6 September, the UN Security Council decided to meet 
on the matter. A 48-hour ultimatum was set for Indonesia to do something about the 
security situation. On 10 September, UNAMET departed East Timor leaving many of 
its local staff behind. By mid September an estimated 150,000 people were being held 
in paramilitary camps in West Timor which sharply increased to 200,000 by the end 
of the month. The government gave them just two weeks to decide whether to remain 
as Indonesian citizens. A great many fled to the mountains. 
At this point, Australia announced its plans to lead an international peace keeping 
force in East Timor committing 2,500 troops on standby and 4,500 for a UN force. 114 
Domestic outcry from the images of the militias rampaging through the streets of Dili 
has prompted the Australian public to back Prime Minister Howard's decision. Later 
Foreign Minister Alexander Downer also noted that he was unconvinced that the 
Indonesian military could maintain security within East Timor; therefore, Australia 
prepared an army to move into East Timor. 
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As a response, the military imposed martial law on the territory which gave them the 
legality to manage operations in Timor including militia operations. As such, it came 
as no surprise that clashes continued between the pro-integration and pro- 
independence factions. 116 Pressure added for Indonesia to accept an international 
peacekeeping force with many European and Asian states pledging troops. Australia, 
New Zealand and Canada all called for the Security Council to dispatch a 
114 Ibid. 
115 Jakarta Post, `Australia `not duped' by Jakarta over E. Timor', 25 November 1999, 
www. thejakartapost. com, accessed 25 November 1999 
116 Jakarta Post, 'UN warns Indonesia to halt E. Timor violence', 8 September 1999, 
www. thejakartapost. com, accessed 8 September 1999 
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peacekeeping force immediately. '" With mounting international pressure, the military 
did not have much of a choice. On 12 September, Habibie finally agreed to a 
peacekeeping force. On 21 September, the first few troops entered the region. The 
Indonesian army formally handed over responsibilities to the international 
peacekeeping force and the number of militias drastically reduced. 
After being adamantly against the idea of an international peacekeeping force, what 
made Indonesia agree to finally admit the force into the territory? Despite calls from 
Kofi Annan for All Alatas to control the situation, the determining factor came from 
the unity of many states attending the APEC meeting in New Zealand and 
international organisations to impose sanctions. Alatas and Habibie cancelled their 
attendance to avoid any uncomfortable questions and remarks that would undoubtedly 
be raised during the meeting. President Clinton announced that the US had suspended 
all military sales to, and ties with, Indonesia, consequently, affecting $100 million 
worth of military purchases. ' 18 The IMF also issued successive statements that it was 
closely watching the situation in East Timor. On 9 September, the IMF announced 
that it was suspending a planned visit to Indonesia which lending would be decided 
on. ' 19 On 11 September, the UK suspended the sales of the Hawk fighter jets to 
Indonesia and the EU followed suit by announcing its own arms boycott. On the 11 
September, the Security Council Mission and Wiranto flew to Dili to assess the 
situation in East Timor. Ian Martin, Head of UNAMET, noted that Dili was relatively 
117 Jakarta Post, `Consequences of the E. Timor ballot', 5 September 1999, www. thejakartapost. com, 
accessed 5 September 1999 
118 Jakarta Post, `World ups pressure on Indonesia', 12 September 1999, www. thejakartapost. com, 
accessed 12 September 1999 
119 Martin, Self Determination in East Timor, p. 108 
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calm which indicated that the military were orchestrating the violence. 120 Finally on 
12 September, Habibie's administration caved in. 121 
The Indonesian government and the armed forces were dumbfounded by the 
international condemnation of its actions in East Timor. Many Indonesians 
condemned the Timorese for opting for independence, arguing that they should have 
been grateful for material and moral support that has been channelled into the 
territory. 122 It caused several sections of the Indonesian polity to take on an anti- 
western stance. East Timor is a sensitive issue for Indonesians. For the last 25 years 
Indonesians have been taught in school that brave Indonesian soldiers liberated the 
half province from the Portuguese. 123 After two full months of havoc caused by 
clashes between the militias and pro-independence groups, the MPR agreed to accept 
the results of the 30 August ballot. Though all factions including the military agreed 
on the decision, some such as the members of the PDI-P continued to attack 
Habibie. 1 24 Unfortunately for Habibie, his plans to portray himself as a reformer had 
backfired. 
The Indonesian government's acceptance of the peacekeeping force has shown how 
international pressure influenced state effectiveness to act in East Timor. The military 
had rejected government plans for a referendum as well as a peacekeeping force after 
the ballot was held in August. During this period, the military revealed a degree of 
120 Ibid, p. 111 
121 Christian Science Monitor, 'What made Indonesia accept peacekeepers', 14 September 1999, 
www. csmonitor. com, accessed 14 September 1999 
122 Jakarta Post, 'TNI fortified by West's approach to E. Timor', 20 September 1999, 
www. thejakartapost. com, accessed 20 September 1999 
123 Jakarta Post, 'A ripple that became a tsunami', 25 September 1999, www. thejakartapost. com, 
accessed 25 September 1999 
124 Jakarta Post, 'East Timor's independence endorsed', 20 October 1999, www. thejakartapost. com, 
accessed 20 October 1999 
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autonomy in initiating its own plans for East Timor. Though the military did not 
directly disrupt the plans, the use of militias served to fulfil the military's plans. I 
should also add that the military was the only state segment which opposed the 
referendum and possesses the capability to follow through with its plans. 
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Summary of Findings 
In many instances, the case of East Timor shows that the Indonesian state's 
effectiveness in carry out its action was enhanced through support from other social 
forces in Indonesia as well as support from other states. 
Table 5: Summary of Findings in the Case of East Timor 
Presidency Social Forces State Action External Forces The implications 
Soeharto Social forces in Military action to International support State action was 
Timor demand for crush rebels. was firmly behind the carried out 
independence. Indonesian state. In through mutual 
However, the the context of the empowerment 
Indonesian state Cold War, Jakarta from other social 
achieved high gained support from forces. Other 
levels of social US and Australia to states also 
control over other annex East Timor. supported 
social forces; thus, Portugal wanted a Indonesia's 
enhancing state quick departure from annexation of 
effectiveness. the territory. East Timor. 
Social forces in Jakarta opens East Other states begin to State action was 
Timor continue to Timor. The military raise the issue of carried out 
demand opens fire on human rights. Jakarta through mutual 
independence. groups demanding defies international empowerment 
Despite the Dili for independence criticisms, closes East from other social 
incident, other resulting in the Dili Timor and continues forces. Though 
social forces are incident. its campaign against pressure from 
unaware of the those demanding for other states 
situation. The high independence. increased due to 
levels of social the Dili incident, 
control over other military and 
social forces financial 
meant that the assistance 
state had more continued. As 
capability to act such, the changes 
according to will. at the int'l level 
did not limit the 
state effectiveness 
in maintaining its 
hold over East 
Timor. 
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Table 5: Summary of Findings in the Case of East Timor (continued) 
Presidency Social Forces State Action External Forces The implications 
Habibie Social forces in Autonomy and later Pressure coming from Social forces 
Timor demand for the offer of Popular states that originally were strong and 
independence. Consultation which backed the there was 
Other segments of could lead to East annexation of 1975 international 
society within Timor's dramatically change pressure for 
Indonesia may independence. their stance and call Indonesia to 
sympathise with for Indonesia to resolve the 
the abuse that East resolve the conflict in conflict, the 
Timor has endured East Timor. multidimensional 
throughout the crises also served 
years but only as a to weaken the 
part of wider state, hereby, 
protests against limiting its 
the military's dual capacity. 
function. Other 






The case of East Timor shows the persistent lack of social control which differs from 
the case of Aceh where social control had fluctuated throughout time. After the 
annexation of East Timor in 1975 by Indonesian forces, the majority of social forces 
in East Timor never accepted the legitimacy of Indonesian rule. Levels of 
participation were also low. However, there was a degree of compliance through 
coercive means. It was through the mutual empowerment of other social forces 
outside East Timor and no external involvement that enabled the Indonesian state to 
remain its control over East Timor until 1999. 
What bearings does the case of East Timor have on the state-in-society approach? The 
international community has definitely played role in the case of East Timor. There is 
an abundance of examples to show this. Predominantly, former colonies gained their 
independence post-1945 and many others later in the 1960s. For the case of East 
Timor, history did not affect how and when it should be decolonised. Left out of the 
decolonisation process, it was incorporated by Indonesia. Though history did not play 
a defining role, at the very least it influenced which secessionist movements should 
gain independence. The case of Aceh will later show that because it lacked a colonial 
past and therefore an external support, it never received any international support for 
independence; thus, providing a counterfactual case. Aceh only received substantial 
international attention only after the tsunami hit the region in 2004. 
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Rather, international politics of the time, or specifically the Cold War significantly 
influenced East Timor's political future as opposed to history. As I have mentioned 
earlier, evidence shows that Indonesia would not have gone ahead with plans to annex 
East Timor had it not received clear signs of approval from states such as the US and 
Australia. However once the context of the Cold War was removed, many states 
began to change their stance towards the East Timor issue. The end of the Cold War 
also coincided with the Dili incident, which was publicised worldwide, effectively 
increased awareness which eventually led to action. When the UN began introducing 
resolutions in 1976, most EU (then EC) countries abstained from voting. However, 
the EU dramatically changed its stance since the late 1980s. Of course, this had much 
to do with Portuguese lobbying within the EU as well as the changing context within 
the international arena. 
At the time, the World Bank dubbed Indonesia as an `Asian Miracle'. Indonesia's 
position as an emerging market has also influenced other states' support or opposition 
to Indonesia's role in East Timor. Trade links have influenced some states to ignore 
the situation in East Timor. However, with the collapse of the economy in 1998, 
support for East Timorese independence increased. Again, this had much to do with 
the newfound freedoms of the Indonesian media that reported on the situation. This in 
turn has increased awareness and support for East Timor amongst the general public 
such as in Australia; subsequently, pushing its government to intervene in the 
situation in East Timor. Here, Australia played a role in lobbying for resolution to the 
conflict. Other states such as the US as well as the EU also pressured Indonesia to 
accept a peacekeeping force in East Timor after the referendum indicating a 
significant change of stance from the Cold War years. In sum, the changing 
182 
international context with a mixture of international interests influenced external 
support for or intervention in Indonesia's policies towards managing secessionism in 
East Timor. 
As argued by Buzan, third world states are dependent on the international factors for 
its own state survival. Indonesia is a deviant case from this approach as external 
factors cannot be construed as essential to state survival. Though international 
influence have greatly shaped the way conflict resolution took place in East Timor 
from 1998 onwards, the relationship between the state and the international can only 
be defined as external pressure being influential but not a determining factor of 
Indonesian state's decision-making. The findings in the case of East Timor reinforce 
this. The 1991 Dili incident exemplifies that Indonesia can defy international 
criticisms. 
While there is ample evidence to show that international politics influenced the state's 
actions in East Timor, other social forces also had an impact on limiting state 
capability. The upsurge in social forces in 1998 also coincided with the multiplicity 
of crises at the time which in turn provided social forces in East Timor with an 
opportune moment. In the absence of the 1998 crises, the Indonesian state would most 
likely have possessed the capacity to maintain control of social forces within East 
Timor. 
As Migdal argues states and their societies do not necessarily need to be on opposing 
ends but can be mutually empowering. As such, social segments can support other 
social segments to increase their effectiveness by putting forward their demands 
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towards the state; or social segments could support the state, hereby, increasing state 
effectiveness. However when demands from one social segment involve breaking 
away from the state, it is unlikely that any other social segments would support this. 
Sub-nationalism is a feeling specific to a group of people discontented with the state. 
Because a sense of nationalism is motivated by a particular group of people, other 
social groups are unlikely to share any common interests with secessionist groups. 
Therefore, other social forces and state segments are most likely to support the state's 
policies that prevent the break-up of the state. Potentially, the policy area of managing 
secessionism could be an area that is most likely to give clear-cut results because of 
the predictability of which way social support (other than the secessionist movement) 
will go: the state or the secessionist movement. 
The main actors in the East Timor conflict are the president and the military with the 
political elites supporting either one of the two. The president has predominantly 
taken the initiative on the East Timor problem. While some such as ICMI and Amien 
Rais endorse the president's decision, others such as Megawati and Wahid oppose it. 
However, the military has taken a step further by disrupting it. The importance of 
national unity is held dear to the military and it will oppose any governmental plans 
that threaten or disrupt unity in any way or form. 125 That the TNI instigated violence 
through the military's backed militia in East Timor after and during the referendum 
was held illustrates the point. The dynamics between the state segments, especially 
between the state's official action and the military, stresses the importance of a theory 
to capture the dynamics and the conflicts of interests within the state. In the case of 
Indonesia, the military has long had a dominant role in Indonesia's politics and 
125 Bradford, The Indonesian Military as a Professional Organization: Criteria and Ramifications for 
Reform' 
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society. As many cases show, attempts to remove the military from politics are very 
rarely complete. ' 26 In some cases, the military may opt to increase its assertiveness in 
policy-making as opposed to when the military was formally in power or in control. 127 
In the post-Cold War era, democratically elected governments have become the 
standard. As such, it is no longer internationally acceptable for a military to take 
direct control over political processes within a state. 128 The Indonesian military was 
somewhat aware of this. While discontent with Habibie's initiative and the MPR's 
decision to let East Timor go, the military opted for the use of proxies as opposed to 
directly disrupting the referendum itself. 
The state-in-society approach has captured the conflict of interests amongst state 
segments well. The military being a dominant institution in many states especially in 
Indonesia, deserves more recognition as a dominant actor as opposed to being treated 
as `an equal' among other state segments. The military was not the only state segment 
who opposed Habibie's resolution to the conflict in East Timor. As mentioned earlier, 
Megawati and Wahid, front-runners in the 1999 elections, both opposed it. The 
majority of Indonesians did not back the President either. However no political figure 
or social segment possessed the ability to disrupt or overturn Habibie's decision. 
Reluctance to do so is a potential explanation. While social forces were more 
preoccupied in putting forth demands concerning the wider political context, political 
elites were gearing up for the upcoming elections though some did capitalise on the 
126 Gavin Cawthra and Robin Luckham (eds. ), Governing Insecurity: Democratic Control of Military 
and security establishments in transitional democracies, (London: Zed, 2003), p. 10; Roger Hamburg, 
`Military Withdrawal from Politics', Constantine P. Danpoulos (ed. ), Military Disengagement 
, 
from 
Politics, (London: Routledge, 1988), p. 1 
12' Hamburg, `Military Withdrawal from Politics', Danpoulos (ed. ), Military Disengagement from 
Politics, p. 1 
128 Cawthra and Luckham (eds. ), Governing Insecurity: Democratic Control of Military and security 
establishments in transitional democracies, p. 8-10 
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population's discontent with Habibie on the East Timor issue. However a more 
plausible explanation is that in the majority of states, the military is the `well supplied 
and most technologically advanced institution' 129. This is coupled with the matter of 
the armed forces being the least accountable of all of the segments within the state. 130 
Though there have been some attempts to bring military officers guilty of human 
rights abuses to justice, punishment is minimal and there are plenty of others that still 
remained unpunished. Consequently, this increased an element of confidence in the 
military taking on its own initiative and reduced the fear of repercussions. 
The military involvement in politics goes back to the national revolution against the 
Dutch. As such, post-Soeharto governments have to grapple with the challenges of 
long institutionalised cultures within the military. The most important is the military's 
continued assertion of its role as the protector of national unity. With the territorial 
structure still in place, the civilian government effectively encourages this role. This is 
an on-going legacy that will most likely disrupt the process of reform of the armed 
forces in the long run and the management of ethnic tensions within Indonesia. 
129 Hamburg, 'Military Withdrawal from Politics', Danpoulos (ed. ), Military Disengagement from 
Politics, p. 2 
130 Cawthra and Luckham (eds. ), Governing Insecurity: Democratic Control of Military and security 




This chapter explores the characteristics of the Indonesian state's response towards 
the secessionist movement and its support in Aceh. In the following sections, I will 
examine the interactions between external forces, social forces and state segments 
which may either support or oppose the political decisions in managing secessionism 
in Aceh during the Soeharto and post-Soeharto governments. I will also examine the 
related claims of the state-in-society approach mentioned in Chapter Two. 
In Chapter Three, I explored the relationship between the state and society in three 
areas: participation, compliance and legitimacy which indicate the levels of social 
control within Indonesia. Unlike the case of East Timor there has been much more 
variation in the case of Aceh. The levels of social control exercised by the Indonesian 
state in Aceh have fluctuated over time. This social control has been challenged at 
times by Acehnese social forces demanding a separate state. The periodic fluctuation 
of social control in Aceh means that the three indicators of social control are not used 
to frame entire chapter. However I return to these indicators in my conclusion. In 
what follows I will in turn address the issue of resistance against the Indonesian state. 
The first section of this chapter will show that a combination of high levels of social 
control meant that the state had the capacity to deal with the secessionist movement 
with very little limitations to the state's policy options. Unlike the case of East Timor, 
I have not placed any particular emphasis on any specific events as I did with the 
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1975 annexation and the Dili incident which concerned international involvement as 
Aceh did not attract any international attention during this period. 
After the collapse of authoritarian rule, strong social forces did influence the state's 
decision to concede special autonomy. However, strong social forces were not the 
only factor which influenced the state. The multidimensional crises the state was 
facing created an opportune moment for secessionist movements, not only in Aceh, to 
voice their demands for independence. Integrated domination by the state had now 
shifted to society. During Megawati's presidency, the multiplicity of crises began to 
recede; the state had the capability to act on its initiatives. This also coincided with 
the weakening of social forces in Aceh and other social segments supporting tougher 
action in managing secessionism in Aceh. Similar assessments can be noted for the 
policies under SBY's administration. Therefore, the outcome shows that the state 
more manoeuvrability to manage secessionism. 
Aceh under the New Order 
The region of Aceh is situated at the most northern tip of Sumatra, Indonesia's most 
western island. It has an area of 57,365.57 square kilometres. The four million 
inhabitants are predominately Acehnese. Other groups include the Gayo and the Alas. 
Though Bahasa Indonesia is widely spoken, the Acehnese language is spoken 
amongst the Acehnese. 
Aceh is known for its fierce resistance against the Dutch from 1873-1903 and then the 
Japanese during the Second World War. It then joined the Indonesian revolution 
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against the Dutch after the Second World War. Not long after independence, it began 
its own struggle against the Indonesian state. 
The Acehnese who want independence have constructed history to legitimise their 
right for independence and de-legitimise Jakarta's rule over its territory. However, in 
comparison to East Timor as well as Papua, Aceh perhaps has the weakest case. East 
Timor was a former colony of the Portuguese and was later incorporated into the 
Republic of Indonesia. Though Papua was part of the former Dutch East Indies, it was 
decolonised separately from the rest of the archipelago. Furthermore, neither region 
played a part in the revolution against the Dutch nor did they accept Jakarta's rule 
when each was incorporated into the Indonesian fold. Though the referendum in East 
Timor has set a precedent for similar demands from the Acehnese, Indonesian 
nationalists can easily argue that East Timor was an exception. Because of the manner 
of how it was incorporated into the Republic of Indonesia and its lack of involvement 
in the revolution, it has been noted that Indonesians consider East Timor an adopted 
brother. ' Likewise a similar argument can be made for Papua, though Indonesian 
nationalists are unlikely to do so. - The same argument cannot be made for Aceh. 
Unlike East Timor and West Papua where both were forcefully incorporated into 
Indonesia, Aceh had voluntarily joined the nationalist elite in their struggle against the 
Dutch and wholeheartedly became a part of the new state. 
Richard Barber (ed. ), Aceh: the untold story, (Bangkok: Asian Forum for Human Rights and 
Development, 2000), p. 61 
2 Aspinall and Berger, The break-up of Indonesia? Nationalisms after decolonisation and the limits of 
the nation-state in post-cold war Southeast Asia', p. 1016 
189 
Early Opposition against the Indonesian State 
The following sections will show that social forces in Aceh under the New Order 
were divided between two groups: those supporting the Indonesian government and 
those demanding a sovereign Aceh. However though support for independence 
gradually increased over the years, the Indonesian state managed secessionism with 
very little limitations to its policy options. This was due to mutual empowerment or 
high levels of social control over social forces in other parts of the archipelago and no 
inference from other states. 
Establishing the starting point of centre-regional relations in Aceh is not as 
straightforward as in East Timor. Secessionism and a sense of nationalism in East 
Timor materialized when Indonesia annexed the territory in 1975. In other words, 
nationalism was a response to what was perceived by the East Timorese as a foreign 
invasion. A new form of resistance in Aceh only emerged in 1976 more than two 
decades after the Republic of Indonesia gained its independence. However, the Free 
Aceh Movement or GAM leaders have always asserted that they have been 
wrongfully colonised by the Javanese as noted in `The Redeclaration of Independence 
of Acheh3, Sumatra' 4 December 1976: 
To the peoples of the world: 
We, the people of Acheh, Sumatra, exercising our right of self- 
determination, and protecting our historic right of eminent 
Hasan Mohammed di Tiro rejected everything Indonesian, hence, used the nineteenth-century English 
spelling, Aceheh as opposed to using Aceh. See Siegel, The Rope of God, p. 336. Other ways in spelling 
include Atjeh which is the Dutch version. 
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domain to our fatherland, do hereby declare ourselves free and 
independent from all political control of the foreign regime of 
Jakarta and the alien people of the island of Java. Our fatherland, 
Aceh, Sumatra, had always been a free and independent 
Sovereign State since the world begun.... 
However, when, after World War II, the Dutch East Indies was 
supposed to have been liquidated--an empire is not liquidated if 
its territorial integrity was preserved--our fatherland, Acheh, 
Sumatra, was not returned to us. Instead, our fatherland was 
turned over by the Dutch to the Javanese--their mercenaries--by 
hasty fiat of former colonial powers. The Javanese are alien and 
foreign people to us Achehnese Sumatrans. We have no historic, 
political, cultural, economic or geographic relationship with 
them.... " 
However, the weakness in Acehnese secessionist claims is the historical point where 
the Acehnese joined the nationalist elites in their struggle for independence against 
the Dutch, and thereafter, whole heartedly became a part of the new republic. Both 
sides were united with a common goal of creating a single state formerly known as 
the Dutch East Indies. ' Not only did the Acehnese emotionally support the Indonesian 
revolution, they also supported it financially through revenue from its exports to 
Malaysia and Singapore. ' The Acehnese role in the revolution is often emphasised in 
Indonesian history books. Acehnese resisted the Dutch return, and unlike other parts 
4 Hasan di Tiro, The Price of Freedom: The Unfinished Diary of Tengku Hasan di Tiro, derived from 
www. ohiou. edu, accessed 30 August 2003 
5 Bertrand, Nationalism and ethnic conflict in Indonesia, p. 165 
6 Bertrand, Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict in Indonesia, p. 165; Priyambudi Sulistiyanto, `Whither 
Aceh? ', Third World Quarterly, Vol. 22 No. 3, p. 439 
191 
of the archipelago, it was never retaken. This also created the legitimacy that the 
former Dutch East Indies had survived a Dutch reoccupation. ' The Indonesian 
military also utilises its own version of history to influence the public sentiment. For 
instance, the military stresses Acehnese heroine Cut Yak Dien's (1848-1908) role as 
an early Indonesian nationalist who protected the `Unitary State of Republic of 
Indonesia'. ' On the other hand, GAM leaders mention little about Aceh's involvement 
in the revolution. Rather, Hasan di Tiro, founder and leader of GAM, points to a 
temporary loss of national consciousness that only needs to be reawakened. ' 
Due to the continued resistance against the Dutch, the Acehnese had formed a distinct 
identity10 yet at this juncture it was not seen as incompatible with that of the newly 
constructed Indonesian. Though the Acehnese had a distinct identity, they had 
voluntarily given up its plans for independence when Sukarno promised autonomy for 
Aceh. However, relations began to deteriorate thereafter. In order to unite a new state 
inhabited by 300 groups, nationalist elites including Sukarno sought to build a new 
nation on the basis of secularism; hence, the third sila which upholds unity in 
diversity. This created a sense of discontent among the Acehnese, especially the 
religious leaders (ulama), who still had a prominent role in Acehnese society and 
politics. Furthermore, plans for autonomy never materialised. Soon after 
independence, Aceh was absorbed into the province of North Sumatra as opposed to 
being made a province in its own right. 
7 Nazaruddin Sjamsuddin, The Republican Revolt: A study of the Acehnese Rebellion, (Singapore: 
Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1985), p. 30 
8 Indonesian National Military Homepage, `Dear God... I have betrayed Cut Nyak Dhien's struggles', 
www. tni. mil. id/english, accessed 23 March 2004 
9 See di Tiro, The Price of Freedom: The Unfinished Diary of Tengku Hasan di Tiro 
10 Bertrand, Nationalism and ethnic conflict in Indonesia, p. 163 
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From 1953 to 1965, Darul Islam, or the House of Islam movement, broke out in 
Indonesia in support of a federal Islamic State of Indonesia. In 1953, Daud Beureueh, 
a well-respected Acehnese ulama, led Aceh to join forces with other provinces in 
Indonesia but he did so in the name of Darul Islam of Indonesia, not Darul Islam or 
Darul Islam Aceh'". In other words, the movement rejected the nature of the state as 
well as elements of the nation but were not aiming for an outright divorce from the 
existing state. Hence, at this juncture, it is crucial to make clear that the Acehnese still 
identified themselves as a part of the Indonesian state, as noted in the Manifesto of the 
Atjeh Rebels (1953): 
If we now establish a State, this does not mean we shall be 
setting up a state within a state, because in our hearts and souls 
we have always regarded the State of the Republic of Indonesia 
as but a golden bridge leading to the creation of a state that we 
have long been yearning. ' 2 
With the movement gaining increasing support, the central government made Aceh a 
-special region" (daerah istimewa). These concessions meant granting autonomy in 
areas of religion, customary law (adat) and education. This had pacifying effects on 
many sections of Acehnese society. 
GAM premise their claims for a separate state on the grounds that they were wrongly 
colonised by the Javanese. These claims are undermined by the Acehnese 
involvement and support in the revolution. The Acehnese started their bid for an 
11 Siegel, The Rope of God, p. 336 
12 Selections of the Manifesto of the Atjeh Rebels in Clive J. Christie, A Modern History of Southeast 
Asia Decolonisation, Nationalism and Separatism, (London and New York: I. B. Tauris Publishers, 
2000), Appendix 5 
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independent state in the mid- I970s, hence, Acehnese nationalism was not a response 
to a foreign invasion as stated in the GAM literature. Discontent erupted a sense of 
nationalism that was constructed to be incompatible with that of Indonesian identity. 
The new movement fundamentally differed from the rebellion in its objective. GAM's 
aims, as posted on its official website, are the survival of their political, social, 
cultural, and religious heritage which are being destroyed by the Javanese colonialists; 
the continued existence of their national homeland which is being confiscated and 
divided among the Javanese... ' GAM's ideology is national liberation. GAM leaders, 
such as Hasan di Tiro, claim that Aceh has been a long-standing independent 
sovereign state for thousands of years' which has been `recognised internationally'. " 
By this, GAM leaders are referring to the 1817 Treaty of Sumatra assuring Aceh's 
sovereignty. This ultimately refutes any claims that the Dutch had successfully 
brought Aceh under colonial rule. In other words, GAM sees its struggles as a 
continuation of the anti-colonial rebellion in 1873 when the Dutch invaded Aceh. It 
was later illegally incorporated into the Republic of Indonesia, as noted in its 
declaration of independence on December 4,1976: the transfer of sovereignty meant 
by the old Dutch Colonialists to the new, Javanese colonialists'. 
Hence, GAM claims its cause is legitimate and not a matter of separatism as branded 
by the Indonesian government but an issue of decolonisation according to 
international law. " This rhetoric is continuously echoed in GAM literature and in 
statements by GAM leaders. On the other hand, the Darul Islam rebellion aimed to 
13 Statement by Tengku Hasan M. di Tiro President of Acheh/Sumatra National Liberation Front before 
the 44i1' Session of the UN Sub-Commission on the Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of 
Minorities, August 3-28 1992, Geneva, Switzerland 
14 See GAM's website, Aims of the Asnlf, www. asnlf. net, accessed 19 June 2004 
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change the status of Islam in the young nation and did not seek to create a separate 
entity. Most importantly, Darul Islam was not done in the name of the Acehnese but 
done in the name of Indonesian Islam. 
The Genesis of the Free Aceh Movement 
Dr. Teungku Hasan Muhammad di Tiro, a prominent businessman and former 
representative of the Darul Islam rebellion at the United Nations, founded GAM in 
1976. Edward Aspinall usefully distinguishes the factors that triggered the conflict 
and the factors that the sustained the conflict. " The factors that triggered the conflict 
were economic and the highly centralised state. The factor that sustained the conflict 
and generated increased social opposition was violence which will be explored in a 
later section. Distinguishing the two will not only clarify the issue of support but will 
also shed light on what brought various sections of social forces in Aceh to support 
the cause for independence. 
One source of discontent was the highly centralised state of the New Order. The 
earlier Darul Islam movement in the 1950s dissolved when Sukarno promised the 
territory autonomy. However, soon after Soeharto took over the reigns of power, signs 
of promised autonomy diminished as the New Order consolidated and became more 
centralised. 
As one of the four richest regions of the archipelago, economic exploitation played a 
crucial role in igniting a sense of ethnic discontent towards the centre. From being an 
15 Edward Aspinall, International Symposium on Peace Building in Aceh: Lessons from Sri Lanka and 
Northern Ireland, 16 -18 August 2004, Bangkok 
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economy with absolutely no significance to becoming one of the fastest growing 
economies in the archipelago, known as the `LNG boom', the economic aspect of the 
conflict cannot be underestimated. In mid-1970s, Jakarta began exploiting Aceh's 
abundance of natural resources that included oil, natural gas, timber and various other 
minerals. ' New Order authorities along with foreign capitalists reaped the benefits. 
At the same time, decision-making was concentrated amongst the New Order elites. 
By the mid- i 980s, Aceh's GDP per capita was equal to 282% of the national average 
becoming an important source of revenue for Jakarta. " Not only did the local 
businessman miss out on Aceh's economic opportunities during this period, there was 
also a general feeling that revenues which should be rightfully theirs were extracted 
out of Aceh. As such, a considerable amount of resentment stemmed from the central 
authorities not spending enough on the region. The situation was made worse due the 
insensitive attitude of the government officials and military personnel whom often 
described the locals as `fanatics' whose culture and world view were in need of 
modernisation and improvement"'. Furthermore, the Acehnese also accused the 
newcomers of corrupting society with gambling, drinking and prostitution and being 
disrespectful to local customs. 
Not all Acehnese lost out on Aceh's booming economy. Social forces in Aceh during 
this time consisted of two loosely bound categories: those close to the New Order and 
those who did not benefit from the regime such as di Tiro. Those closely connected to 
the New Order were known as the technocrats. The technocratic elite in Aceh 
16 Geoffrey Robinson, 'Rawan Is as Rawan Does?: The Origins of Disorder in New Order Aceh' in 
Andersen, Violence and the State in Suharto's Indonesia, p. 220 
1' Hal Hill (eds. ), Unity and Diversity: Regional Economic Development in Indonesia since 1970, 
(Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1989), p. 6 
18 Robinson, `Rawan Is as Rawan Does? ', p. 222 
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received their education in Jakarta. Though they were dedicated to Islamic values, 
they were also committed to the government's development goals. Many of those that 
associated with the regime included former academic Ibrahim Hassan who became 
Aceh's governor during the 1980s with the support of Soeharto and rose to 
prominence as a cabinet minister. Ibrahim Hasan famously requested the increase of 
troops in Aceh. Soon after the request was made, Aceh was given a DOM status. 
There was also a web of connections between the decision-makers in Jakarta and 
those connected with the decision-makers in Jakarta which included foreign 
capitalists, military and government officials. Patrimonial ties with Jakarta not only 
ensured access to power but also ensured compliance from these social forces which 
in turn created legitimacy for the New Order. Some ulama were co-opted by 
government-sponsored organisations MUI or Golkar which indicated paricipation. 19 
On the other hand, those who lacked the links with the elites in Jakarta founded 
GAM. Z" Consequently, this created a division amongst the Acehnese elites which 
served to weaken the movement. This differed from the situation in Papua and East 
Timor where the local elites lacked any links with the New Order. This in turn, 
created a relatively unified group amongst the supporters of independence in Papua 
and East Timor. '' 
Initial social support for GAM was marginal. In comparison to the case of East Timor 
where there was relatively strong opposition to the Indonesian state at the time of the 
1975 annexation. There are two explanations for this. Despite having an anti- 
19 Bertrand, Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict in Indonesia, p. 169 
20 Robinson, `Rawan Is as Rawan Does? '; Shane Barter, Neither Wolf nor Lamb: Embracing Civil 
Society in the Aceh Conflict, (Bangkok: Asia-Forum, 2004), p. 69 
21 Bertrand, Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict in Indonesia, p. 170 
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corporate tone, the movement for independence was confined to a handful of the 
Acehnese elite which included intellectuals and businessman. 22 It is crucial to note 
that at the time of GAM's emergence, di Tiro had lost out on bids for oil exploration 
contracts in Aceh and not all of Acehnese elite supported the movement. 
Increasing Opposition in Aceh and the State's Response 
Though social support was minimal to begin with, it gradually increased throughout 
the two decades under the New Order. GAM's evolution strength can be charted in 
two periods. In the initial phase from the birth of GAM in 1976 to 1982, the 
movement proclaimed independence and attempted to populise its agenda. The 
second period was from 1989-1992 and will be mentioned in a later section of this 
chapter. During the first period, both Tim Kell and Eric Eugene Morris argue that the 
movement lacked an Islamic agenda. 23 As such, the movement failed to attract support 
from a population with a strong Islamic identity and most importantly the well- 
respected ulama. Influential ulama Daud Beurueh who led the earlier Darul Islam 
rebellion initially agreed to back GAM's struggle under the condition the movement 
was premised on Islam. Di Tiro refused as he believed that having an Islamic agenda 
would fail to attract outside support. Consequently, Daud Beureueh did not back the 
movement and called for his followers to do the same. It was still early days and the 
effects of the centre's economic exploitation had not been widely felt. As such, there 
was only a small group of disgruntled businessmen that missed out on the LNG boom 
who supported GAM. 
22 Ibid, p. 171 
2; Morris, Islam and Politics in Aceh: A Study of Centre-Periphery Relations in Indonesia, p. 300; Kell, 
The Roots ofAcehnese Rebellion, 1989-1992, p. 65 
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How did the state respond to the newly established movement? Although GAM had 
very little social support within Aceh and had few weapons to share amongst 
themselves and only engaged in sporadic incidents of fighting, the government took 
no chances. Jakarta immediately sent troops to deal with the situation and with the 
help of influential leaders involved in the Darul Islam rebellion, word quickly spread 
amongst the population that GAM was the enemy'. The government also began 
development projects such as new roads and the installation of television stations to 
contradict GAM claims that the government only sought to exploit Aceh. By 1982, 
the army crushed the movement to the point where a re-emergence seemed untenable. 
GAM leaders were either dead, in prison or in-exile. However, a handful of those who 
managed to escape the heavy-handed tactics of the military fled to Libya where they 
received ideological and military training as well as financial support. 
However, the movement re-emerged and relations between Jakarta and Aceh reached 
its most intense period from 1989-1992. It has been estimated that 2,000 people were 
killed in this period. 24 In 1986, hundreds of Acehnese began their training in Libya. 
Various sources give different indicators which should all be treated with caution. 
Though exact figures will never be known, it is nevertheless useful to get a rough idea 
how the movement had grown in this phase. Di Tiro estimates there were 5,000 
Libyan graduates during the period of 1986-1989 while GAM leader Malik Mahmud 
gives a much lower figure of 1,500.25 The Brussels based International Crisis Group 
cite 700-800 in comparison to the Indonesian military sources which estimate 583 
24 Bertrand, Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict in Indonesia, p. 172 
25 Figures obtained during an interview with Hasan di Tiro and Malik Mahmud, cited in Kirsten E. 
Schulze, The Free Aceh Movement: Anatomy of a Separatist Organization, (Washington, DC: East- 
West Center, Washington, 2004), p. 30 
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members who were Libyan recruits. 26 These figures only indicate those who were 
trained in Libya; however, there were also supporters that remained in region. When 
comparing membership at the initial phase of the movement to this stage, there is no 
doubt that the movement had grown and was far from defeated. 
In 1989, the movement returned better armed and posed a greater challenge to Jakarta. 
The state responded to social opposition by imposing the notorious DOM under which 
mass human rights were committed on a wide scale only to crush a relatively small 
movement. Under DOM, the military had virtually a free hand in controlling Aceh. 
The region soon became a haven for political and economic gain for the military, not 
to mention career advancement for the commanders posted there. Support which was 
initially limited to Acehnese intellectuals and the business community had widened to 
the other segments of society that suffered under DOM. 
Support for GAM was a negative reaction to the army's brutality. It was during this 
period that the military embarked on a systematic programme to terrorise the 
Acehnese which included various methods such as public executions, rape, 
disappearance, detention, 'torture and other forms of cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment'''. Various other strategies included the cooperation of civilians. For 
instance and as widely used in East Timor, the `fence of legs' relied on ordinary 
Acehnese to advance into areas ahead of the army in order retaliate against rebels that 
may be preparing for an ambush or to prevent the rebels from attacking the troops. 
The military also set up night patrols which also used civilians. These nights patrols 
included groups such as Unit Ksatria Penegak Pancasila (Noble Warriors for 
26 Schulze, The Free Aceh Movement: Anatomy of a Separatist organization, p. 30 
27 Amnesty International, `INDONESIA New military operations, old patterns of human rights abuses 
in Aceh (Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam, NAD)', www. amnesty. org, accessed 4 September 2005 
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Upholding Pancasila) and Bela Negara (Defend the State) just to name a few. 
Members of such units received military training and were armed with basic 
weaponry such as knives, spears and machetes. 2B 
Bringing together a community that suffered common grievances under Jakarta's 
exploitative rule, the Acehnese sympathised with the movement. In other words, 
popular support for GAM came from fear and anger of the military's brutality and not 
necessarily an anti-Jakarta feeling or aspirations for a separate state per se. Though 
support for the movement had increased and the conflict intensified, the government 
were quick to reiterate that the problem in Aceh should not be taken as a yardstick to 
judge Indonesia's stability. 29 Top ranking government officials also stressed that 
activities of Acehnese rebels were purely criminal and not politically motivated as 
reiterated by the Acehnese nationalist elites calling for independence. 
GAM's capacity had increased attacks on military and police posts within the region. 
By the mid- 1990s, support had expanded and was strong in the areas of Pidie, North 
Aceh and East Aceh. "' Like the case of East Timor, Aceh never received support from 
other social segments within Indonesia throughout the New Order when social control 
was high. As mentioned in Chapter Three, there was widespread legitimacy for a 
strong government to maintain the stability of the nation. This was due to the general 
fears of political chaos experienced during the Sukarno years. Structures in places 
such as corporatism ensured participation. As such, the Indonesian state had more 
manoeuvrability to carry out its actions in Aceh due to high levels of social control. 
28 Robinson, `Rawan Is as Rawan Does?, p. 230-231 
29 Defense and Security Minister L. B. Moerdani quoted in Jakarta Post, `Aceh Extremists not 
politically motivated', 23 June 1990, www. thejakartapost. com, accessed 23 June 1990 
° Sulistiyanto, `Whither Aceh? ', p. 441 
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Up until 1998, both Aceh and East Timor continued to be ruled as a DOM area where 
the government 'mounted one of the most heaviest counterinsurgency campaigns seen 
since the 1960s"'. The situation deteriorated and order seemed far from improving. It 
was believed that over a thousand Acehnese civilians were killed during the first three 
years alone. The most cautious figures obtained by the provincial government 
documented 871 dead, 387 missing who were later found dead and 500 
disappearances. `' The number of deaths left 16,375 children orphaned. 33 
This instance shows that state effectiveness was enhanced through mutual 
empowerment between the Indonesian state and social forces in Indonesia. In 
comparison to East Timor's Fretilin, Aceh's GAM did not have widespread societal 
support in its initial period. Social support was low because discontent against the 
state was only felt by a mere handful. It was only later when the various segments of 
Acehnese society began to feel the effects of a highly centralised state, economic 
exploitation but predominantly the brutality of the military that social opposition 
against the state increased. The expansion of the GAM's support in areas such as 
Pidie, North and East Aceh are indicators that show that social support had grown. 
Suppression by the state during the DOM also served to enhance this support. The 
lack of support from other social forces within Indonesia can be explained by two 
factors. Firstly, a sense of nationalism is a feeling specific to a particular group. As 
such, other social segments belonging to other ethnic groups did not support 
Acehnese independence and were more inclined to support the stability of the state. 
" Human Rights Watch, `Indonesia the War in Aceh', Vol. 13, No. 4, August 2001, 
http: //www. hrw. org/reports/2001/aceh/, accessed 15 August 2001 p. 8 
''' 
Ibid, p. 8 
33 Far Eastern Economic Review, An Army in Retreat', 19 November 1998, p. 25 
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Secondly, the structures of co-optation and repression were in place in other parts of 
Indonesia. Despite the gradual increase of social support for independence since 
GAM's inception, there were high levels of social control over other social forces 
which enhanced the state capability to carry out its actions in managing secessionism 
in Aceh. 
Furthermore, Aceh still lacked the support of the international community. Firstly, the 
tightly controlled media under Soeharto meant little was heard of the Acehnese 
movement. As Barber notes the relatively unknown Aceh at the international level 
also created a perception of weakness and illegitimacy in comparison to East Timor. 
Secondly, unlike East Timor Aceh was a part of the Dutch East Indies; therefore, it 
lacked a third state to bring its case to the attention of the international community. 
For East Timor, there has always been international involvement whether it be 
positive or negative support for the territory. From the 1975 annexation, the Dili 
incident to East Timor's successful case of independence was due to its Portugal and 
Australia which played a role in bringing East Timor's case into the limelight. Aceh's 
nearest foreign neighbour Malaysia is unlikely to get involved in the conflict. Member 
states of ASEAN have a tradition of non-intervention in one another's internal affairs. 
Even closer to the Malays in terms of geography and ethnicity are the Malay-Muslims 
in Thailand's most southern provinces. Malaysia has only offered to chair talks 
between the leaders of Bersatu, an umbrella organisation of the five southern 
movements, and has clearly stated that it will support Thailand's borders. 34 This 
instance confirms the central hypothesis. 
34 Bangkok Post, 30 April 2003 
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Aceh Post-reformasi 
Soeharto's speech announcing his resignation on 22 May 1998 was a historical 
moment for all Indonesians. During Soeharto's thirty-two-year-rule, a generation of 
Indonesians grew up only to know the extreme orderliness of the New Order. The 
regime had controlled nearly every aspect of the state and its unravelling in effect had 
unleashed social forces that were dormant under the regime's control. Though the 
presence of the military still remained there was no doubt that the flowering of society 
in all parts of the archipelago, including Aceh, was starkly different from the reaction 
of social forces under the New Order. The upsurge in ethnic violence in many areas in 
the archipelago and the gathering of students and intellectuals demanding reformasi 
had ultimately brought down the regime. The chaos and uncertainty brought about 
political change and rapid democratisation, consequently, a transformation in state- 
society relations. This section will show that a multiplicity of social demands sapped 
the strength of the state which consequently led to the Indonesian state conceding to 
social demands including those in Aceh. Though strong social forces led to 
concessions, this did not lead to independence due to the lack of support from other 
states. The rest of the chapter will examine the dynamics behind the state's response 
under the subsequent presidencies in the post-Soeharto period in managing 
secessionism in Aceh. 
Habibie inherited a multiplicity of problems left behind by the New Order. 
Unfortunately for Habibie, he lacked popular support. Considering Soeharto as his 
mentor and having been handpicked by Soeharto himself did not go down well with 
the public who saw him as a relic of the New Order that had to be removed. Soon 
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anti-Habibie protests emerged amongst other problems the government had to deal 
with. Furthermore, the collapse of Soeharto's regime brought freedom to the media 
which provided a medium for the Acehnese voice to be heard. Stories of horror, abuse 
and rape conducted by the army became daily headlines. The media which exposed 
the stories of horror which undermined the state's most important part in its 
machinery in bringing ethnic discontent under control: the army. 35 
The Indonesian media, which had long been suppressed throughout Soeharto's 32- 
year-rule, showed footage of the massacres and continuously reported on human 
rights abuses. This immediately raised public awareness amongst both the Acehnese 
and non-Acehnese. Some social forces protested against the government in support of 
the victims of human rights in Aceh. However, this was only done as part of wider 
protests against the government and the military's dual function. Furthermore, 
protests did not necessarily translate into support amongst non-Acehnese Indonesians 
for Aceh's aspirations for independence. Support only went as far as bringing the 
perpetrators of human rights violations to justice. " 
The Upsurge in Social Forces in Aceh 
In line with the reformasi euphoria experienced throughout the archipelago, during 
April and early August 1998, social forces in Aceh boldly demanded the notorious 
DOM status to be removed from the region. Delegations from Aceh left for Jakarta 
with endless stories of abuse, and evidence of abuse, during the DOM period. Several 
NGOs were established with the aim of documenting human rights abuses in Aceh. 
35 Sulistiyanto, 'Whither Aceh'? ', p. 443 
36 Barber (ed. ), Aceh: the untold story, p. 61 
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Similarly, Komnas-HAM was assigned to investigate these stories of abuses and the 
DPR, Indonesia's national parliament founded fact-finding missions. As interest in the 
region heightened, Indonesian NGOs and journalists both foreign and Indonesian 
flocked to the region. 
The human rights abuses committed by the military in Aceh resulted in an upsurge of 
support for Acehnese independence. However, social forces within Aceh were divided 
by the means of achieving an independent state. On one hand, GAM and its 
supporters mainly from poor rural areas that suffered greatly under DOM supported a 
violent struggle against the Indonesian military. On the other, student groups and their 
supporters believed that Acehnese independence could be achieved through 
democratic processes such as a referendum. The student group consisted of student 
organisations, NGOs and religious based organisations such as thaliban (muslim 
students) and ulama davah (religious teachers) who were all former student activists 
that had studied abroad or in Java during the 1970s and 1980s. This group became the 
main thrust of the reformasi movement. 37 Other groups such as MUI that were 
formerly co-opted by the New Order also joined the student movement. This group 
was directly influenced by the referendum held in East Timor. 
While there was an upsurge in groups demanding for independence, there were a 
number of NGOs that emerged which were more focused on human rights and social 
issues as opposed to having a political agenda. Lastly, there were also the social 
forces co-opted by the New Order such as the technocrats and business elite in Aceh 
which formed a relatively small group at the time. It was the three former categories 
37 Sulistiyanto, 'Whither Aceh? ', p. 444 
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that formed the social forces which played a significant role in mobilising against the 
state. Social momentum was great and there were hopes that independence was within 
reach as reflected in popularised slogan of the time: sebatang rokok lagi or only a 
cigarette away. i8 
Perhaps the most illustrative example was the annual rallies held by the Acehnese in 
protest of the government. By late 1999, the central government had very little 
authority in the territory. This can be seen from the 23rd anniversary of GAM (4 
December 1999) which attracted widespread support. In GAM strongholds, local 
governments were hardly functioning. Student groups such as Student Solidarity for 
the People (SMUR) along with Aceh Referendum Information Center (SIRA) 
successfully organised protests which attracted widespread support. In November 
1999, an estimated 500,000 to two million people took to the streets in support of 
SIRA goals in a peaceful demonstration. 39 Though some sources give a lower number 
while others claim support was much higher, there is no doubt that there was a 
substantial support for independence. A year later, similar efforts were made to 
organise the same rally. While the previous crowds were much larger, the security 
forces had felt the need to prevent the rally which enjoyed overwhelming support of 
the population. ß0 
u Edward Aspinall, The Helsinki Agreement: A More Promising Basis for Peace in Aceh? 
(Washington DC: East-West Center, 2005), p. 9 
'`' Human Rights Watch estimate 500,000 see Human Rights Watch, `Indonesia the War in Aceh', p. 
10; two million is estimated by Lilianne Fan Coordinator of Student Coalition for Aceh see `Crisis in 
Aceh Threatens Indonesian Unity', Tapol, 28 November 1999, www. tapol. org, accessed 17 August 
2005 
40 For details see `Tens of thousands rally for peace in Aceh', Tapol Bulletin Online 160, December 
2000, accessed 23 January 2003 
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As social forces gathered momentum in Aceh, in other areas as well as in Jakarta 
began calling for Habibie's resignation and for democratic elections to be held. At the 
same time, political opponents of Habibie began to engineer his removal. The loss of 
East Timor had a profound effect on the mindset of the Jakartan elites who felt that 
the threat of disintegration was real and Aceh might gain the international support 
East Timor had. 41 It was under these circumstances that the Indonesian elites felt the 
issue needed its most urgent attention. 
Though Jakarta had no inclination to allow Aceh to choose its future via referendum 
as in East Timor, the disoriented political elites and military had no choice but to ride 
the waves of change. 42 This was an extreme opposite to Soeharto's rule. As such, the 
conflict cannot be viewed in isolation from the nature of the transition. The 
government caved in to demands for reformasi. Concessions were made to 
secessionist groups. Like the case of East Timor, social forces in Aceh had increased 
capacity to put forward its demands to the state. Concessions indicate the weakening 
of social control. These concessions included the offer of an asymmetrical 
autonomous status to the region. 
I use the term concessions, as the new policies were a significant departure from the 
brutal response towards secessionism used during the New Order where the concept 
of unitary state was placed above over diversity. Secondly, the implementation of 
asymmetrical autonomy had profound effects on Indonesian nationalism and 
democracy. Decentralising not only meant that power was devolving from Jakarta to 
41 Interview with Chief Negotiator for the Republic of Indonesia, Wiryono Sastrohandoyo, Jakarta, 24 
June 2005 
42 Interview with Chief Negotiator for the Republic of Indonesia, Wiryono Sastrohandoyo, Jakarta, 24 
June 2005 
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the regions but also from the central bureaucracy to the parliament. " Furthermore, it 
also indicated that Jakarta was acknowledging that Papua and Aceh were special cases 
that differed from other regions in Indonesia. 
This begs the question: what implications do the two different policies towards 
managing secessionism in East Timor and Aceh have on the state-in-society 
approach? Though the upsurge in social activity in East Timor and Aceh occurred in 
the same context of reformasi, the Indonesian state felt it was more justified in 
offering East Timor a choice on its political future due to its history. This is in 
contrast with the case of Aceh where the nationalist elite wholeheartedly joined the 
Republic of Indonesia in its revolution against the Dutch. However, the state-in- 
society approach does not make assumptions about human behaviour or decision- 
making. Rather, the approach is more focussed on the coalitions between state 
segments and social forces which can potentially disrupt the state's official action. 
Thus, the difference in the state's responses towards East Timor and Aceh does not 
negate the approach in any way. 
Among the many concessions made, President Habibie made a visit to apologise to 
the Acehnese. S4 Defense Minister and TNI Commander-in-Chief General Wiranto also 
made a public apology for the brutality of the army during the infamous DOM 
operations. He almost immediately agreed to put an end to the eight-year status and 
withdrawal of 1,000 troops. 45 Acehnese-in-exile including those involved in criminal 
activities would not be prosecuted and would be allowed to return to Aceh. Other 
43 Rodd McGibbon, Secessionist challenges in Aceh and Papua: is special autonomy the solution? 
(Washington DC: East-West Center, 2004), p. 22 
44 Edward Aspinall and Harold Crouch, The Aceh peace process: why it failed, (Washington, DC: East- 
West Center Washington, 2003), p. 6 
45 Far Eastern Economic Review, An Army in Retreat', 19 November 1998, p. 24 
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promises were made, including bringing the perpetrators of human rights abuses to 
justice, scholarships for orphaned children and a plan to boost the economy. The 
Habibie administration also authorised an independent body to investigate various 
allegations of human rights abuses in Aceh. 
The Habibie administration that granted amnesty to Acehnese prisoners and those-in- 
exile had contributed to the strengthening of, and rapid growth in, GAM. Supporters 
of GAM, in hiding both in the region and abroad reappeared in populated areas of 
Aceh. "' Those that were abroad had received ideological and military training. 
Quickly, they began to spread the word and popularise GAM's cause for 
independence. The relatively open environment, in comparison to political and media 
controls during the New Order, made it easier to do so. 
By mid-1999 it seemed as if GAM was better organised than before and its influence 
began to spread to areas where support was originally weak. 47 And for the time being, 
GAM enjoyed widespread support from various segments of Acehnese society. The 
movement continued to grow and expand into the rest of Aceh. One observer notes 
that GAM membership increased five-fold since its inception, and successfully 
controlled 70-80 per cent of the region including the institution of local government. 4R 
As many have suggested, the ideals of separatism became the dominant discourse in 
post-Soeharto Aceh. 49 
46 Sulistiyanto, 'Whither Aceh? ', p. 444 
07 Aspinall and Crouch, The Aceh peace process: why it failed, p. 6 
°ß Schulze, The Free Aceh Movement (GAM): Anatomy of a Separatist Movement, p. viii 
49 International Crisis Group (ICG), 'Aceh: Can Autonomy Stem the Conflict? ' Asia Report No. 18,27 
June 2001, www. crisisweb. org, accessed 20 July 2004, p. 2; Anthony L. Smith, 'Aceh: Democratic 
Times, Authoritarian Solutions', New Zealand Journal of Asian Studies, Vol. 4, No. 2 (December, 
2002), p. 83, Also based on discussions with the Acehnese themselves, journalists and academics who 
were in the region during this period. 
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Support for independence became so intense that in certain areas the Indonesian 
government at the village and subdistrict levels was practically non-functioning. This 
literally means that state officials have abandoned their administrative posts or have 
come to an arrangement' with GAM. In traditional GAM strongholds: Pidie, North 
and East Aceh, an International Crisis Group report suggested that Acehnese 
institutions are replacing the state structure and institutions. 50 One example would be 
the revival of the tuhapeut, a group of four village elders that take responsibility of 
managing and leading discussions on village affairs. Whilst facilitating and 
monitoring the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement (COHA) Major General 
Tanongsak Tuvinun, Chairman of the Joint Security Committee (JSC), noted how the 
crowds would follow GAM leaders around while shouting "Medeka" (independence) 
in the presence of the TNI. 51 Academics and journalists who have been to the region 
have also noted similar incidents. 52 It is impossible to know how much support there 
was for independence unless a secret ballot had taken place. However, the rallies held 
in 1999 and 2000 in protest against the government, the expansion of the GAM's 
strongholds and the increase in GAM's membership all indicated an upsurge in social 
forces and a stronger movement. 
International involvement is crucial to both sides. International pressure would 
weaken the government's position resulting in concessions to secessionist demands 
such as bringing those suspected of human rights abuses to justice or devolving more 
power to the region. International pressure could go as far as altering the boundaries 
50 International Crisis Group (ICG), 'Aceh: Can Autonomy Stem the Conflict? ', p. 13 
51 Major General Tanongsuk Tuvinan, 148 Days in Aceh A Diary during the Implementation Process of 
Cessation of Hostilities Agreement (COHA) between the Government of Indonesia and the Free Aceh 
Movement, (Bangkok: Peace Operations Divisions, 2002), p. 15 
52 Smith, `Aceh: Democratic Times, Authoritarian Solutions', p. 83-84 
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of the state as has been done in the East Timor case. On the other hand, the 
international community could turn a blind eye or exert nominal pressure on Jakarta's 
policies in handling secessionism, consequently, posing fewer limitations to decision- 
making in Aceh. 
Timing of the re-emergence of GAM was unfortunate for their cause for 
independence. Though domestic and foreign media and NGOs began publicising the 
Acehnese tragedy, much attention was diverted to East Timor. Indonesian's Southeast 
Asian neighbours are unlikely to interfere with Indonesia's internal considering 
Asean's long tradition of non-intervention. Recent developments have reconfirmed 
ASEAN member's apathetic stance. 
During this period, social forces in Aceh can be loosely categorised into four groups. 
First, those connected with the former regime, Second, NGOs campaigning for human 
rights. Third, student groups that supported Acehnese independence through 
democratic means. Fourth, GAM and its supporters that demanded Acehnese 
independence through an armed conflict. The latter three categories formed an 
opposition against the Indonesia state. The state responded to these demands from 
social forces in Aceh by granting a number of concessions. An upsurge of social 
forces in Aceh was also made in tandem with wider protests calling for reformasi. 
Other crises such as the financial crisis and inter-ethnic violence together created 
multi-dimensional problems for an already disoriented state. Though society has 
achieved integrated domination over the state, social forces within Indonesia did not 
support Aceh's claims for independence. With no support from other social forces and 
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external forces, Aceh still remained part of the Indonesian state. This instance 
confirms the central hypothesis. 
Had there been an absence of these pending challenges, the state would probably have 
had the capability to manage secessionism in Aceh. Social discontent had always 
existed but was controlled by the military and the previous strong state under the New 
Order. As such, had there not been a multiplicity of challenges, the structures to 
maintain social forces were still in place. Furthermore, history strongly indicates that 
the state has managed to control regional rebellion in Aceh and East Timor for more 
than three decades. 
I have also noted that both East Timor and Aceh called for independence during this 
period; however, the Indonesian state offered the chance for the East Timorese to 
choose their political future via referendum. The state-in-society approach does not 
make any assumptions about decision-making; thus, accounts for differences in the 
state's response towards managing East Timor and Aceh. The flexibility in the 
approach this gives it more manoeuvrability to explain a variety of situations. 
Under Wahid's Presidency: the Humanitarian Pause 
Like the circumstances under Habibie, Wahid was operating in the context of low 
levels of social control. The Indonesian state was dealing with a multiplicity of 
demands from social forces. Unlike the case of East Timor which had the support of 
many states for its bid for independence, Aceh had none. It was a combination of low 
levels of social control that limited the state's policy options. However, due to the 
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lack of international support for Aceh which meant that independence would not be 
achieved. 
While the autonomy package was being discussed, President Abdurraman Wahid 
popularly known as Gus Dur, also initiated peace talks to resolve the conflict in Aceh. 
However, Wahid's decision-making took place in the similar context as Habibie- the 
state was still reeling from the crises post-Soeharto. And if it were not for these timely 
circumstances, the peace talks would not have taken place. Firstly, the military was 
still recovering from its wounded reputation following revelations of mass human 
rights violations especially those committed in East Timor and Aceh. This barred the 
government or the military from taking a military approach. The Foreign Minister, 
Hassan Wirajuda in his discussion with Hasan di Tiro, also acknowledged this points; 
On the other hand, GAM also had little hope of defeating the army. Secondly, social 
forces in Aceh had emboldened. GAM's reawakening and the emergence of softliners 
such as Muslim student groups, Islamic school students and Islamic school teachers 
also indicated that the government was losing its control over policy making in Aceh. 
Thirdly, the domestic domain began pressurising the government to bring those guilty 
of gross human rights abuses to justice. 54 Lastly, the elections had brought 
Abdurraman Wahid to power. The combination of the four factors above indicated 
that the state was in no position to defy social forces. 
Wahid was known as a reformist and was deeply suspicious of the military. However, 
Wahid was also generally known for his conflicting statements and erratic behaviour. 
As Ulil Abshar-Abdakka, head of the Human Resources Research and Development 
5' Aspinall and Crouch, The Aceh peace process: why it. failed, p. 11 
54 Sulistiyanto. 'Whither Aceh? ', p. 446 
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Department of NU notes that, 'Gus Dur, who is famous for his unpredictability and 
penchant for political zig-zagging and is difficult to understand, is like what he was 
when he led the Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) for 15 years"'. A clear example of this was 
when Wahid founded his own think-tank Democracy Forum in 1991 and together 
with pro-democracy activists, he boldly criticised the government on various fronts. 
However, by the 1997 elections, Wahid had abandoned his democratic ideals, 
supported Golkar together with Soeharto's eldest daughter, Siti Hardiyanti (Tutut) 
Rukmana and became a member of the handpicked MPR, Indonesia's highest state 
institution whose responsibilities included amending the constitution and re-electing 
Soeharto. 56 It was a combination of these rare circumstances that enabled Wahid to 
initiate peace talks with GAM. In January, Wahid made an agreement with the 
Geneva based Henri Dunant Center (HDC) to mediate the talks between Jakarta and 
GAM. After several talks, the agreement for a Humanitarian Pause between GAM and 
the Indonesian government was signed on 12 May 2000. The agreement received 
widespread support in Aceh as thousands held mass prayers for a successful process 
indicating strong social support. 57 
There was no doubt that a bumpy road laid ahead for the mediators. Firstly, both sides 
were adamant about their objectives. On one hand, GAM insisted that it would not 
settle for anything less than independence. On the other, political elites in Jakarta 
asserted that any agreement could only be based on the unitary state of Indonesia. 
There was also insistence that the offer of autonomy was the starting point of 
ss Interview with Ulil Abshar-Abdalla, `Gus Dur: tale of a great survivor', Harry Baskara (ed. ), 
Questioning Gus Dur, (Jakarta: The Jakarta Post, 2000), p. 18 
56 O'Rourke, Reformasi The Struggle for Power in Post-Soeharto Indonesia, p. 20-21 
57 Online Interview with NGO worker based in Aceh, 23 May 2000 
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negotiations. ` However, the costs of participating in the peace deal seemed low 
enough for both sides to take the risk. 59 What changed from the early reformasi period 
was that sympathy for the Acehnese from the parliament began to wane. No major 
political party supported the president's initiatives in Aceh and the army was 
especially opposed to the potential destruction of national unity. 
Disunity amongst social forces in Aceh posed additional problems. There was 
increasing doubts to the extent GAM leaders in exile had control over the GAM 
fighters in Aceh, despite assertion by GAM fighters that Hasan di Tiro was their 
leader. Unlike East Timor's movement for independence, there was no clear 
leadership. The East Timorese looked up to Xanana Gusmao for political leadership 
while turning to Bishop Belo for religious leadership. GAM has had the longest and 
most prominent role in advancing Acehnese aspirations for independence. However, 
as the political leaders are in exile in Sweden, there was a lack of accessibility and 
contact with Acehnese social forces. GAM's dissident faction in Malaysia added 
further complications. As a result, social support for independence was not unified. 
As mentioned earlier, other sections of Acehnese society had been increasingly 
involved in supporting the call for independence through democratic means. Student 
movements play prominent roles in lobbying international organisations such as the 
UN, investigating human rights abuses, providing refuge and humanitarian aid for 
displaced people. `' As a result, student movements have gained respect and credibility 
but still have limitations to their political capacity. " 
"8 Interview with Chief Negotiator for the Republic of Indonesia, Wiryono Sastrohandoyo, Jakarta, 24 
June 2005 
" Konrad Huber, The HDC in Aceh: promises and pitfalls of NGO mediation and implementation, 
(East-West Center Washington, 2004), p. 18 
6u Barber (ed. ), Aceh: the untold story, p. 63 
61 Ibid, p. 64 
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Despite the factions in GAM and the multiplicity of other groups demanding 
independence, peace talks went ahead with the political leadership in Sweden. 
Though the Acehnese had little confidence in Jakarta's promises, participating in 
negotiations that were mediated by an international organisation seemed like a good 
opportunity for GAM to internationalise the conflict. Peace talks would strengthen the 
legitimacy of the government-in-exile in Sweden in the eyes of the Acehnese which 
they hoped would unify the territory in the struggle for independence. 
How did other state segments view the peace negotiations? Apart from Wahid and a 
few of his ministers, peace talks received a cool reception in Jakarta. Some such as 
House Speaker Akbar Tanjung criticised the government for upgrading the status of 
GAM by inviting an international host to mediate the talks. There was little doubt that 
the military opposed the talks, however, it was in no position to the stop the process. 
At the time, gaining the support from the military seemed relatively inconsequential 
due to its battered image. On the other hand, failure to gain the military's backing 
would later cause disruptions and collapse in 2001 and again in 2003 (during 
Megawati's presidency). Though talks went ahead, clashes on the ground continued. 
On the international level, talks were praised and supported by the UN, US and EU 
countries. Both the US and Norwegian governments provided the funding. 62 
Though Wahid was a key advocate for reconciliation with the Acehnese, the 
unfolding impeachment case, which began in the first half of 2001, overshadowed the 
peace process. Wahid was also known for his conflicting statements, clumsy attempts 
62 Barter, Neither Wolf nor Lamb, p. 15 
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to initiate democratic reform and erratic behaviour which Indonesians witnessed 
during the final months of his presidency. Towards the end of his tenancy, there was 
increasing opposition to his ill-judged policies at the same time he also managed to 
alienate his allies. As the presidential crisis unfolded, Wahid lost control of his 
government as it became increasingly disunited. As a result, this provided the space 
for security forces to take more coercive measures. " 
In March 2001, the DPR threw its support behind security operations in the region. 
On II April, faced with a greater crisis on his hands, President Wahid formalised 
security operations by signing a Presidential Instruction (Inpres 4/2001) on 
Comprehensive Measures to Resolve the Aceh Problem which aimed to resolve the 
conflict by addressing six areas of concern: political, economic, social, legal and 
public order, security, and information. The period thereafter saw a complete 
breakdown of security. Subsequently, the peace process came to an end. 
To a large extent, Wahid was working in the same circumstance as Habibie. There 
were strong social forces not only in Aceh but in other parts of the archipelago other 
social forces were putting their demands to the state. Furthermore, the state had to 
deal with other challenges such as the financial crisis. As such, low levels of social 
control limited the state's policy options which resulted in the state having to make 
concessions to social forces in Aceh. This instance confirms the central hypothesis. 
`'' McGibbon, Secessionist Challenges in Aceh and Papua: Is Special Autonomy the Solution? p. 40; 
Aguswandi, Civil Society: The Missing Piece in Peace Building in Aceh in Annelies Heijmans, Nicola 
Simmonds. and Hans van de Veen (eds. ), Searching. for Peace in Asia Pacific: An Overview of Conflict 
Prevention and Peacehuilding Activities, (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner, 2004), p. 387 
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As in the case of East Timor, the military opposed the concessions made to Aceh. 
However in the case of Aceh, the military did not go as far as disrupting the state's 
official action as it had done in East Timor after the Habibie's administration 
announcement of popular consultation. This was because the situation had not pushed 
the military to take drastic measures as it had done in East Timor. Furthermore, the 
connection with the militia and attacks after the referendum in East Timor had done 
much damage to its image. 
Megawati takes over 
At this juncture, social demands and calls for reform had receded. State and society 
relations were classified as dispersed domination where neither the state nor society 
achieved domination over the other. Though the state did not enjoy high levels of 
social control as it did during the New Order, the combination of social support for 
tougher action and the changing international context gave the Indonesian state more 
manoeuvrability to take military action in Aceh. 
By the time Megawati took over the presidency, there was a considerable change of 
attitude in the MPR towards the conflict in Aceh. At the time of Soeharto's downfall, 
the media reporting on mass human violations in conflict areas had mustered 
sympathy for the people in conflict areas including Aceh. However by 2001, there 
was a change of heart. Jakarta had become increasingly impatient with the permissive 
attitude and began to lobby for more coercive means that gradually led to the 
imposition of martial law in 2003. 
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Megawati had once vowed never to let another drop of blood spill in Aceh after her 
party, the PDI-P, won an overwhelming victory in the 1999 elections. 64 Reiterating 
this stance in January 2001, she announced the government had `every intention' to 
resolve the conflict in Aceh. However upon seceding Wahid, she announced six 
national goals placing national integrity above all in her acceptance speech. It is also 
widely known that she perceives herself as the true guardian of her father's legacy, or 
Pancasila which he had authored. In regard to the government policies imposed on 
Aceh, one senior official had noted that Megawati had acted as `Bung Karno's 
daughter rather than a president'. 65 Such nationalistic views only brought her closer to 
the military than her predecessor. 66 Inpres 4/2001 (presidential instruction signed by 
former President Wahid giving the military a mandate to carry out military 
operations) was still in place and other state sectors seemed eager to send in more 
troops. 
On II October 2001, Megawati continued the presidential instruction by issuing 
Inpres No. 7/2001 citing that there had been no sign of resolution through peaceful 
means"". The new minister for Home Affairs, Lieutenant General (ret. ) Hari Triyono, 
though stating that the military was following the government's policy, also 
announced that the military was ready to send in more troops and a third of the 
64 if one day Cut Nyak lead this country, I will not let even a drop of people's blood to fall to Aceh's 
ground, which has given so much to making Indonesia independent. To you I pledge my love', stated 
Megawati in her victory speech on 29 July 1999 after the PDI-P won the 1999 general elections. 
65 Confidential interview with Indonesian Official, Jakarta, 15 June 2005 
66 Rizal Sukma, 'Secessionist Challenge in Aceh Problems and Prospects', Hadi Soesastro, Anthony L. 
Smith and Han Mui Ling (eds. ), Governance in Indonesia Challenges Facing the Megawati 
Presidency, (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2003), p. 175 
67 Jakarta Post, No compromise with the Free Aceh Movement', 8 February 2002, 
www. thejakartapost. com, accessed 8 February 2002 
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marines. Likewise. Kompassus was only waiting for a request for reinforcements 
from the military. " 
From the previous two presidencies, evidence shows that both Habibie and Wahid 
were still dealing with the multiplicity of challenges which in turn limited the state's 
policy options. Concessions were granted to appease social forces in Aceh. What 
enabled the state to take on more assertive stance on managing secessionism in Aceh? 
Tough action had much to do with Wahid's removal from office in July 2001. Wahid 
was known as the architect of accommodation and the key advocate for negotiations 
and conciliation. However, Wahid had miscalculated several of his political decisions 
that alienated his allies. There was growing opposition to his presidency and by early 
2001 Wahid sought to assuage the military by taking a tougher approach to 
separatism, which resulted in the signing of Inpres 4/2001. As the military took 
control of the situation, social momentum in Aceh was neutralised and political space 
once enjoyed during the period immediately after the downfall of Soeharto came to an 
end. 
Because of Megawati's nationalistic views, the change of the presidency emboldened 
the military. Lieutenant Ryamizard Ryacudu expressed: for two years we [the 
military] have been pushed around all the time and have not been able to move. It is 
as if our feet are tied but GAM's are not and our men are slaughtered and killed... In 
any country these who are terrorists or armed insurgents will be eliminated. How can 
es Maj. General Amirul Isnareni interviewed in Jakarta Post, `Kompassus readied to quell Aceh rebels', 
17 April 2001, www. thejakartapost. com, accessed 17 April 2001 
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we make peace with them? Two offers of peace are enough... How can we negotiate 
a thousand times? "' 
As mentioned earlier, Acehnese social forces demanding independence lacked support 
from other social forces outside of Aceh. The wider movement for reform in 
Indonesia included demands the trial of those guilty of human rights abuses in areas 
such as East Timor and Aceh which suffered greatly under the military's operations. 
However, this did not necessarily translate into support for Acehnese independence. 
Another important factor that tipped the balance in favour of the state was the 
changing international environment post 9/11. Governments were placing a great deal 
of importance on state security. The government sought to take advantage of the 
changing context by labelling GAM as a terrorist organisation. This also led Jakarta to 
add pressure on the Swedish government to prosecute GAM leaders whom had taken 
up Swedish citizenship and were living in exile in Sweden. The international 
environment also opened up opportunities for the Indonesian military to become a 
partner in tackling terrorism, which it hoped would repair the bad image, created from 
the East Timor saga. Here, the constellation of weak social forces in Aceh, a lack of 
social support from other areas within Indonesia for Aceh's independence and the 
state's increased ability to manage its resources in turn increased the state's 
effectiveness to carry out its actions. However, support from external forces to take 
tougher action against secessionism in the light of the 9/11 attacks gave more 
manoeuvrability to the Indonesian state to take military action against the Acehnese 
rebels in the name of the war against terror. 
`19 Aspinall and Crouch. The Aceh peace process: why it failed, p. 24 
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However, the reconsolidation of state authority also had much to do with enhanced 
state effectiveness in managing the pending economic and political crises. At this 
juncture, the crises that the country was facing had receded which in turn strengthened 
the state and broadened the state's policy options. Regional rebellion in other areas 
such as Riau had been pacified. There was greater macroeconomic stability and 
inflation had been brought under control. Elections had been held in 1999 which 
addressed the wider demand for democratic reform since the fall of Soeharto. 
Peace Talks and Military Action 
State response towards managing secessionism in Aceh involved peace talks and 
military action. This reflected two views within the state on how to manage the 
conflict. On one hand, there were a few such as Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono who 
advocated peace talks. On the other, there were others such as the military, the PDI-P 
that favoured military action. The government also made unilateral concessions for 
special autonomy which was key to dealing with the conflict. Habibie first proposed 
the offer of autonomy in 1999. The DPR was required to adopt laws on special 
autonomy for Aceh and West Papua by I May 2001. Though the DPR did not meet 
the deadline, the Special Autonomy Law on Nanggroe Aceh Darulsalam (NAD) was 
only passed on 19 July, a few days before Wahid's disgraced downfall. The law was 
only signed by his successor on 9 August. 
As for the peace talks, various international bodies such as the HDC and a few foreign 
governments continued efforts to revive the faltered peace process. However, 
223 
international involvement was not as great as in East Timor. Evidence of international 
support for the peace talks was shown in 2001 when the team of `wise men' was 
formed by HDC which consisted of former foreign diplomats70. However, it was not 
until Megawati gave the go ahead when the wise men were allowed to take part in the 
peace process under the condition that they acted solely as mediators and not on the 
behalf of their countries. As such, international involvement in the conflict was the 
encouragement for the two sides to engage in peace talks as opposed to exerting 
pressure as had been the case of East Timor which in turn limited the Indonesian state 
capabilities. 
Several foreign dignitaries from the US and the EU made trips to Aceh throughout 
2001 and 2002 in attempt to bring the two sides to the negotiating table. Such 
endeavour was not completely hopeless as the secretariat at the Kuala Tripa Hotel in 
Aceh and the monitoring teams were still in tact indicating that the government had 
not entirely turned its back on the option of resolving the conflict through peaceful 
means. 
Talks started in February 2002 but it was only in May when the meeting between the 
two sides amounted to an agreement that GAM would accept the NAD law as a 
starting point for negotiations. However, though some progress had been made at the 
negotiation table, fighting on the ground continued. State segments especially the TNI 
did not attempt to hide their opposition to the peace process. TNI Chief Endriartono 
70 The wise men included retired US Marine General Anthony Zinni; former Thai Foreign Minister 
Surin Pitsuwan; Yugoslav ambassador to Jakarta, Budimir Loncar; later they were joined by former 
Swedish diplomat, Bengt Soderberg and Lord Eric Avebury who was not a wise man but worked along 
with the group. 
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Sutarto believed that 'separatist groups such as GAM should be seen as an enemy so 
that the TNI can carry out its duties without any fear of allegations of human rights 
violations"'. As fighting persisted, talks did not produce any favourable results to 
justify its continuation. It was not long until other state segments opposed the peace 
talks. The DPR grew increasingly impatient and called for intensified military 
operations to replace the negotiations that were going nowhere. 72 Susilo Bambang 
Yudhoyono, then Coordinating Minister for Political and Social Affairs and advocator 
of talks, expressed his reluctance and impatience in continuing with negotiations: 
Any separatist movement must be crushed, and we have the international support to 
maintain our national territorial integrity'.... ` Should the dialog continue to proceed in 
an uncertain manner, while there isn't a sincere indication from GAM to find a 
peaceful solution to the Aceh question, the government might later decide to stop the 
dialog"'. As the pressure from the hardliners to take tougher action against GAM 
mounted, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono finally gave the go ahead for military 
operations, citing that the heightened security situation in Aceh has recently forced 
us to consider whether we can continue with civil authority there'74. 
Peace talks coincided with the government's move to step up on security aimed to 
pressurise GAM into coming back to the negotiation table. Susilo gave GAM an 
ultimatum to accept negotiations within the framework of special autonomy before 
the end of Ramadan (6 December). If GAM refused these conditions, the government 
71 Interview with TNI Chief Endriartono Sutarto in Jakarta Post, `House backs moves to use force 
against separatist movements', 25 June 2002, www. thejakartapost. com, accessed 25 June 2002 
72 Jakarta Post, `House backs moves to use force against separatist movements', 25 June 2002 
www. thejakartapost. com, accessed 25 June 2002 
73 Jakarta Post, `Military to get new mandate to crush GAM', 8 February 2002, 
www. thejakartapost. com, accessed 8 February 2002 
74 Jakarta Post, `Government mulls military crackdown against separatist movement in Aceh', 4 July 
2002, www. thejakartapost. com, accessed 4 July 2002 
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would take 'tough and appropriate' measures. This shows that the state had 
strengthened considerably. 75 
On the other hand, external forces continued to support a peaceful resolution but not 
independence. This support did not amount to pressure. As such, international 
involvement was not as strong as it was in the case of East Timor post-1998. Japan, 
US, EU and the World Bank cosponsored a Preparatory Meeting on Peace and 
Reconstruction in Aceh which pledged humanitarian programmes and rehabilitation 
under the condition that an agreement between Jakarta and GAM had been signed. ' 
Australia and Canada promised funds to support the monitoring of the peace 
agreement while Norway, Sweden and the US continued their support for the HDC. " 
Because those who advocated peace talks were a minority within the government, 
those who advocated a military approach, which also included the president, 
dominated the decision-making process. There had been much talk amongst the 
Jakartan elites, especially the military, about reviving the Aceh military command, 
known as Iskandar Muda Military Command. With several military victories 
including the killing of GAM military commander Abdullah Syafi'ie, the hardliners 
felt justified in continuing with military options. Indeed, the military command was 
reinstated in tandem with the peace talks in Geneva. Consequently, the establishment 
of the military command would only make the military presence a more permanent 
feature in Aceh which would also confer the military with the legal mandate to crush 
the rebellion. On the other hand, the reestablishment of the military command was 
75 Ibid 
76 Jakarta Post, `Japan, US initiate meeting to rebuild shattered Aceh', 21 November 2002, 
www. thejakartapost. com, accessed 21 November 2002 
77 Jakarta Post, `Western leaders hail Aceh truce, promise aid', 11 December 2002, 
www. thejakartapost. com, accessed 11 December 2002 
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met with opposition amongst the majority of the Acehnese with the exception of the 
local elite. ' 
Not long after the signing of COHA, both sides began accusing one another of 
violating the agreement. Those within the state who opposed the peace talks began 
accusing GAM of holding public rallies and disseminating propaganda supporting a 
separate state of Aceh. Jakarta also accused GAM of reconsolidating itself by various 
means including rebuilding its government structure which functioned like any local 
government79, recruiting new members, accumulating new weapons and collecting tax 
from the public or what the government terms as extortion. "' It was feared that GAM 
was expanding its influence into new areas. Government sources admitted that local 
government in some areas were even under GAM's control. Consequently, Jakarta 
took action by tightening controls on society. The government began arresting a 
number of human rights activists including Muhammad Nazar, chairman of the SIRA 
for spreading sedition against the government. 81 
At this juncture, social opposition continued and GAM was still reluctant to start the 
disarmament process in fear that the Indonesian military was preparing for new 
military operations. It was not long before negative statements began appearing in the 
press which threatened negotiations. SBY stated `Indonesians love peace, but 
Indonesians value their sovereignty and territorial integrity even more'82, which 
" Jakarta Post, 'Does Aceh need a military command? ' 11 January 2002, www. thejakartapost. com, 
accessed II January 2002 
70 For example, GAM issued marriage certificates. 
80 Interview with Chief Negotiator for the Republic of Indonesia, Wiryono Sastrohandoyo, Jakarta, 24 
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81 Jakarta Post, `Aceh's peace agreement stronger than RI law', 7 April 2003, www. thejakartapost. com, 
accessed 7 April 2003 
82 Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono quoted in Jakarta Post, `Peace versus sovereignty', 29 April 2002, 
www. thejakartapost. com, accessed 29 April 2002 
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clearly indicated a pretext for a military campaign. Tensions rose between the military 
and GAM as clashes between the two sides became frequent. The JSC office in Aceh 
had been attacked. This led many observers to believe that the military, which at that 
juncture was clearly against the peace process, had been behind the incidents in an 
attempt derail the whole process. 83 
As tensions rose, Jakarta prepared for other security options. In one last ditch to save 
the faltering peace process, the HDC backed by the US, EU, Japan and the World 
Bank brought the two sides together for talks in Tokyo on 17 May. 84 However at the 
time, preparations for military action were well advanced to the point the army was 
unlikely to pull back. An Indonesian official said between 40,000 to 50,000 troops 
were preparing for security operations. Softliners that advocated resolving the conflict 
were growing impatient with GAM and at this juncture had very little reason to 
believe that GAM was sincere in resolving the conflict through peaceful means. Many 
such as the chief negotiator, Wiryono Sastrohandoyo, now believed that GAM only 
accepted negotiations for the purposes of consolidating its forces and to resume 
fighting when it mustered enough strength. 85 
Violence from both sides stepped up which ultimately discredited any attempts to 
resolve the conflict through the peace agreement. The domestic situation post-Bali 
bombings, which occurred on 12 October 2002, tilted in favour of a firm approach. 
On 19 May 2003, martial law was imposed on the region for six months and extended 
83 Discussions at `Reconstruction and Peace Building in Aceh', August 2005, conference held in 
Jakarta, Indonesia 
84 Unlike the peace talks facilitated by the HDC in December 2002, the Japanese government hosted 
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228 
again in November for an additional six months. Many have attributed Megawati's 
ascendancy to power to her father's legacy, and who, it is observed by her harsh 
critics, to shy away from the media, had gained increasing popularity for this move. 
The implementation of martial law immediately suspended the implementation of 
autonomy. The government's decision to implement martial law was facilitated by the 
September 11 attacks and the subsequent attacks on Afghanistan and Iraq. Though 
there were calls from external forces such as the UN and Australia" to lift martial law 
the pressure was not great, as post-9/11 created an environment where state security 
was prioritised. Furthermore, these faint calls had little effect on Jakarta as western 
nations that backed the invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq lacked any form of 
credibility to stop Jakarta from sending in its own troops in its own territory. 87 
According to opinion polls, the public supported Megawati's tough stance on 
separatism. COHA revived a nationalistic sentiment amongst the public which was 
also fanned by the military and the political elite statements which indicated that 
separatism posed a grave threat to the integrity of the nation if not dealt with 
effectively. Consequently, strong popular sentiment surfaced against GAM. The 
imposition of marital law ultimately meant the suspension of autonomy and the 
military possessing absolute powers in the region. 
Though there were calls from external forces such as the UN and AustraliaRB to lift 
martial law pressure was not great as post-9/11 created an environment where state 
security was prioritised. There has also been a subsequent call for the resumption of 
86 Jakarta Post, 'Int'l community decries war in Aceh and calls for peace', 21 June 2003, 
www. thejakartapost. com, accessed 21 June 2003 
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peace negotiations. However, Indonesians generally view western governments as 
adopting double standards. With the war on Iraq, Indonesians feel that western 
governments have been unfair to tell Indonesia to avoid war in their very own 
territory especially when this war means the unity of the nation. " This point was also 
reiterated by the Chief Negotiator for the Republic of Indonesia, Wiryono 
Sastrohandoyo. `'0 
Suggestions from a lecturer at the University of Indonesia to take legal action against 
the Swedish government to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) for harbouring 
citizens of Acehnese descent, who are involved in GAM, have subsequently turned 
into a government campaign. The Acehnese residing in Sweden include GAM's 
government in exile as well as the movement's founder, Hasan di Tiro. " 
There have also been changes since the 1999 euphoria of reformasi where most social 
forces were mobilising against the Indonesian state. The waning momentum of civil 
protests in Aceh coincided with Wahid's departure and the Indonesian state's 
tendency to implement military action in Aceh. Mass gatherings that had occurred on 
the same scale as in 1999 and 2000 did not materialise in 2001 which signified the 
weakening of social forces. The military action continued and was formalised under 
martial law. Political freedoms once enjoyed had been curtailed. The media were also 
89 Jakarta Post, No Indonesia without Aceh', 22 May 2003, www. thejakartapost. com, accessed 22 
May 2003 
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required to report on the achievements of the military and publish pieces on 
Indonesian national unity. ' 
Divisions surfaced amongst social forces in Aceh that had previously formed a united 
bloc against the Indonesian state during the reformasi period. Some social forces in 
Aceh that opposed Acehnese independence and aligned themselves with the 
Indonesian state begun to emerge. For example, there was an upsurge in militia 
activity since late 2002 to early 2003 which the military deny any involvement. " 
There had also been reports that community leaders had been rallying farmers, civil 
servants and militia groups that had pledged loyalty to the Indonesian state in a 
ceremony before the military commander which was the biggest pro-government 
since the imposition of Martial Law. Predominantly, this group consisted of Acehnese 
who disliked GAM because the movement had been involved in taxing the people. 
However, evidence also seemed to suggest the Acehnese that had joined militia 
groups and rallies against GAM were co-opted or forced to do so for fear of being 
accused a GAM sympathiser. 94 
Under martial law 2003: the suppression of social forces in Aceh 
Under martial law, the government had complete control over its policies in Aceh 
independent of social forces. Public opinion in Indonesia was tilting in favour of the 
government's tough actions against GAM. Under this status, the authority of the 
92 Jakarta Post, `Aceh war sparks a culture of fear within the media industry', 18 June 2003, 
www. thejakartapost. com, accessed 18 June 2003; Also Jakarta Post, `Free speech on Aceh curtailed', 
19 June 2003, www. thejakartapost. com, accessed 19 June 2003 
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administration was transferred and became subordinate to the military as the Martial 
Law Administrator. 
The Aceh military rulers brought a number of controls to the region. Just barely two 
days into martial law, Aceh military ruler Major General Endang Surwarya, placed 
restrictions over the media, printing facilities, postal services and telecommunications. 
The media was specifically instructed not to print statements from GAM. 95 `I want all 
news published to uphold the spirit of nationalism. Put the interests of the unitary 
state of Indonesia first. Don't give statements from GAM any credence as they are 
made without facts and evidence'. Instead, a selected group of journalists were 
embedded within Indonesian troops to report on the situation. Consequently, it was 
during this period that media reports were more focussed on military successes as 
well as mass rallies held in support and loyalty to Republic of Indonesia or more 
specifically the unitary state, otherwise known by the Indonesian acronym of NKRI. 97 
These rallies were held almost everyday for Acehnese to repent their disloyalty to 
Jakarta, pledge their support for the state ideology Pancasila and the 1945 
Constitution, sing the national anthem and other patriotic songs as well as fly the 
Indonesian flag. In no time, as Rodd McGibbon notes: The notion of NKRI became 
increasingly popular public formation in public discourse both in Jakarta and Aceh 
and came to function in much the way as pancasila had done during the New Order- 
as the key construct of state nationalism"'. However, there were also reports that 
95 Jakarta Post, `Victims of War', 23 May 2003, www. thejakartapost. com, accessed 23 May 2003 
96 Jakarta Post, `Truth becomes causality of war as military restricts media', 22 May 2003, 
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villagers were forced to attend these functions. Other rallies that were initiated by 
civil movements were banned during this period. 
Secondly, the government continued its initiative (since negotiations began) to arrest 
many prominent human rights activists and several other Acehnese for their alleged 
involvement or support for GAM. In addition, several NGOs were also accused of 
being GAM sympathisers. For the military, GAM includes the separatist armed wing 
fighting for independence and also those who adopt political and peaceful means in 
voicing their demands to Jakarta such as students, human rights activist and NGO 
workers. ` Authorities under martial law had the power to detain suspects for 20 days 
without trial which could be extended for another 50 days. 
Thirdly, the Indonesian government imposed restrictions on foreigners entering Aceh 
including NGO workers. 10° The UN, which remained, had its activities restricted to 
Banda Aceh. The government also required that the Acehnese working for the 
administration undergo special screening known as Litsus (short for penlition khusus) 
which was originally used during the Soeharto era to root out the communists. This 
time round, the purpose for the reintroduction of Litsus was to wipe out all GAM 
elements within the local bureaucracy. 10' All Acehnese were also required to apply for 
new identity cards while the Acehnese living outside the region were living under 
surveillance. 
9, Jakarta Post, The role of intelligence and counterinsurgency', 28 May 2003, 
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Fourth, like the case of East Timor, civilian militias were established to support the 
military's activities and provide intelligence. "' In all, the power the military enjoyed 
under the martial law was not much different from the powers it had once enjoyed 
under Soeharto. Here, state authority over social forces in Aceh was at its height. 
TNI spokesman claimed that a year of martial law had been imposed; GAM's strength 
had been reduced to 40%. 10; TNI claimed to have killed 1,300 GAM members while 
2,000 surrendered. Some 1,200 alleged GAM members reportedly attended 
reeducation camps where they were required to swear their allegiance to the 
Indonesian state, learn about Pancasila, and sing the national anthem as well as other 
patriotic songs. 114 The local administration had been reinstated at both the regency and 
district levels. Schools had also been reopened. Due to the mass crackdown on GAM 
members and the fear of being suspected of supporting GAM, support for 
independence had subsided. "' Though the situation had improved and the military 
seemed to have gained control over the territory, the movement still existed which 
kept the military on guard. 
During this period, the Indonesian state initiated two policies to deal with 
secessionism in Aceh: talks mediated by the HDC and military action. The main 
supporter of peace talks was Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono. However, he also 
advocated an integrated approach' which required a mixture of negotiations as well 
as military action. The military, undoubtedly, supported a more hard line approach in 
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managing the conflict. This can be seen from its support of reinstating the military 
command in Aceh making the military presence a more permanent feature. The state's 
'integrated approach' also involved the state promising concessions or benefits if 
GAM conceded to the state's proposals. However, the stick approach or military 
action was also applied when GAM refused. What social forces in Aceh wanted had 
very little impact on decision-making. Consequently, both military action and talks 
were done independent of social forces in Aceh. Opposition from social forces in 
Aceh and within other parts of the archipelago had subsided since the reformasi 
period. This gave the Indonesian state precedence over policy making and to carry out 
its actions. The strengthening of the state also had much to do with the Megawati 
administration's attempt to tackle the Indonesian state's pending problems such as the 
weak economy and unemployment levels. The state-in-society approach also assumes 
that the state's increased ability to control social forces in Aceh could be explained 
through the state's ability to manage resources. Though international involvement 
encouraged and mediated peace talks but did not create a substantial amount of 
pressure which was experienced in East Timor during the referendum. On the 
contrary, the changing international context gave the state more manoeuvrability to 
carry out military action. This instance confirms the central hypothesis. 
President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono 
While a military offensive continued, the political changes at the national level 
ushered a new chapter in managing secessionism in Aceh. The presidential elections 
held in September 2004 brought victory to Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono and Jusuf 
Kalla. Though in the past Susilo had demonstrated he was committed to peace 
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negotiations, he also supported military action to eliminate GAM. Kalla was the main 
drive in the government to resolve the conflict in Aceh through democratic means; 
however, the devastation caused by Indian Ocean tsunami of 26 December interrupted 
talks. 
At the time of writing, the two sides have agreed on several key issues that have 
resulted in the signing of the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU). There was more 
optimism of the MoU succeeding in comparison to the previous agreements such as 
the Humanitarian Pause in 2000 which was followed by COHA in 2002. This was due 
to several factors. The authority of the third party or the Aceh Monitoring Mission 
(AMM) consisting of the EU and ASEAN, is greater than the previous body, the JSC, 
during COHA. " In addition to issues discussed in the preceding negotiations, the 
latest round of talks has touched on the idea of having local political parties and the 
need to reintegrate former GAM members into society. As such, the new agreement 
provides more incentives and benefits for GAM. However, were the new incentives 
enough to entice GAM to come back to the negotiating table? 
Many media reports suggested that the Boxing Day tsunami was the determining 
factor that brought the two sides back to the negotiating table. "' While the human 
catastrophe prompted the two sides to rethink their positions and re-open negotiations, 
steps to resurrect negotiations had started before the tsunami occurred. The post- 
tsunami context provided both sides to push for peace talks especially for those in the 
government supporting a peaceful resolution to the conflict. The context enabled SBY 
106 Monitoring mechanisms are more formalised, both the Indonesian government and GAM are not 
allowed to veto decisions and decisions made by the AMM are binding to both parties. For more details 
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and Kalla to present the talks as a humanitarian response to the Boxing Day tsunami 
as opposed to a concession. 108 As a result, both sides would not lose face. Both the 
military and GAM agreed to suspend hostilities to allow humanitarian aid to reach the 
territory devastated by the tsunami. The TNI also were reassigned to assist with relief 
efforts. International interest was renewed in promoting a peaceful resolution to the 
conflict. 10" Not long after the tsunami had interrupted the flow of negotiations, GAM 
publicly announced hope that negotiations could continue. Jusuf Kalla responded 
positively to GAM calls. 
Though there was a transformation of state policies from military action to peace 
talks, this did not coincide with the weakening of the state or the strengthening of 
social forces. On the contrary, martial law, which was followed by civil emergency 
status, reduced GAM's capacity in combat. A number of senior figures within GAM 
had been captured or killed. With the military gaining ground, GAM fighters were 
deeply demoralised. However, the reduction of GAM members did not necessarily 
translate into an increase of Acehnese social support for the Indonesian state. The past 
shows that the military's brutality has in turn alienated and encouraged the Acehnese 
to sympathise with GAM. As mentioned in the previous section, under martial law the 
military had full reign over the territory; consequently, limiting any opposition from 
non-armed social forces. Civil liberties such as freedom of the press were 
considerably restricted. Rallies were organised for the Acehnese to pledge their 
loyalty to the Indonesian state and Pancasila. As such, the reduction in social support 
for independence was under the state's control as opposed to having a change of 
heart. Because GAM needed the population for its guerrilla warfare this ultimately 
108 Aspinall, The Helsinki Agreement: A More Promising Basis. for Peace in Aceh? p. 21 
109 Ibid, p. 20 
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deprived GAM of its crucial supply of food, supplies and intelligence. "' The situation 
within Aceh worsened and optimism of achieving independence, once ran high during 
1999-2000 at the time of the civil protests against the government, was now 
wavering. "' With a combination of the factors above, social forces that supported 
independence within in Aceh had considerably weakened. 
Not only did GAM experience a loss in personnel and morale, international attention 
for the conflict had also waned during the martial law period. As mentioned earlier, 
international concern for the conflict Aceh never matched the attention that East 
Timor received. International interest in East Timor went as far as supporting the 
territory's independence. On the other hand, international involvement in Aceh only 
went as far as mediating peace negotiations in 2000-3 and vanished soon after. Since 
the collapse of the 2003 talks and subsequent imposition of martial law and civil 
emergency, the conflict has received very little international attention. Because GAM 
has always craved international attention, receiving none of it at this point pushed the 
movement to consider other options. As a result, this strengthened the Indonesian 
state's position in negotiations and with GAM making several concessions. 
An important factor in bringing the negotiations back on the table was the change in 
leadership at the national level. We have seen from the administrations under Habibie 
and Wahid, the Indonesian state still did not have much of a choice as it was still 
reeling from the multiplicity of problems it was facing at the time. When Megawati 
took over, the crises the state was facing began to recede. It was during this period 
when the state segments such as the military, which favoured military action, began to 
'10 International Crisis Group (ICG), `Aceh: A New Chance for Peace? ', Asia Briefing No. 40,15 
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take precedence over policy making in Aceh. The strengthening of forces within the 
government to resolve the conflict through peace negotiations came when Susilo and 
Kalla were elevated to top positions within the state. As such, the transformation of 
the state's policies towards managing secessionism in Aceh had nothing to do with 
changes in state effectiveness. 
Though Kalla had a personal interest in reviving a peace deal with the Acehnese, the 
initiative was not without opposition from segments of the political elite. Staunchly- 
opposed to anything disrupting national unity, the PDI-P continued to endorse the use 
of military force as a solution to the conflict. However, not only was there a change at 
the leadership level, the wider population which formerly supported a military 
approach in resolving the conflict now deemed such measures politically incorrect. "' 
Here, some segments within Indonesia and a few states began calling for a peaceful 
resolution to the conflict. 
Despite opposition from segments of the political elite, Kalla continued efforts with 
support from segments of the population. Both Wahid and Megawati needed the 
military for their political survival. In comparison, SBY-Kalla defied any opposition 
to and was more prepared to defend their policies. This was due to Kalla's relatively 
strong position within the Indonesian polity. '" First of all, the SBY-Kalla government 
has more control over the military. Secondly, Kalla is also a chairperson of Golkar, 
the leading party of the 2004 legislative elections. Furthermore, Kalla has also built 
up good relations with major Islamic groups. Consequently, as Rizal Sukma argues: 
'These political assets enabled the government to pursue peace talks with GAM, and 
112 Rizal Sukma, `Indonesia and the tsunami: responses and foreign policy implications', Australian 
Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 60, No. 2, p. 219 "3 
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helped it to pull together significant support for the peace deal from the DPR, the 
TN1, and Islamic groups, especially when it had to ward off opposition to deal with 
some retired generals and PDI-P714. 
More specifically, the shift from military action to peace talks had much to do with 
Kalla. Though SBY was also open to negotiations under the previous administration, 
he never entirely ruled out the option of a military offensive. SBY formerly adopted 
the 'integrated approach' where military action was used to eliminate GAM but also 
considered other measures such as humanitarian aid to ease past grievances. Kalla's 
interest in resolving the conflict in Aceh through negotiations started when he served 
as a minister in Megawati's cabinet. It was during this period that he also mediated 
talks between Christian and Muslim groups in Maluku and Poso, Sulawasi which 
resulted in the signing of the Malino Accords. 15 
New initiatives from a new administration were not the only ingredient for the peace 
negotiations. Peace negotiations during Wahid and Megawati were disrupted by the 
military. As such, the success of negotiations is also dependent on the civil-military 
relations. Though SBY was a retired general who developed a reputation as a 
reformist, he did not make any further attempts to reform the armed forces. Instead, 
he devoted much attention to sidelining the conservative generals such as General 
Ryamizard Ryacudu who was one of the staunchest critics of the Aceh peace process 
in 2003. Consequently, there was no significant disruption to the peace plans in Aceh 
from the military. In addition, SBY also allocated a further 526 billon rupiah package 
114 Ibid, p. 220 
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to the military. This in turn convinced the military that the peace deal was 
economically advantageous to them. "' 
The renewed peace talks, which resulted in the signing of the MoU, confirm the 
central hypothesis. The 2004 Presidential elections bought about a change in 
leadership which also brought a new perspective in dealing with the conflict in Aceh. 
Vice President Kalla pushed forward the new approach. At the same time, social 
momentum in Aceh had dramatically reduced due to tight controls under martial law. 
Furthermore, the military offensive inflicted losses on GAM which resulted in a loss 
of morale. This is a stark contrast in comparison to the optimism during the period 
immediately after Soeharto's downfall. The tsunami renewed international interest in 
the region; however, this did not go as far as supporting Aceh's independence. Social 
forces in other areas of Indonesia that formerly supported a military approach to the 
conflict in Aceh viewed such measures as politically incorrect. As such, there was 
increasing support for a peaceful resolution to the conflict. However, this did not 
mean that there was support for independence. 
The more social control, the more manoeuvrability the state has to carry out its 
actions. With the support from other social forces to resolve the conflict though 
peaceful means, the crises of 1998 finally subsided and no international support for 
Aceh's sovereignty, this enabled the state to carry out its initiatives with very little 
opposition to its policies. This instance confirms the central hypothesis. 
116 Mietzner, The Politics of Military Reform in Post-Suharto Indonesia: Elite Conflict, Nationalism, 
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Summary of Findings 
The findings of the case of Aceh are summarised in the table below: 
Table 6: Summary of Findings in the Case of Aceh 
Presidency Social Forces State Action External Forces The implications 
Soeharto Social forces in Military action to Unlike East Timor, State action was 
Timor demand for crush rebels which little was known carried out 
independence. was later about Aceh. As such, without any 
However, the formalised under no international substantial 
Indonesian state DOM. opposition to the opposition from 
achieved high state's policies in society or any 
levels of social Aceh can be other external 
control over other translated into force in turn 
social forces; thus, international support enhancing state 
enhancing state for the Indonesian effectiveness to 
effectiveness. state. act. 
Habibie Social forces in Offer of Special No international Social forces 
Aceh demand for Autonomy. involvement. were strong and 
independence. there was no 
Other segments of international 
society within pressure for 
Indonesia may Indonesia to 
sympathise with resolve the 
the abuse that conflict. The 
Aceh has endured state's diminished 
throughout the ability to manage 
years but only as a resources also 
part of wider served to 
protests against weakened its 
the military's dual position. 
function. Other 
segments do not 
support Aceh's 
inde endence. 
Wahid Civil protests Special autonomy No international The 
continued in Aceh. and peace talks or involvement. circumstances 
Other social the Humanitarian had not changed 
segments within Pause. since Habibie's 





Table 6: Summary of Findings in the Case of Aceh (continued) 
Presidency Social Forces State Action External Forces The implications 
Wahid Waning Inpres 4/2001 No international The state was still 
momentum of resulting in military involvement. in disarray from 
social forces in action. Presidential presidential crisis; 
Aceh. No support crisis however, the state 
from other overshadowed the had the capability 
segments within peace process and to assert itself 




Megawati 1) Waning social 1) Peace talks or 1) Relatively new and Waning 
momentum since COHA. unknown HDC momentum from 
the immediate 2) The re- mediates peace talks. social forces both 
period after establishment of the 2) The war on terror in Aceh and 
Soeharto's military command gives the state more within Indonesia 
downfall. No in Aceh. manoeuvrability to increased the 
support from other carry out military state's 
social segments. action. manoeuvrability 
2) Protests against to carry out its 
the re- actions. Outside 
establishment of support provided 
the military the state the 
command. No opportunity to 
positive support implement 
from other social martial law. 
segments. 
Protests within Martial law. Pushed HDC's role a State 
Aceh against the forward by the mediating talks ends. effectiveness 
implementation of military and Aceh returns to enhanced through 
martial law. Other supported by those international mutual 
social segments who initially obscurity. empowerment of 
support the state's supported peace social forces and 
decision. talks. int'l support 
SBY Battle fatigue and MoU which Renewed State 
moral running low includes the offer of international interest effectiveness 
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The case of Aceh shows that social control has fluctuated throughout time. In this 
respect, the case of Aceh differs from the case of East Timor. The annexation of East 
Timor which was perceived by the Timorese as an act of colonialism which meant the 
people never accepted the legitimacy of the state. There was no strong indication that 
there was any participation from the population. Compliance was predominately 
achieved through coercive means. In comparison to the case of Aceh, the Indonesian 
state enjoyed high levels of social control from the revolution against the Dutch until 
the formation of GAM. The Acehnese nationalist elite wholeheartedly joined the 
Indonesian nationalist movement against the Dutch which indicated participation. 
After the Dutch departed the region, the Acehnese accepted Indonesian territorial 
boundaries as legitimate and complied with Indonesian rule. However, the perceived 
grievances of economic exploitation and the lack of political decentralisation ignited a 
sense of discontent amongst a group of local businessmen who later formed GAM. 
The demands for sovereignty indicated that social control over social forces in Aceh 
began to falter. This chapter focused on the period where there was a lack of social 
control until the peace deal post-tsunami when demands for independence were 
dropped. 
As noted in the case of East Timor, through mutual empowerment the state is most 
likely to gain control over social forces even in areas where a secessionist movement 
has been longstanding and commands support from the population it seeks to 
represent. The case of Aceh provides additional instances to reinforce this. Reasons 
for this are similar to the case of East Timor. Firstly, the approach works well with 
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secessionism because sub-nationalism is a feeling specific to a group of people 
discontented with the state. Because of the feeling that is motivated by that particular 
group of people, other social groups are unlikely to share any common interests with 
secessionist groups. Therefore, other social forces are likely to support the state's 
policies that aim to maintain state security, thus, preventing a secessionist movement 
from coalescing with other social forces opposing the state. Secondly, secessionist 
movements are very unlikely to gain international support at the present time. While 
some states are involved in supporting secessionist movements, such involvement is 
insufficient for the secessionist movement to achieve independence. For this reason, 
the state-in-society approach can offer some useful implications for the case of Aceh. 
However the case of East Timor is a different matter. East Timor was left out from the 
decolonization process because of the Cold War context and only received its 
independence later. Consequently, international politics played a bigger part role than 
historical factors in determining East Timor's political future. 
The theory's strong point was its fluidness. First of all, because the theory assumed 
that the Indonesian state was not a cohesive unit, it captured the politics of policy 
making within the state. Most importantly, it showed how one state segment can 
disrupt the official state policy. There were two main sources of opposition within the 
state that opposed peace talks. The first group would be the military that have been 
the main actors in spoiling previous agreements and making negative statements, 
though some have been careful about making comments. As mentioned in Chapter 
Three, the military is not a unified actor. However, it is safe to say that all support a 
hard line view on how to deal with the conflict in Aceh. Partially this is due to the 
military's economic interests within the region. TNI only receives a small amount 
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from budgetary sources but has to raise the rest from its business activities, some even 
illegal. Another important factor would be the military's ideological opposition to 
separatism. 
The second source of opposition is the political elite especially from parties. A 
nationalistic sentiment reined the DPR since the loss of East Timor; consequently, 
many have advocated tough measures. Because of the experience of East Timor, 
many disapprove of mediators for fear of `internationalising' the conflict and 
enhancing the status of GAM to that of an international actor and as an equal to the 
Indonesian state. Those opposing talks include representatives from the PDI-P, 
Golkar, and major Islamic parties. Many have expressed their opposition to the 
formation of political parties in Aceh. 
Elected governments with little commitment to developing democracy may also 
choose to co-opt the armed forces while having very little interest in democratising 
the armed forces. "' For the case of Indonesia under the Megawati administration, 
Megawati herself had more of an interest in retaining her position of power than 
reforming the military, though it must be noted that the military no longer enjoys the 
position and power it once did during the Soeharto era. Inter-ethnic unrest, 
secessionism and political instability have provided the military with the perfect 
circumstances to assert its role as the protector of the state against any disintegrative 
forces which in turn allowed the military to reclaim its primacy over decision-making 
in the area of security. "' And as argued in Chapter Three, the military also has its way 
of asserting its influence through parliament though it no longer has its reserved seats. 
ßi7 Cawthra and Luckham (eds), Governing insecurity: democratic control of military and security 
establishments in transitional democracies, p. 10 
118 Aspinall, The Helsinki Agreement. A More Promising Basis for Peace in Aceh? p. 55 
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However, while it is still a powerful political force in post-Soeharto Indonesia, the 
stabilisation of the political scene and the more authoritative administration under 
Susilo has reduced its influence. Though its influence has been reduced and it has not 
made any significant disruptions to the present peace deal with GAM post-tsunami, 
the ability of the military to disrupt the state's official action cannot be 
underestimated or overlooked. 
Wahid's presidency provides a clear example of this. While Wahid favoured peace 
talks, the military wanted to conduct a military offensive. However at the time the 
military was in no position to take an assertive role. This soon changed when the 
peace process was overshadowed by the impeachment that eventually led to Wahid's 
removal from office. The military and the parliamentarians who favoured a tougher 
approach could then play a more assertive role in resolving the conflict in Aceh. Like 
East Timor, there was an established network of militias in Aceh each with links to 
the local district command. Such groups were used to attack international monitors 
during COHA. Their leaders often have grievances against GAM, such as having a 
family member abducted or killed by the movement. Some were even targets 
themselves. "' The case of East Timor also confirms this. The military-backed militias, 
which disrupted the referendum, also show the military possess the resources to 
disrupt the state action. 
Secondly, because the state-in-society approach does not make any assumptions or 
generalisations about human behaviour, it captures the fluidity of the decision-making 
that was brought about by the change of government. Policies under the 
119 Aspinall and Crouch, Why the peace process failed? p. 40-41 
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implementation of Megawati's nationalistic views had dramatically changed by the 
time SBY and Kalla came to power. 
State-in-society theorists assert that states and societies are in constant flux with one 
another and have the ability to change one another's actions. The approach does not 
account for the increase in resources which in turn can increase the effectiveness of 
the state to carry out its actions, rules and norms. However, it does note that the 
state's strength to manage social forces is dependent on other factors such as its 
ability to manage its own resources. The transition from the Wahid to the Megawati 
administration provides an example of this. While social momentum in Aceh was 
waning, state effectiveness had much to do with the receding problems that the 
Habibie and Wahid administrations had to grapple with. It was during the Megawati 
administration that the inter-ethnic violence was diminishing, secessionist movements 
such as the one in Riau had disappeared, the economy was picking up and inflation 
and employment rates were improving. However, a state-in-society theorist could 
argue that the increased state effectiveness during the Megawati administration can be 
attributed to the government's ability to tackle the state's pending crises. 
The findings from the case of East Timor show that external pressure on the 
Indonesian state to take a course of action that the state would not have otherwise 
done; consequently, limiting the state's options. An example of this was the pressure 
from other states on Indonesia to accept an international peacekeeping force and for 
the military to halt all of its operation to sabotage the referendum in East Timor. 
Furthermore, it was during the explosive period of reformasi where secessionist 
movements saw an opportune moment to make its case for independence while the 
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state was preoccupied with the pending crisis. Though operating within the same 
environment, only East Timor gained support from other states for independence. The 
case of Aceh provides the counterfactual of this. The Acehnese case show that 
regardless of whether there was an upsurge in social opposition in Aceh, with the 
absence of international support, the state still had the manoeuvrability to carry out its 
actions in Aceh. 
International involvement is crucial to both sides. International pressure would 
weaken the government's position resulting in concessions to secessionist demands 
such as bringing those suspected of human rights abuses to justice or devolving more 
power to the region. International pressure could go as far as altering the boundaries 
of the state as has been done in the East Timor case. On the other hand, the 
international community could turn a blind eye or exert nominal pressure on Jakarta's 
policies in handling secessionism, consequently, posing fewer limitations to decision- 
making in Aceh. 
The case of Aceh still lacked the support of the international community. Firstly, the 
tightly controlled media under Soeharto meant little was heard of the Acehnese 
movement. As Barber notes the relatively unknown Aceh at the international level 
also created a perception of weakness and illegitimacy in comparison to East Timor. 120 
Secondly, unlike East Timor Aceh was a part of the Dutch East Indies; therefore, it 
lacked a patron to bring its case to the attention of the international community. For 
East Timor, there has always been international involvement whether it be positive or 
negative support for the territory. From the 1975 annexation, the Dili incident to East 
120 Barber (ed. ), Aceh: the untold story, p. 63 
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Timor's successful secession was due to its former colonial ruler and its southern 
neighbour which played a role in bringing East Timor's case into the limelight. To a 
large degree, the timing of the re-emergence of GAM was unfortunate for their cause 
for independence. Though domestic and foreign media and NGOs began publicising 
the Acehnese tragedy, much attention was diverted to East Timor. Indonesian's 
Southeast Asian neighbours are unlikely to interfere with Indonesia's internal affairs 
considering ASEAN's long tradition of non-intervention. Recent developments have 
reconfirmed ASEAN member's apathetic stance. Aceh's nearest foreign neighbour 
Malaysia is unlikely to get involved in the conflict. Member states of ASEAN have a 
tradition of non-intervention in one another's internal affairs. Even closer to the 
Malays in terms of geography and ethnicity are the Malay-Muslims in Thailand's 
most southern provinces. Malaysia has only offered to chair talks between the leaders 
of Bersatu, an umbrella organisation of the five southern movements, and has clearly 
stated that it will support Thailand's borders. '" 
The case of Aceh confirms that the context of international politics has much to do 
with other states as well as the Indonesian state's policies towards managing 
secessionism. In the case of East Timor, the international context had more to do with 
achieving independence than its colonial past. The point where East Timor only 
gained independence more than two decades after Portugal had departed the region 
reinforces the point. Furthermore, the reason why other governments did not oppose 
the annexation had much to do with the cold war. Likewise, the war on terror has 
enabled the Indonesian state to capitalise on the situation and for other governments 
to place a priority on state security. 
121 Michel Gilquin (trans by Michael Smithies), The Muslims of Thailand, (Bangkok, IRASEC and 
Silkworm Books, 2002), p. 86-7 
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Chapter 6 
Evaluating the state-in-society approach 
At the beginning of this thesis, I set out to do the following: 
1) To theoretically explain why the two secessionist movements within the same 
political context have resulted in different outcomes. 
2) To contribute to the empirical study of the respective secessionist movements. 
3) To address the lack of comparative analysis in the field of ethnic conflict 
specifically in Indonesia. 
My second aim has been addressed in Chapters Four and Five. By conducting 
research and presenting my findings through a comparative study, I have addressed 
my third aim. In the following sections, I will present my findings from the cases of 
Aceh and East Timor. These findings will shed light on why the two secessionist 
movements have resulted in two different outcomes. Based on my own findings, I will 
also present some suggestions to enhance explanatory power of the state-in-society 
approach. 
Summary of Findings 
This thesis aimed to explain why the East Timor and Aceh have resulted in two 
different outcomes. Based on my findings, the cases differed because East Timor 
gained support from other states for independence while Aceh lacked such support. 
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Some suggest that external support for East Timor was due to its colonial past. ' 
However though this provided a strong argument for East Timorese independence 
post-Soeharto, this does not explain why the timing of independence had not come 
any sooner after the Portuguese departed the region in 1975. In this study, 
international involvement includes external state involvement within the conflict 
between the secessionist movement and the state it seeks to secede from. External 
involvement may support the state or the secessionist movement which in turn will 
enhance the capacity of either side to act. 
However, I am reluctant to make far-reaching generalisations. Though I had seven 
instances to test the validity of the state-in-society approach, I had only two case 
studies. Such deductions rarely claim success in exporting generalisations to other 
cases. Furthermore, the literature surrounding and the debates of globalisation and its 
effects on the state also reinforce this. What I have presented are two factors- the 
international context and interests- that influenced the dynamics in the cases of East 
Timor and Aceh. One or more may have influenced the cases at various junctures. 
These observations may have useful implications for secessionism in process or may 
present useful explanations for any successful cases. What is certain in these two 
cases is that international involvement is crucial in the dynamics between a 
secessionist movement and the state. It is crucial because it can enhance the capability 
of either side that states, NGOs or international organisations may choose to lend their 
support. 
Aspinall and Berger, `The break-up of Indonesia? Nationalisms after Decolonization and the limits of 
the nation-state in post-cold war Southeast Asia' 
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This begs the question under what circumstances do other states influence Indonesia's 
policies on managing secessionism? I am reluctant to make any firm generalisations 
due to limited numbers of cases in my thesis. Furthermore, it has also been noted that 
internal intervention is selective where intervention might occur in some states such 
as Afghanistan but may not occur in others. 2 The birth of Bangladesh presents an 
anomaly as do the five `stans' of Central Asia. It is these cases where the outcomes 
are path-dependent and more contextual details need to be taken into account. 
However, the patterns and findings based on the cases of East Timor and Aceh may 
have useful implications for other cases or may be used to stimulate further research 
or generate hypotheses. The two cases show that two factors have influenced the path 
of the two secessionist movements which include the politics of the international 
context, interests and state relations. One factor may not be exclusively responsible 
for the outcome of each instance but one or more may be combined together to 
influence the happenings of each case. These factors in turn provide opportunities for 
or constraints to other states to act in the concern of secessionism. 
The findings in the two cases show that the context of international politics can 
influence other states to take a stance on secessionism which can enhance the state 
capacity in managing secessionism. The ideological conflict during the Cold War in 
turn supported Indonesia's annexation of East Timor. This support enabled Indonesia 
to carry out its actions which it would not have otherwise done. Other instances such 
as when other states such as Australia began exerting pressure on the Indonesian 
military to stop its operations to sabotage the referendum and accept a peacekeeping 
force reinforces this. Increasingly, international intervention has been conducted on 
` Chandler, `Rhetoric without responsibility: the attraction of 'ethical' foreign policy', p. 307-308 
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the basis of `the right thing to do' or otherwise labelled as ethical foreign policy. 3 This 
involves taking action for the good or interests of others as opposed to national 
interests. Examples are illustrated in the cases of international intervention in 
Afghanistan, Iraq, Somalia, former Yugoslavia, Sierra Leone as well as the case of 
East Timor. 
From the findings of the two cases, I am reluctant to say that support from other states 
is the determinant factor as to whether secessionism remains in process or is 
successfully granted independence. The 1991 Dili incident shows that the Indonesian 
state had the ability to defy international criticisms and continue its reign over East 
Timor for an additional eight years. Also with the case of East Timor, an international 
peacekeeping force could only move in when Habibie gave his consent. Furthermore, 
in a last attempt to save the faltering COHA peace talks, the HDC was backed by the 
US, EU, Japan and the World Bank in an attempt to bring the Indonesian government 
and GAM together for talks in Tokyo to be held on 17 May 2003. Again, this 
example shows that international backed initiatives do not necessarily achieve its 
goals and objectives. 
The two cases show that the international context in which states operate in influence 
how they would act. The Cold War influenced many western states such as the US 
and Australia to support Indonesia's annexation of East Timor. In the 1990s, ethical 
foreign policy began to take hold as international intervention in Somalia, Yugoslavia 
and Sierra Leone as well as East Timor was conducted on the basis of the right thing 
to do. With the case of Aceh, the concern on state security in the light of the 9/11 
Ibid, p. 296 
° Unlike the peace talks facilitated by the HDC in December 2002, the Japanese government hosted the 
talks held in Tokyo. 
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attacks provided the Indonesian state more manoeuvre to take military action and 
implement martial law in the territory. 
It is not only in the area of secessionism where it is hard to theorise under what 
conditions external forces will effect state capacity whether it is to enhance state 
capacity or undermine it. Linda Weiss suggests that state capacity is not uniform in all 
policy areas. Consequently, an idea of generalised state capacity is meaningless, thus, 
it becomes more useful to examine specific policy arenas. 5 Likewise, Michael Mann 
examines four potential threats to nation-states including global capitalism, 
environmental danger, identity politics and post-nuclear geo-politics. 6 He concludes 
that impacts on the nation-state in these four areas are varied. How globalisation may 
strengthen or weaken the nation-state or the nation-state system differs according to 
the area. 7 Likewise, the influence of external involvement, whether to enhance the 
capacity of the secessionist movement or the state, may vary according to time and 
space. In many cases, international involvement is a case of selectiveness as noted 
earlier. For the case of secessionism, it is unlikely that nations seeking independence 
will gain any formal support from other states at present, though secret support is a 
different matter. However, it is sufficient to say that other states and international 
bodies can play a role in limiting and enhancing the state's capacity to manage 
secessionism, though cannot be overly emphasised as a determining factor to produce 
a certain outcome. 
5 Linda Weiss, The Mvth of the Powerless State governing the economy in a global era, (Cambridge: 
Polity Press, 1998), p. 4 
6 Michael Mann, Has globalization ended the rise and rise if the nation-state? ', Review of International 
Political Economy, Vol. 4, No. 3 
' Ibid, p. 494-495 
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In some instances, Jakarta has demonstrated the ability to defy international criticisms 
as it did after 1991 Dili incident. Though it can be argued that international criticisms 
were not forceful and Jakarta was still an important trading partner to some states 
including Australia, this instance shows the relationship between developing states 
and the external pressure is not as straightforward as illustrated in the weak state 
literature. This has implications for Buzan's weak state's analysis. This also parallels 
Robert H. Jackson's analysis of the international normative framework that supports 
'third world' state jurisdiction which have experienced decolonisation often as a 
`formal-legal condition' or what he terms as `negative sovereignty'. 8 Here, the 
international arena should be viewed as a normative framework for keeping the 
territorial bounds of these `quasi-states' intact. On the other hand, governments that 
possess positive sovereignty have the capabilities that enable them to carry out their 
own actions both domestically and internationally. Also reiterated by Christopher 
Clapham in his book, 'Africa and the International System', the inter-state system, 
international institutions and regulations are likely to deter such a drastic prospect 
9 from occurring. 
Though Clapham addresses this dichotomy by acknowledging the danger of dividing 
states in a simple weak and strong state binary and argues instead for a long 
continuum of fragile states1°, there is a danger of portraying a picture of these states of 
incapable of carrying out actions with other states in the international system. 
The state-in-society approach, without my added assumptions, is likely to have more 
explanatory power in cases of secessionism where there is no link with any other 
8 Jackson, Quasi-states: Sovereignty, International Relations and the Third World, p. 26-28 
9 Clapham, Africa and the International System, p. 22 
10 Ibid, p. 15 
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state; thus, resulting in no international involvement. The approach is most likely to 
work well with secessionism because of the approach's element of mutual 
empowerment. Because nationalism is specific to a particular group, other groups are 
unlikely to endorse the goals of a secessionist group. As such, the state is supported in 
its goals of maintaining state security. Based on the assumptions put forward by the 
state-in-society theorists, the more social control, the more manoeuvrability the state 
has in managing secessionism. The seven instances of this study reinforce that state 
capability to act is dependent on social control. The instances under the New Order in 
the cases of East Timor and Aceh show that the state had high levels of social control 
or achieved integrated domination. The outcome of both cases show that the state had 
very little limitations to its policies in managing East Timor and Aceh. 
With the instances under Habibie and Wahid where social control was low, the state 
has many limitations to what it could carry out. The outcome in both cases show that 
the state had conceded to social demands which was a significant departure from 
period under the New Order. The instances that followed including Megawati and 
SBY show that state-society relations resulted in dispersed domination where neither 
the state nor society had achieved domination over the other. The instances under the 
two presidencies show that increased social control from Habibie and Wahid granted 
the state more manoeuvrability to carry out its actions. 
However, support from other social forces in supporting the state in achieving its 
goals towards managing the movements in East Timor and Aceh was coupled with the 
fact that the Indonesian state was managing two relatively weak movements. Though 
both Fretilin and GAM had enjoyed support from the population it aimed to represent, 
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its capability to disrupt the state was limited to its territory. As such, the two 
movements' capability alone did not pose a significant challenge to the state. The 
challenge from secessionism only became apparent in the context of regime change in 
1998. The state was operating in an environment of conflict with a multiplicity of 
demands from social forces. Because both lacked support from other social forces in 
Indonesia, the determining factor that differentiated the cases of East Timor and Aceh 
was support from other states or international organisations. Consequently, the seven 
instances confirm the central hypothesis. 
The Strength of the State-in-Society Approach 
As this thesis is about centre-regional relations, I needed a theory that not only 
captured the on-going dynamics between the state and groups seeking independence 
but that also accounted for the ability of both actors to carry out their actions in order 
to fulfil their goals. I also deemed it important to acknowledge the ability of external 
forces to limit or enhance the capability of both the state and independence 
movements in East Timor and Aceh to act. Many, but not all, theories of ethnicity and 
nationalism aim to explain causality. While root causes of ethnic conflict had to be 
explored, the main purpose of the thesis was to explore the interactions between the 
state and the secessionist movement since the emergence of the secessionist 
movement to the present. Theories of ethnicity and nationalism could not fully 
explain what I had set out to do in the thesis often because they were too static. 
Because I posed the question: what determines state effectiveness in managing 
secessionism, I also explored the main schools of state theory. Though corporatism or 
258 
other strands of elitism did claim some usefulness, such explanations were unhelpful 
to the purpose of explaining centre-regional relations because they did not 
acknowledge the ability of the secessionist movements to carry out their actions. 
Rather, the emphasis was on the autonomy of the state. On the other hand, Marxism 
which acknowledges social agency reduces the state to a mere instrument. Elements 
of pluralism were useful because it recognises the fragmentation of state and society. 
However, pluralism views the state as an arena for competing interest groups. As 
such, the theory fails to account for state agency which I deem crucial as the state, at 
various junctures, can exemplify degrees of autonomy or relative autonomy. I found 
weak state theories unhelpful as they portrayed a picture of the state incapable of self- 
rule; hence, failing to acknowledge the autonomy or relative autonomy of the state to 
carry out its actions. The focus of these theories was to explain causality. As such, 
weak state theories not only failed to acknowledge state capacity to carry out its 
actions but also the agency of secessionist movements. 
I found that the assumptions put forward by the state-in-society approach addressed 
these issues. The state-in-society approach assumes that the interactions between state 
segments and social forces will affect the final outcome of the state action, policy, or 
norm. As such, it assumes that social forces are actors in their own right. Because 
secessionist movements possess the ability to put forward their demands, which at 
times the state has to take into account and may eventually lead to a change in how 
the state deals with the secessionist movement in question, I found this element of the 
state-in-society approach suitable for the type of study I set out to conduct for my 
thesis: the dynamics of centre-regional relations. This addressed my concern about 
weak state analysis which produces a distorted and static picture of a state, some 
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incapable of self-rule. Because the state-in-society approach accounts for fluctuating 
state effectiveness, this made the theory more attractive to the project. Furthermore, 
the fluidness of the approach also acknowledged that states in the `developing world' 
could also vary in capacity. 
However, I also added a third dimension to the analytical framework because the 
claim to statehood can also potentially attract external involvement. Third state 
involvement can also enhance or limit that capability of to carry out actions. It is the 
interactions between the three clusters of power which formed the basis of this study. 
There were many advantages and useful elements of the state-in-society approach 
which explained the dynamics between the Indonesian state and social forces in East 
Timor and Aceh. Firstly, I found that the approach captured the differences in policy- 
making within the Indonesian state. Migdal intended to create an approach that moves 
away from groups and their static goals to focus on the process of the continuing 
interactions between groups. ' He does not conceal his distaste for rigorous 
approaches where `action is frozen' 12. Complexity has been significant obstacles to 
general theories that attempt to accurately explain and predict human behaviour in 
politics. Having operationalised the state-in-society approach, in both the cases of 
Aceh and East Timor, I found that the approach captured the interactions between the 
state segments and social forces: GAM and Fretilin in the cases of Aceh and East 
Timor, exceptionally well. Because the state-in-society approach does not assume any 
regularity in behaviour as in many other theories or approaches such as rational 
choice, the approach captures the fluidity of decision-making under each president. 
Migdal, State in society: studying how states and societies transform and constitute one another, p. 23 
12 lbid, p. 24 
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The case of Aceh provides a good example of this observation. As seen from the 
Wahid administration, the president favoured a democratic resolution to the conflict 
which resulted in the 2000 Humanitarian Pause. When Megawati came to power, 
military operations were combined with peace talks but because some state segments 
(military and a number of political parties such as the PDI-P) grew increasingly 
impatient with the lack of progress, martial law was imposed. After the 2004 
elections, vice president Kalla re-introduced peace talks again. The state-in-society 
approach has captured the transformation of goals and behaviour from the three 
consecutive administrations well. 
Another element of the state-in-society approach that I found had useful implications 
was its assumptions about the state. The state-in-society approach assumes that the 
image of the state contradicts its actual practices. 
13 Thus, the state-in-society approach 
acknowledges that the state is not a cohesive unit. The main schools of state theory 
fail to acknowledge the potential disunity of the state. Marxists portray the state as a 
captive of the dominant classes or the regulator of class conflict. The state, thus, acts 
in a unified manner. The majority of pluralists, with the exception of group theorists, 
view the state as an arena for interests groups. Elitism views the state as a coherent 
instrument of state action. 
The case of East Timor provides a clear example of the incohesiveness of the state. In 
the period prior to the referendum up to the period where an international 
peacekeeping force was employed in the territory, the military showed considerable 
capacity via militias to disrupt the state's official action or in this instance the 
" Ibid, p. 49 
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referendum. This also occurred in Aceh under Megawati's administration. There was 
an established network of militias in Aceh each with links to the local district 
command. Such groups were used to attack international monitors during COHA in 
order to disrupt the peace talks. Under Wahid's administration, the military also 
criticised the peace talks. At that juncture, the military was in no position to carry out 
its goals to oppose the state's official action. It is not only the military that opposed 
peace deals with secessionist movements; parliamentarians have also endorsed 
tougher approaches in dealing with secessionism. The way these two state segments 
have opposed the state's official action illustrates the lack of cohesiveness within the 
state. 
However, the military has shown that it had the ability to take matters a step further 
while parliamentarians could at most criticise or utilise the failure of conflict 
resolution in election campaigns. The military's ability to disrupt the 1999 referendum 
in East Timor illustrates the point. Though the state-in-society approach has captured 
the conflict of interests amongst state segments well, the military as a dominant 
institution in many states, especially in Indonesia deserve more recognition as a 
leading actor as opposed to be treated as `an equal' among other state segments. 
Where the military's role has been dominant, there still remains a legacy of its 
involvement in politics. Indonesia is not a unique case where the military still plays a 
role in policy making though not as influential as before. States such as Pakistan also 
continue to have a military influence in politics. As a useful theory should possess an 
element of specificity, it might be worthwhile to make specifications about the 
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military, considering Migdal's aims to especially explain new states in Asia and 
Africa. '4 1 will return to this concern later in the chapter. 
However the assumptions on the state as an incohesive unit, though useful, are not 
novel according to many, such as the new institutionalists and group theorists. In his 
1988 volume, Migdal takes Max Weber's definition of the state: `it is an organization, 
composed of numerous agencies led and coordinated by the state's leadership 
(executive authority) that has the ability or the authority to make and implement the 
binding rules for all that people as well as the parameters of rule making for other 
social organizations in a given territory, using the use of force if necessary to have its 
. is way . 
However in his 1996 volume, Migdal distances himself from the Weberian definition 
of the state considering it unhelpful in capturing the realities of the state. It becomes 
an aim of his work to `present a new definition of the state in place of Max Weber's 
widely used one', which according to Migdal has `led scholars down sterile paths' 16. 
For Migdal, Weber's definition poses a few problems. 17 Firstly, the focus on 
monopoly does not capture situations `where authority is fragmented and 
contentious'. Secondly, the words used in Weber's definition of the state such as 
"legitimate" 'diverts attention from contending forms of authority or disgruntlement 
with dominant forms of authority'. Thirdly, using Weber's definition of the state as an 
ideal type does not capture the realities of state; therefore, the variation of states can 
only be measured as distant or some cases will be posed as a deviation of the 
1° Ibid, p. 5 
15 Migdal, Strong Societies and Weak States, p. 19 
16 Migdal, State in Society Studying How State and Societies Transform and Constitution One Another, 
F' 3 
[bid, p. 14-15 
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standard. " Based on these criticisms of the Weberian model, Migdal suggests a new 
definition of the state: The state is a field of power marked by the use and threat of 
violence and shaped by 1) the image of a coherent, controlling organization, which is 
a representation of its people bounded by that territory, and 2) the actual practices of 
its multiple parts" 9. 
This begs the question how the new definition has transformed the state-in-society 
approach. It does not. Though Migdal accepts Weber's definition of the state in his 
1988 book, he still argues that there are internal divisions and tensions within the 
state. 20 This is also reiterated in his 2001 book. Though Migdal's new definition does 
not transform his theory it does make it more consistent with his state-in-society 
approach. 
Although the assumptions of the fragmented state are not innovative, there are 
differences between the state-in-society and other approaches. As mentioned in 
Chapter One, Migdal's state-in-society approach shares many similarities with group 
theory. Both would agree that the policy is a result of interactions between social 
segments, or pressure groups according to group theorists, and the state apparatus. As 
such, both would agree that the state is fragmented. 
However, this is where the similarities end. There are two major differences between 
group theorists and the state-in-society approach concerning the state. Firstly, the 
state-in-society approach would agree that state segments are self-interested and may 
have their own agenda which in turn may play against the state's official action. On 
18 Ibid, p. 15 
19 Ibid, p. 16 
20 Migdal, Strong Societies and Weak States, chapter six 
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the other hand, group theorists would view the state as neutral which would not 
necessarily have its own agenda. Secondly, views diverge concerning the state's 
capacity to act. Both would agree that policies are a result of the interactions between 
the state and social forces indicating the state's limitations to act according to will. 
The state-in-society approach would acknowledge the state's relative autonomy. This 
occurs when social control is high; thus, the higher the levels of social control, the 
more capacity the state possesses to carry out its own actions. On the other hand, 
group theorists do not acknowledge state autonomy. Rather, the state is perceived as 
an arena for pressure group activity and interaction. 
Weaknesses of the State-in-Society Approach 
One of the problems I ran into when applying the state-in-society approach was its 
lack of determinacy and measurability. The state-in-society approach aims to identify 
and analyse patterns of domination and change. Domination is the recurring ways in 
which some use violence, threats, and other means to make others behave in ways 
they would not have otherwise chosen' and when and why this position of dominance 
changes. 21 
Social control is key to domination. As Migdal argues: `With high levels of social 
control, states can mobilize their populations effectively, gaining tremendous strength 
in facing external foes. Internally, state personnel can gain autonomy from social 
21 Ibid, p. 1 
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groups in determining their own preferred rules for society... ' 22 The measures that 
reflect the strength of social control are reflected in the following three: 
1) Compliance. The strength of the state is dependent on the extent the 
population will comply with the state's demands. 
2) Participation. The strength of the state is also enhanced by the ability to 
organise the population into specialised tasks. 
3) Legitimacy. According to the state-in-society approach, legitimacy involves 
the acceptance of the state's rules and its social control as `true and right'23. 
Based on the above, the greater the social control, the more the state can achieve in 
terms of their goals and how the rules of the game should be. 24 Social forces also use 
the same currency as do states to gain social control. When a state possesses high 
levels of social control, the state has more manoeuvrability to respond to secessionism 
and vice versa. Furthermore, parts of state can coalesce with social forces to 
strengthen their position in order to carry out their actions which may contradict the 
state's official action. Migdal predicts that struggles between the state and social 
forces will produce two outcomes. Integrated domination occurs when the state or 
society can establish nationwide domination. On the other hand, when neither the 
state nor society can establish nationwide domination, dispersed domination occurs. 
When operationalising the approach, I ran into problems of identifying the levels of 
social control especially in the instances of dispersed domination. As indeterminacy is 
problematic, the state-in-society approach lacks the power to predict outcomes. 
22 Migdal, Strong Societies and Weak States, p. 52 23 Ibid, p. 52 
24 Ibid, p. 52 
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Though still highly contested and diverse25, a theory within the social sciences 
become useful when it can 1) simplify the complexities of the real world in order to 
increase our control or enhance our adaptability and 2) provide us with a basis in 
order to make predictions or expectations about the world. 26 While predictability 
within a theory of political science is still one of those elements that remain 
contentious, the aims of the state-in-society approach were not only to explain but 
also to predict. Based on the approach, Migdal has suggested a few issues including: 
When social organisations besides the state exercise significant social control, how 
has the state's ability in different issue areas been affected? '27 As such, the `when' 
clearly indicates that Migdal has meant for the state-in-society approach to possess a 
certain degree of predictability. But because I did not know at what levels social 
control had to be in the cases of dispersed domination in combination with the 
vagueness and immeasurability of indicators of social control (compliance and 
legitimacy; and participation) I could not categorise and figure out the constellations 
in order to make predictions. 
To illustrate my point, my own project did not run into problems of indeterminacy 
during the Soeharto period where social control is widely accepted to be high. I found 
it easy to identify the extent of social control under the New Order because it was 
absolute. Corporatist institutions ensured participation. Participation in elections was 
an indicator that the population complied with state demands. High economic growth 
rates legitimised the New Order and its rules and norms as `true and right'. Various 
structures were in place to guarantee compliance from the population such as the 
25 Stephen Van Evera, Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science, (Ithaca and London: Cornell 
University Press, 1997), p. 7 
26 Jarol B. Manheim et al., Empirical Political Analysis Research Methods in Political Science, (New 
York and London: Longman, 2005), p. 15 
27 Migdal, State in society: studying how states and societies transform and constitute one another, p. 57 
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military. Corporatism where social forces were linked to a state institution illustrated 
the ability of the Indonesian state to command participation over the population. 
Soeharto's New Order was highly centralised and power was concentrated at the apex 
of the New Order elites. Popular support was either firmly behind the regime or social 
opposition was carefully managed as mentioned in Chapter Three. In all, the key 
strength of the New Order was the amount of autonomy it possessed to carry out its 
actions. There were also low levels of social opposition and incidents of opposition 
that did occur were dealt with swiftly and effectively. 
On the other extreme under the Habibie administration, there were low levels of social 
control as social forces possessed the ability to topple the state. Under both these 
governments, integrated domination had been achieved though by different actors. 
With the instance of the Soeharto government, the state achieved integrated 
domination over social forces. While during the Habibie administration, social forces 
achieved integrated domination. Because the degree of social control during these two 
periods was absolute and clear, regardless of whether social forces or the state were 
dominant, predictions could be made. 
I had anticipated a problem with indeterminacy with state society relations under post- 
Soeharto governments. Under these circumstances, the lack of clear indicators to 
show how much social control post-Soeharto governments possessed were difficult to 
identify. Overall, social control was lower in comparison to the New Order. Power 
was more dispersed and the state often had to take social demands into account. 
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The lack of clarity in applying the state-in-society approach to reality is illustrated in 
Dauvergne's edited volume `Weak and Strong States in Asia-Pacific Societies'. In 
this study, the authors of each individual case study have agreed to a general 
definition of the state. 28 However, other concepts such as capability, legitimacy, weak 
and strong are up to the discretion of each individual author. Though each of the 
authors are examining different political contexts but because they are dealing with 
different visions of weak and strong, the results showing whether the theory has any 
explanatory power according to each case study is questionable. If some results 
conclude that the theory lacks any useful implications, this will beg the question 
whether the theory failed to capture the realities of the political world because the 
results were skewed by the individual definitions set by the authors or whether the 
fault was in the theory itself. This may pose greater problems when applying the state- 
in-society approach to a cross-national comparative study especially when Migdal has 
made it one of his aims to `provide new and exciting answers to well-studied issues in 
comparative studies... '29 Not only because the concept of weak and strong are vague 
but also because the approach is a process-oriented approach; consequently, the 
concepts of weak and strong are situational and contextual. Because the concepts of 
weak and strong are fluid in relation to the context, the concepts cannot be 
standardised to make a cross-national comparison. 
Rather, I found that the state-in-society approach is more suited for capturing and 
simplifying the complexities of the world as opposed to making predictions. Though I 
ran into problems of indeterminacy concerning social control, the state-in-society 
approach assumes that the state and society are mutually empowering. 
28 Dauvergne, (ed. ), Weak and Strong States in Asia-Pacific Societies, p. 2 
29 Migdal, State in Society Studying How State and Societies Transform and Constitution One Another, 
p. 3 
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The concept of mutual empowerment was a reaction to statist claims where the state is 
viewed as crucial to socio-economic change. 30 The concept of mutual empowerment 
is also reiterated by Peter Evans in `Embedded Autonomy: States and Industrial 
Transformation' where he criticises the idea of zero-sum power relations between the 
state and society. Mutual empowerment in the case of managing secessionism was 
just as institutionalised as instances such as economic development under the New 
Order where there was strong support from the public and the business sector 
cooperated with the state under corporatist institutions. 
Because subnationalism is a feeling specific to a particular group, other state 
segments and social forces are unlikely to join forces with secessionist groups to 
oppose the state. Therefore, it had been clear that various other social groups and state 
segments would not support an independent state of Aceh or of East Timor while a 
great deal of others were indifferent to how the state manages secessionism; thus, at 
the very least these groups did not oppose the state's initiatives in managing 
secessionism. Whether or not other social forces within the Indonesian supported 
state's means-peace negotiations or military action- in managing secessionism, there 
was a widespread interest within Indonesia to maintain security and prevent 
Balkanisation. Opinion polls have shown increased support for Megawati in her tough 
measures against the GAM. 31 The approach is most likely to work well with 
secessionism because nationalism of a particular group is unlikely to gain support 
from other social forces. 
30 For example see Evans, Rueschemeyer, Skocpol, Bringing the state back in 
31 Anthony L. Smith, `Indonesia's Aceh Problem: Measuring International and Domestic Costs, Asia- 
PaciTc Center for Security Studies, Vol. 2, No. 5, July 2003, p. 3 
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However in other policy areas such as trade agreements which may benefit some and 
disadvantage others, the outcome of a struggle between the state and society will most 
likely become less predictable due to problems with measurability and indeterminacy 
of social control. The concern here would be how many groups of social forces and 
state segments would have to join forces in order for this coalition to successfully 
carry out their actions? 
With the case of managing secessionism in Aceh and East Timor, I have argued that 
the majority of social forces would endorse its policies for the sake of security and to 
maintain the territorial boundaries. However, there are other social forces within the 
archipelago in distant islands on the eastern side where secessionism in Aceh seems 
like a distant issue of their concerns. In my final assessment of the situation, I argue 
that the social forces that do endorse state action in Aceh and other secessionist areas 
as illustrated in the polls. If we were to accept that certain groups can enhance the 
state's capacity to carry out its action, this leads to another related question. Are all 
social forces equal in terms of power or what they have to offer to the state in order to 
enhance state capacity? Or if we were to assume that different state segments (such as 
the military in the cases of Aceh and East Timor) and social forces possess different 
capacities, would it be a matter of which state segments or social forces would have to 
coalesce to successfully achieve their goals? As such, would the state seek support 
from certain groups more then others in order to enhance its capacity to carry out its 
goals? 
Based on a collection of essays applying the state-in-society approach, authors of the 
edited volume, State Power and Social Forces: domination and transformation in the 
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Third World, have concluded that power is somewhat similar to wealth which can in 
turn be divided or accumulated. Some groups may possess more power than others. 32 
On this note, neo-pluralists share such concerns which came as a result of criticisms 
of pluralism which failed to take note of inequality amongst groups. Here, the neo- 
pluralists developed an argument that business interests are given more importance in 
comparison to other social interests. 33 For the state-in-society theorists, this resource 
of power within society varies according to conditions such as the state's capacity to 
'penetrate and centrally coordinate the activities' of that society, the organisation and 
consciousness of these groups, and most to the extent where of the state elites and 
these social groups can converge. 34 This point has not been developed further and 
seemed to have lost its importance in Migdal's later 2001 volume, State in Society 
Studying How State and Societies Transform and Constitution One Another. 
A useful theory is one that has a certain degree of generality that can be applied to 
other relevant cases. 35 If generality concerns the different phenomenon that the theory 
can account for36, the state-in-society approach can be classified as general. The state- 
in-society approach does have room to manoeuvre in a variety of different social 
contexts. This flexibility according to context has been deemed more suitable than 
approaches that are more restrictive. 
37 Though flexibility and manoeuvrability within 
the approach can address a variety of contexts and situations; this leads to a concern 
32 Migdal, Kohli, and Shue (eds. ), State Power and Social Forces: domination and transformation in 
the Third World, p. 321 
33 Dunleavy and O'Leary, Theories of the State the politics of liberal democracy, p. 293 
34 Migdal, Kohli, and Shue (eds. ), State Power and Social Forces: domination and transformation in 
the Third World, p. 321-322 
31 Michael Coppedge, `Theory Building and Hypothesis Testing: Large- vs. Small- N Research on 
Democratization', Paper prepared for presentation at the Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political 
Science Association, Chicago, Illinois, April 2-27,2002, p. 2 
36 Will H. Moore, `Evaluating Theory in Political Science', Unpublished paper, 9 August 2001, 
http: //garnet. acns. fsu. edu/-whmoore/researchpapers. html, accessed 6 June 2006 
37 Migdal, Kohli, and Shue (eds. ), State Power and Social Forces: domination and transformation in 
the Third World, p. 319 
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that the approach is too general and lacks specificity. It accounts for the effectiveness 
of the state, policy outcomes, state disunity and the interactions between state 
segments and social forces. 
I have illustrated that the state-in-society lacked predictability power. However, the 
approach still captures the mutual empowerment between the state segments within 
the state and social forces to oppose the secessionist movements. In order to explain 
these phenomena within different states, with different social forces, interacting in 
different policy areas, in different times; the state-in-society approach has simplified 
its explanations to capsulate and explain the different situations. As such, with its 
generality comes simplicity. However, oversimplified assumptions run into the risk of 
trading off its accuracy for simplicity. As Michael Coppedge argues: `Only a complex 
theory can begin to approximate the richness of reality'38. 
Even though simplifying the world of politics is what most political scientists set out 
to do, it is generally accepted that universal rules are impossible to form due to the 
nature and complexity of the world of politics. 
39 If we accept that the world of politics 
is complex, then a theory of political science should then be falsifiable. 40 As such, 
challenge for a theorist to construct a theory that maintains a balance between a 
certain degree of generality and also a degree of specificity. It should be `specific 
enough so that it is clear what evidence is required to determine whether the evidence 
41 is consistent or inconsistent with the implications'. 
38 Coppedge, `Theory Building and Hypothesis Testing: Large- vs. Small- N Research on 
Democratization', p. 3 
39 Ibid, p. 2 
40 Moore, `Evaluating Theory in Political Science', p. 3; Van Evera, Guide to Methods for Students of 
Political Science, p. 20 
41 Moore, `Evaluating Theory in Political Science', p. 3 
273 
Returning to the two cases, though the military has illustrated that it possesses the 
capacity that exceeds other segments within the state, the state-in-society makes 
general assumptions on segments within the state opposing the state's official action 
which does explain the instances within both cases because of its generality. Because 
the state-in-society approach focussed on the interactions between the state and 
society, it never specified issues such as resources that might in turn strengthen state 
effectiveness. 
The examples from applying the state-in-society approach indicate that the theory is 
potentially an all-encompassing theory. Combined with vagueness of terms such as 
dispersed domination, the theory has more manoeuvrability to capture the realities of 
the world of politics. If this is the case does this make the state-in-society approach a 
non-falsifiable theory? Because my comparative study can only be classified as a 
small-N (which consists of two case studies with seven instances between the two), I 
am not in the position to make any firm conclusions, though the findings of both the 
cases seem to indicate that the state-in-society approach is non-falsifiable. 
Suggestions for the State-in-Society Approach 
I have questioned the difference in abilities of various groups to act. In this section, I 
propose that the military should be given special consideration due to its capacity and 
relative autonomy to carry out its own initiatives to disrupt the state's official action. 
The suggestions are aimed to add specificity to the state-in-society approach and 
enhance its explanatory power. However, due to the limited number of instances in 
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this comparison, I do not claim to propose law-like regularities. My goal is perhaps 
less ambitious than Migdal's. While he aims to present an approach suitable for all 
Asian and African states, I remain fairly reserved in my goal. I aim to propose certain 
observations and implications that may have further implications for other cases of 
secessionism. 
The position of the military within the state 
The first of my concerns is the position of the military within the state-in-society 
approach. The military as a dominant institution in many states especially in 
Indonesia deserve more recognition as a leading actor as opposed to being treated as 
an equal' among other state segments. One of the strong points of the state-in-society 
approach is that it assumes that the practices of the state often times contradict the 
cohesive image of the state. This suggests that the state's final output might diverge 
from the state's official action. Migdal argues that social organisations may coalesce 
with one another or with parts of the state, or parts of the state can join forces with 
one another to oppose the state's official action. 
42 I identified a few state segments, 
including certain political parties such as the PDI-P and Golkar as well as the military, 
that often opposed the state's official action when it was perceived to be `too soft'. 
However, my findings also show that the military had the capacity to carry out its own 
initiatives to disrupt the state's official action. A clear example of this would be how 
the military possessed the capacity to disrupt the internationally backed referendum 
without having to coalesce with other parts of the state or any other social force. If the 
military were to be recognised as an actor among state segments which possesses 
42 Migdal, State in society: studying how states and societies transform and constitute one another, p. 11-22 
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greater capacity than others to carry out its actions, this would also in turn enhance the 
complexity of the theory. 
Based on the findings of the two cases, the military has exemplified its ability to 
oppose the state despite the state's initiatives to limit the military's power. There are 
numerous accounts where the military defied the state's official action and embarked 
on its own initiatives in Aceh and East Timor. Furthermore though democratisation 
has in part curtailed the military's direct influence in politics, in my final assessment I 
conclude that the military adapted well to the new situation especially when the 
civilian governments have failed to address the military's territorial structure. This 
tells us that the military's ability to adapt to situation cannot be underestimated and 
the military as a relatively independent actor with the capacity to carry out its actions 
cannot be undermined. The outcomes in democratising the military under the different 
presidencies in Indonesia also show that success is varied. 
The armed forces in all countries exercise a certain degree political influence. 43 If we 
subscribe to this view, this should not disrupt the aims of the state-in-society approach 
which is intended to explain the complexities of new Asian and African states. This 
political influence may vary according to time and place. In the case of Indonesia, the 
military has long had a dominant role in Indonesia's politics and society. It is not 
uncommon for many countries, including Indonesia, for their militaries to have a 
continuous role in politics. 44 As mentioned in Chapter Four, despite attempts to bring 
43 Eric A. Nordlinger, Soldiers in Politics Military Coups and Governments, (London: Prentice- 
Hall, 1977), p. 3 
44 S. E. Finer, The Man on Horseback the role of the military in politics, (London: Pall Mall Press, 
1962), p. 3 
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the armed forces under democratic control in many states, the military rarely becomes 
subordinate to the civilian government. 
The military perceives itself as the defender of the nation. Unlike parliamentarians 
that are nationalistic in their outlook such as the majority of members of the Golkar 
party and PDI-P, the Indonesian armed forces possess the ability to carry out its own 
initiatives which it sees fit when they perceive official state action in managing 
secessionism could potentially lead to the destruction of national unity. As S. E. Finer 
argues, the armed forces have three advantages over other civilian institutions within 
the state. The armed forces possess `a marked superiority in organization, a highly 
emotionalized symbolic status, and a monopoly of arms' 45 
The case of East Timor illustrates this well. The military had the resources at hand to 
carry out its operations to disturb any plans which it perceived to be detrimental to 
national unity. The Indonesian military even had the financial resources to fund 
militias in East Timor to portray an image of a territory incapable of self-rule. The 
military's financial autonomy, which contributed to its capacity to carry out its action, 
has much to do with its relative autonomy from the central government's budget. This 
is because the military has its own capacity to raise funds. This capacity has been 
facilitated since the 1950s when the territorial structure was institutionalised which 
entrenched the military's presence in the regions both politically and economically. 46 
While combining Migdal's assumptions about the state and based on my own 
findings, I propose that the parts of the state may coalesce with social forces to 
contradict the state's official action but the military is the institution that possesses the 
43 Ibid, p. 6 
46 Mietzner, The Politics of Military Reform in Post-Suharto Indonesia: Elite Conflict, Nationalism, 
and Institutional Resistance, p. 4 
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resources and the capacity to carry out its own initiatives to contradict the state's 
official action. 
While Finer's proposed three advantages rings true for many militaries as well as 
Indonesia, I found the Indonesian military on a number of occasions was confined by 
context. In other words, though the military possesses advantages over other civilian 
institutions, this does not necessarily mean that the military has the capacity to act 
according to will or possesses the autonomy independent of other state segments or 
social forces. After disrupting the referendum, the military was confined by its 
wounded reputation both domestically and internationally. However this soon 
changed during Wahid's impeachment and Megawati's subsequent ascendance to 
power. 
In retrospect, the military opposed the state's official action when it perceived 
governmental initiatives as a threat to the unity of the nation. Incidents where the 
military have disrupted the state's official action included conducting the referendum 
in East Timor under Habibie and COHA under Megawati. The military was 
emboldened towards the end of Wahid's tenancy when the president's position was 
duly weakened and he was subsequently impeached. Learning from her predecessor's 
experience, Megawati became dependent on the military for political survival. 
Consequently, the extent that post-Soeharto governments could fulfil their demands 
also was highly dependent on the relationship with the military. 
The extent to which the military becomes politicised is dependent on the weakness of 
the civilian political leaders' organisations and their inability to deal with the 
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country's problems. 47 This in turn makes it difficult for the civilian leadership to 
control the military if civilians are divided. Once civilian disunity occurs there is a 
temptation to bring the military to support a particular civilian faction. 48 The SBY- 
Kalla leadership provides the counterfactual. SBY-Kalla defied any opposition and 
was more prepared to defend their policies. This is due to less fragmentation and 
Kalla's relatively strong position within the Indonesian polity including the military. 
Indonesia's civil-military relations are characterised by what Samuel Huntington's 
terms as a lack of `objective civilian control'49. This entails a high level of military 
professionalism, the subordination of the military under civilian control where the 
civilian government are the decision-makers on foreign and military policy and the 
recognition of the military as professional, competent and autonomous. When these 
three criteria are met, the results are the minimisation of the military in politics and 
the political intervention of the military. Hence, I propose that the military needs to be 
regarded as a 'special' institution within the state, which has relative autonomy and 
the capacity to oppose the state's official action in absence of coalitions among other 
state segments or social forces. Based on Huntington's assumptions, whether the 
military will intervene or oppose the state's official is dependent on its 
professionalism. The more professional the military, the less likely it will intervene in 
the state's official action. 
47 Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies, p. 221 
48 Michael C. Desch, `Threat Environments and Military Missions', Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner 
(eds. ), Civil-Military Relations and Democracy, (Baltimore and London: The John Hopkins University 
Press, 1996). p. 14 
49 Samuel P. Huntington, `Reforming Civil-Military Relations', Diamond and Plattner (eds. ), Civil- 
Military Relations and Democracy, p. 3 
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Implications 
Though to a certain degree the dynamics between the state and a secessionist 
movement is path-dependent, it should not prevent or hinder anyone undertaking 
further research on the issue. If we are to accept that no theory can capture the 
complexities of the world of politics, there should be no question why we should not 
generate theories or approaches to capture the complexities of the dynamics of 
secessionism. Rather, I propose observations or patterns that may have useful 
implications to other cases in the area of secessionism in process. 
Though there are difficulties in theorising the dynamics between the secessionist 
movement and the state in a three level of analysis due the contextual nature of 
ethnicity and the unpredictability of external involvement, this does not mean the 
generalisations and theories are useless and fail to capture the complexities of the 
realities of the world of politics. Theories in principle are falsifiable. 50 Theories still 
has its uses in simplifying, explaining and in some cases predicting reality. As such, 
theories should still be generated to help us make sense of the complexities of the 
world. There is a lack of comparative studies on ethnic conflicts which help provide 
useful insights. In turn, these commonalities can help solve or implement certain 
policy issues concerning managing ethnic conflict management. Comparative studies 
on ethnic conflicts are lacking within the literature on Indonesia. Bertrand's 
comparative study on ethnic conflict within Indonesia is the only existing comparative 
study which offers an explanation to why ethnic conflicts emerge at specific times in 
specific spaces. 
50 Van Evera, Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science, p. 20 
280 
Based on my findings I have made firm statements on the certain issues while I have 
not on others. Though some have argued that the usefulness of a small-N comparative 
is limited to generated hypothesis, 51 I claim that my findings and conclusions have 
other helped contribute to the academic literature in various ways. Firstly, though I 
am reluctant to assert any law-like regularities due to the limited number of case 
studies, my findings of my case studies have in turn reinforced elements of other 
general theories within sub-disciplines of politics such as civil-military relations. On 
the other hand, in other areas such as state theory, my findings have both reinforced 
some arguments surrounding the debates within state theory while throwing some 
assumptions into question. Secondly, this study has maintained a balance between 
making generalisations based on my cases while maintaining contextual details of 
each case. As such, theories are enhanced and contextual detail is not necessarily 
compromised. Here, I have contributed to the empirical realities of my two case 
studies while making generalisations based on my findings. These in turn could also 
be used to generate hypotheses which may have useful implications for other cases. 
Though I aimed to find a theoretical explanation as to why the two secessionist 
movements resulted in two different outcomes, my thesis also highlighted a few other 
implications. Firstly, it flagged up the lack of literature or theoretical explanations 
which incorporates a three level of analysis of centre-regional relations. Or more 
specifically, exploring what limits or enhances the capacity of the state and a 
secessionist movement to act and respond to one another. There are an abundance of 
state theories that offer a theoretical explanation of the capacity of the state. As 
51 Peters, Comparative Politics: Theory and Methods, p. 69 
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mentioned in the previous chapter, authors such as Mann and Weiss argue that the 
capacity of the state is dependent on the area in which it seeks to act. On the other 
hand, there is gap in the literature when it comes to exploring the capacity of a 
secessionist movement. The findings of my case studies can hopefully offer a starting 
point or indicators to measure the strength or weakness of a movement. However, my 
own indicators show that East Timor (minus international involvement) and Aceh are 
both weak movements in relation to the Indonesian state. Other cases in process could 
also generate further research and findings. 
The gap, or lack, in the literature highlights the need to converge the two into a more 
dynamic framework which should capture the on-going dynamics between the state 
and a secessionist movement. The main schools that study nationalism- the 
primordialists, the ethno-symbolists and the modernists- concentrate predominantly 
on the causal factors of nationalism. As a result, these theories fail to capture the 
interactions beyond the emergence of nationalism. Comparative studies of the 
dynamics between Jakarta and ethnic movements such as my own and Bertrand's 
book, Nationalism and ethnic conflict in Indonesia, have both relied on state theory. 
Other movements in process, such as that in Papua, may also pose an interesting 
comparator with Aceh considering a common political context between the two. The 
OPM has been considered to be less organised as a secessionist movement than GAM. 
Though there is support for independence, it has been argued that the overall 
movement is disunited due to ethnic division and lacks strong leadership. It is a 
relatively weak movement because it does not have any control of a particular area 
within Papua. The armed wing of the movement possesses a few modern weapons 
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between them, but making more use of traditional bows and arrows in attacks. As 
such, the movement does not really pose a security threat to the military. 52 
Ethnicity is still a fluid concept and unpredictable within itself. The capacity of the 
state to manage ethnic relations is in flux. The occasional external involvement in 
secessionist conflict is also unpredictable. The uncertainties of the elements, which 
are involved in secessionism as well as ethnic conflicts, should not deter scholarship 
or further research on the matter. The fluid nature of centre-regional relations should 
continue to be explored to reveal useful implications for the sake of stability and 
security in many parts of the world. 
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